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This Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-
3(2)(a) and 34a-l-303(6) of the Utah Code. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues in this case are: 
1. Whether this Court should overturn the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
La Jeneause, in favor of the prior Findings Of Fact, Determination And Order, by Bel 
Randal, and Joseph Gallegos Jr, Director Utah Labor Commission, and Utah 
Antidiscrimination & Labor Division for Robin Burgener, dated April 17, 2000, based on 
the conclusions from the extensive investigation and evidence acquired and evaluated, 
which found that Petitioner/Appellant Robin F. Burgener was a disabled person within 
the meaning of the American Disability Act (ADA) and the Utah Antidiscrimination Act 
for the period of March 24,1997 thru September 24, 1997, the time frame the 
discrimination events occurred. 
2. Whether this Court should find that the Administrative Law Judge La Jeneause 
erred when he based his determination on Burgener's medical and psychological status in 
2002 and 2003, rather than the "actual condition at the time of the discrimination, that 
time frame being between March 24, 1997 and September 24,1997, a full five years 
prior. 
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3. Whether this Court should find that Burgener did in fact meet the criteria and 
the definition that she was a disabled person within the meaning of the American 
Disability Act (ADA) and the Utah Antidiscrimination Act for the period of March 24, 
1997 thru September 24,1997, the time frame the discrimination events occurred. 
4. Whether this Court should find that LabCorp did in fact regard Burgener as 
disabled person within the meaning of the American Disability Act (ADA) and the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Act for the period of March 24, 1997 thru September 24, 1997, the 
time frame the discrimination events occurred. 
5. Whether this Court should find that Burgener's argument "that she was 
"regarded as" disabled" was properly preserved for appeal. 
6. Whether this Court should find that LabCorp's Counsel has made several 
statements that were in error and misleading to both The Commission and The Court 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1960, as Amended, (ADA) 
Utah Anti-discrimination Act of 1965, as Amended. (UALD) 
Utah Code 34-A-5-101 et seq. 
Utah Code 34-A-5-102(5) 
Utah Code 34-A-5-106(l) 
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34A-5-107(5)(d), U.C.A. 
Utah Code 34A-5-106 
Utah Antidiscrimination Act of 1965, U.C.A. 34A-5-101 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. 
28 C.F.R. §36.104. 
American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(now the fourth edition, DSM-IV) 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) field offices on July 26, 1999. 
Utah Labor Commission Director of the Anti-discrimination and Labor Division, Joseph 
Gallegos Jr. (76-86) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the CascCourse of Proceedings and Disposition Prior. 
On September 23, 1997, Burgener filed a complaint with the EEOC and the 
UALD charging that she was discriminated against based on her diagnosed disability of; 
Major Depression, Anxiety Disorder (with Severe Panic Attacks), and Sleep Disorder 
and thatLabCorp failed to provide Burgener with the reasonable accommodations 
Burgener was entitled to as a disabled person within the meaning of the Utah Anti-
discrimination Act and that her termination effective September 24,1997, violated The 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1960, as Amended, and the Utah Anti-discrimination 
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Act of 1965, as Amended. 
On May 5, 1999 a fact finding conference hearing was scheduled by the Utah 
Labor Commission, Anti-discrimination and Labor Division to determine "the merits of 
the Charge of Discrimination''; and "whether the respondent (LabCorp) should be ordered 
to provide relief to the Charging Party (Robin Burgener) as authorized by Section 
". LabCorp requested a continuance. The initial hearing was finally conducted on May 
18, 1999 
At the conclusion of that hearing as well as an extensive investigation conducted 
by Bel J. Randall, Presiding Officer of the Anti-discrimination and Labor Division, a 
Findings Of Facts and Determination was submitted for review and re-evaluated by both 
his immediate supervisor, and the Utah Labor Commission Director of the Anti-
discrimination and Labor Division, Joseph Gallegos Jr. (76-86). It is important to note 
that the merits and facts of Burgener's case passed all three individuals re-evaluations, 
and all three concurred with the decision. On April 17,2000 a Determination was issued 
which concluded that: "the evidence is sufficient for the Division to conclude that the 
Respondent (LabCorp) failed to provide reasonable accommodation to the Charging Party 
(Robin Burgener) and that the Charging Party (Robin Burgener) was subsequently 
discharged resultant from her disability". " The evidence is also sufficient for the 
Division to conclude that the Respondent's (LabCorp) position that not having provided a 
reasonable accommodation in the form of a transfer to the day shift Medical Technologist 
position was she not qualified is unworthy of credence." (76-86) 
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On May 5,2000 LabCorp wrote a letter of formal request to appeal the Order 
dated April 17,2000. 
On August 7-8,2001, hearing. Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse held an 
evidentiary hearing. On April 25, 2002 (and a full five years after the discrimination by 
LabCorp), AdministrativeLaw Judge La Jeunesse issued an Order of Denial to Burgener 
on which he wrongly reversed the prior Decision and Order by the adjudication division 
of the Utah Labor Commission stating the reason to be because: 
"Ms. Burgener factually and legally(failed to) qualify as disabled under 
provisions of Utah Code 34A-5-106". 
The rational used to derive at that conclusion was and I quote: 
"Ms Burgener's initial onset of depression and anxiety in fact constituted an 
impairment that substantially limited her with respect to the major life activities of: 
(1) sleep; (2) self care; (3) parenting, and; (4) management of her household. However, 
after the first six weeks following the death of her mother, Ms. Burgener successfully 
corrected avd mitigated her depression with Prozac" 
Burgener filed a Motion for Review on May 25,2002 and received 
.a denial in August, 2002. Burgener filed a motion for reconsideration on September 19, 
2002 which also was denied on October 31,2002. 
Burgener then filed a petition for review with the Utah Court of Appeals and 
assigned appellative court number 20021000-CA, on November 29,2002. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Burgener worked over six years for LabCorp as a Medical Laboratory Technician in 
the Hematology department at the Murray, Utah facility. After earning an Associated of 
Science Degree in Clinical Laboratory Sciences and successfully completing the Association 
Society of Clinical Pathology, Registry, 
Burgener worked the graveyard shift , running from 8:00 p.m. to 6:30 a.m., and 
without complaint over the next five years, she received excellent performance evaluations 
describing her as a "excellent employee" "a valuable assef' and a "very competent, thorough 
and accurate employee". Burgener had been full time employed at LabCorp for over six 
years, and was folly vested in the company. Subsequent to her Mother's death, 
Burgener took three days bereavement between March 24th, 1997 and March 27th, 1997.. 
Burgener attempted to return to work on Friday, March 28th, 1997, and had an emotional 
"breakdown" at work. She started crying uncontrollably and told supervisor Yvonne 
Hendrick's that she "thought she was losing her mind". Burgener tried resting for a spell 
then returning to work, but was still unable to focus, concentrate, or remember what she was 
doing. Burgener was still experiencing severe Anxiety and Panic Attacks. She was sent 
home by her supervisor, Yvonne Hendrickson. 
Burgener attempted to return to work the following night, and was again 
unsuccessful. Burgener was still unable to think clearly, had found herself uncontrollably 
crying, and had feelings of both hopelessness and helplessness, while at same time feelings 
of uncontrollably panic attacks.. She was again sent home by her supervisor, who had told 
6 
her that and that she needed to go to her doctor for an evaluation prior to attempting to 
return to her duties for the third time. Burgener saw her family physician, Dr. Douglas 
Douville on April 3rd, 1997.. Burgener reported to her doctor, the feelings of hopelessness 
and helplessness and how she was suffered from insomnia physical and emotional 
exhaustion.. 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
A. First, LabCorp claims that there lacked sufficient evidentiary basis to find that 
Burgener was a qualified individual with a disability under the Act. LabCorp argues that 
Burgener's disability is "neither permanent nor long term" 
First, it is undisputed by all parties, the Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse's 
findings and order stated "Ms Burgener's initial onset of depression and anxiety in fact 
constituted an impairment that substantially limited her with respect to the major life 
activities of: (1) sleep; (2) self care; (3) parenting, and; (4) management of her 
household". 
Burgener's disability determination should have been actual condition at the time of the 
discrimintion, that being from March 24, 1997 thru September 24, 1997. 
The U.S. EEOC's Directive for Analyzing whether a "disabled person" within the 
meaning of the Act states 
The Court also emphasized that the disability determination must be based on a 
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person's actual condition at the time of the alleged discrimination the Supreme Court 
emphasized that, consistent with EEOC's position, the determination of whether a person 
has a "disability" must be made on a case-by-case basis 
Speculation regarding whether the person would have been substantially limited if s/he 
used a mitigating measure is irrelevant. 
Given those directives, Burgener's determination must be made evaluating 
whether she was a disabled person's based on her actual condition at the time of the 
discrimination, from March 24, 1997 thru September 24,1997, and not retrospectively 
in 2002 2003 after an extensive appeal process, now almost 7 years later, 
Secondly, based on that, Burgener was entitled to the reasonable accommodation 
LabCorp failed to provide Burgener with the reasonable accommodation of a transfer 
from the graveyard shift to a day shift. LabCorp concedes that a daytime position was 
vacant throughout the period during which Burgener was requesting a transfer, but stated 
that Ms. Burgener was not qualified for the position that she requested. The late part of 
August and early of September, 1997, Burgener applied for a day shift Medical 
Technologist position in the Hematology Department at the Murray facility. 
Burgener was not selected reportedly because she did not have a four year degree, 
and therefore, reportedly, did not meet the minimum qualifications for the position. 
However, it is important to note that LabCorp selected another employee for that same 
Medical Technologist position who did not meet the minimum qualifications in that she 
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also did not have a four year degree. LabCorp's rationale for selecting another employee 
for the position in question was that even though the employee did not meet the minimum 
qualifications for the position, she was assigned the position temporarily because she had 
experience working in the Hematology Department. Burgener had been employeed by 
LabCorp in the Hematology Department continuously from August 26th, 1991 as a full 
time Medical Laboratory Technician, thus had six (6) years experience. LabCorp asserted 
that Burgener did not have the necessary experience and therefore, was not as qualified as 
the selected employee and that Ms. Burgener would have required some additional 
training to make her proficient in the position. In addition, LabCorp further asserted that 
there are certain functions which the selected employee could not perform because she is 
not a Medical Technologist. LabCorp stated those functions are assigned to other Medical 
Technologists from other Departments. 
A review of the selected employee's performance file and her appraisal dated 
November 12,1997, reflects the employee needed additional training to become 
proficient in this temporary assignment5\ Insert source pg . A review of Burgener's 
employment history and educational level, reflects she had the same two year degree, 
a degree in Clinical Laboratory Science, fulfilled all of the knowledge and 
competency requirements to be certified as a Medical Laboratory Technician by the 
Board Of Registry, American Society of Clinical Pathologist. In addition, Ms, 
Burgener had more experience as a Medical Laboratory Technician and had been 
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employed by LabCorp longer than the selected employee. Furthermore, LabCorp's 
representatives testified at the initial hearing, that Burgener was an excellent employee. 
The preponderance of the evidence clearly shows that both Dr's Douville and 
Castleton repeatedly and continuously wrote notes to LabCorp stating that Ms. Burgener 
was unable to return to work on the graveyard shift, and that Ms, Burgener needed a 
transfer to the day shift. .Dr. Douville wrote EIGHT Notes to LabCorp repeatedly 
telling them [ LabCorp] that Burgener needed to transfer to a day shift. Dr.Castleton 
wrote THREE Notes, 1 letter and verbally reported to LabCorp (as LabCorp's 
Employee Assistance provider and evaluator for employee's fitness for duty), on a regular 
basis, each time reemphasizing Burgener's inabiUty to work graveyard shift and the need 
for Burgener to transfer to a day shift. In addition, Burgener formally asked LabCorp for 
a transfer to a day shift from the graveyard shift over 16 times. 
LabCorp made no determined attempt to provide a reasonable accommodation for 
Burgener by allowing her to under fill the day shift Medical Technologist position. The 
record further reflects LabCorp allowed another Medical Technician to under fill the 
position but did not consider Burgener. despite her superior qualifications. In addition, 
LabCorp provided no evidence to suggest that to allow Ms. Burgener to under fill the 
position would have created an undue hardship. LabCorp's position has been that 
Burgener would have required additional training to be proficient in the position. The 
record reflects that the employee who was ultimately placed in the position also required 
additional training. Furthermore, the temporary assignment which was given to Medical 
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Technician began in September, 1997 and continued until the incumbent resigned her 
full time employment with LabCorp, in February, 1999. 
LabCorp acknowledges that a daytime positions was open throughout all the 
events of this case prior to her termination, and that Burgener had applied for it 
Under the circumstances, the ADA requires that LabCorp transfer Burgener to a 
vacant daytime position. Although the ADA does not obligate employers to "bump" other 
employees or create new positions, sec. 12111(9) of the ADA requires an employer to 
reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position for which the employee is otherwise 
qualified. See Qile. 95 F. 3d at 499: Hendricks-Robinson. 154 F3d at694-95: Dalton v. 
Subaru-Isuzu Automotive. Inc.. 141 F.3d 667. 678 (7th Cir. 1998): DePaoliv. Abbott 
Laboratories. 140 F 3d 668. 675 (7th Cir. 1998). The employer is obligated to "identify 
the full range of alternative positions for which the individual satisfies the employer's 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory prerequisites" and consider "transferring the employee to 
any of these other jobs. 1 Dalton. 141F. 3d gt 678. is wrong to say that it constitutes 
"affirmative action" to reassign Burgener to a vacant position for which she was entitled 
by equal qualifications and seniority and which would have accommodated her disability. 
Although the ADA does not require the employer to abandon its legitimate policies 
regarding job qualifications and entitlements to company transfers, LabCorp cannot 
seriously claim that the procedural requirement of selecting the other employee with 
exactly the same educational credentials and less seniority was too important for LabCorp 
to bypass when a daytime position was open and Burgener had applied for it. In 
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Hendricks-Robinson. the defendant's policy of posting job openings and insisting that 
disabled employees independently learn of and apply for new positions was insufficient 
to satisfy the employer's duty under the ADA to investigate the possibility of transferring 
disabled employees,. Hendricks-Robinson. 154 F3dat694. LabCorp did not notify or 
invite Burgener of the posted position opening. Burgener saw it posted on the bulletin 
board one of the many times she went into Human Resources requesting a transfer to a 
day shift. Likewise, LabCorp failed its duty of reasonable accommodation because it 
took no action other than to reject Burgener's request. By refusing her request and 
assuming no further duty to accommodate her requests for a shift transfer LabCorp failed 
its ADA obligation. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently issued its Enforcement 
Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation. Under the ADA, employers with 15 or more 
employees must provide "reasonable accommodation" to qualified disabled individuals 
unless doing so would cause "undue hardship." According to the Guidance, workplace 
barriers can prevent otherwise qualified disabled people from applying for or performing 
jobs that they could do with some accommodation. 
The Guidance states that the burden is on the applicant or employee to request an 
accommodation. However, the disabled individual does not have to use any "magic" 
words or mention the ADA specifically to request an accommodation. 
Nevertheless, the employee must give the employer enough information to put the 
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employer on notice that he needs an accommodation. 
If an employee has not asked for an accommodation, you do not have to inquire 
whether one is needed. However, the Guidance suggests that you should broach the 
subject with an employee who is having difficulty performing a job function if you know 
the employee has a disability and you think the problem is related to the disability. 
The Guidance also emphasizes that accommodation requests do not have to be in 
writing. The employer may ask the disabled individual to submit a request in writing but 
may not ignore any verbal requests. 
Once an employee or applicant has requested an accommodation, the Guidance 
indicates that you should determine the following: (1) whether the accommodation is 
needed; (2) if needed, whether it would be effective; 
The Guidance states that reassignment should be to a position that is equivalent in 
pay, status, and benefits. If the disability or need for accommodation is not apparent, the 
Guidance explains that the ADA allows employers to ask questions concerning the nature 
of the disability and the person's limitations. In addition, you may require documentation 
from a medical professional regarding the existence of the disability and the need for 
accommodation, but the documentation request must be limited to these two issues. Thus, 
you cannot ask for all of the individual's medical records or for information on 
disabilities that do not need accommodation however. You can't ask for documentation if 
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(1) both the disabiUty and need for accommodation are obvious; or (2) the individual has 
already provided sufficient information to show that he has a disability and needs 
accommodation. 
Burgener's family physician provided eight notes to LabCorp, specifying that 
Burgener had a disability of Depression, Anxiety Disorder, Panic Disorder, and Sleep 
Disorder. 
Burgener's therapist Dr Donna,Moxley-Castleton, provided three notes, one letter, 
and numerous verbal contacts to LabCorp, specifying that Burgener had a disability of 
Depression, Anxiety Disorder, Panic Disorder, and Sleep Disorder. Dr Donna,Moxley-
Castleton, also specified that Burgener5 s needed a transfer from the graveyard shift to a 
day shift position because of her disability of depression. Anxiety Disorder, Panic 
Disorder, and Sleep Disorder. 
Burgener, herself told Vickie Romero of her disability and her need for the 
reasonable accommodation in excess of sixteen (16) times,.and that both her family 
physician and her therapist advised her that due to her medical and psychological 
condition she is no longer able to work the graveyard shifts, emphasizing that "she most 
likely would never be able to work the graveyard shift, without having serious medical 
problems, and potentially having another complete physical and emotional breakdown.". 
Burgener told LabCorp, that she was released to return to work, with the stipulation that 
14 
it be to a day shift position only. Burgener was not released to work the graveyard shift.. 
LabCorp would not allow Burgener to return to work without a full medical release 
(including Burgener's ability to work the graveyard shift). Neither of Burgener's doctors 
would release Burgener to work the graveyard shift. For Burgener to do so, would have 
been "against medical advise". 
Given the in excess of 28 formal notifications on Burgener;s, behalf, any 
reasonable person would agree, that Burgener has aheady provided sufficient information 
to show that she has a disability and needs accommodation. 
ARGUMENT 
Burgener has presented factual and legal evidence that was not available or 
considered by the Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse. 
A. The Administrative law JMge La Jeunesse, Findings Qf Fact Have Been 
Properly Challenged And Are Supported By Substantial Evidence, 
This Court reviews the Utah Labor Commission's determination of claims under the 
Utah Antidiscrimination Act for correctness. 
1. Burgener was undisputedly a "disabled" person under the meaning of the Act 
from March 24, 1997 thru September 24, 1997, the period of time that LabCorp denied 
Burgener the reasonable accommodation of a transfer from the graveyard shift to a day 
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shift position that she was entitled to under the Utah Antidiscrimination Act. Burgener 
has presented substantial evidence that shows Burgener did qualify as disabled under 
Utah Code Ann 34A-5-106.Burgener argues that her impairments of depression, anxiety, 
and panic attacks are both "permanent" and "long term". The medical records, including 
notes, letters, and verbal statements from Burgener's Dr(s) Douville and Castelton 
document and substantiate the fact that Burgener satisfied both the "qualified person" 
definition, and the requirement that the impairments associated with her depression, 
anxiety, and panic attacks are both "permanent" and "long term". It is undisputed by all 
parties, that Burgener was substantially limited in her major life activities of (1) sleep (2 ) 
self care (3) parenting and (4) management of her household. The extensive medical 
records also document that Burgener was substantially limited in the major life activities 
of (5)thinking (6) concentrating (7) ability to focus (8) remember (9) interact with others. 
(10)walking and driving without getting lost, and (11) work (the graveyard shift) without 
experiencing severe anxiety and panic attacks) 
B ACTUAL CONDITION 
Burgener's disability determination should have been made based on Burgener's 
"actual condition at the time of the discrimintion . that being from March 24,1997 
thru September 24, 1997. For the purpose of determining whether Burgener meets the 
definition of "disability," speculation regarding whether the person would have been 
substantially limited in 2002 2003 after this extensive appeal process, now almost 7 
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years later, is irrelevant. 
C. Regarded As 
The employee continues to receive disabihty benefits as long as the disability is 
certified by its insurance carrier. The regarded as issue has been addressed and 
documented from the very moment the complaint of discrimination was filed on 
September 24,1997, as well as each and every stage of this appeal process when 
Burgener's Short-term disabihty status was included in the initial complaint. 
Furthermore, when "LabCorp testified at the initial hearing on May 5, 1999 
"Respondent explains that it refrains from eliminating positions when an employee is 
participating in the Company's Short Term Disabihty plan, The employee continues to 
receive disabihty benefits as long as thfi disability is certified fey iis insurance carrier. 
In addition, Respondent asserts that upon the employees return to work, the employee's 
position is then eliminated in accordance with the Company's severance policy. 
Respondent states that this is done in order to give the employee the benefit of continued 
disabihty payments. Furthermore, Respondent claims that in the event disabihty 
continues to the end of the Plan's qualifying period, the employee is removed from the 
active payroll and becomes eligible to apply for long-term disabihty benefits." 
Because LabCorp has denied that they regarded Burgener as having a disabihty, it is 
important to assess whether LabCorp's actions indicate otherwise. It is believed that after 
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a carefully scrutinize of Burgener's disqualification and the events that led up to it, any 
reasonable person would have no difficulty determining that there was a causal 
connection. 
Fortis certified Burgener's disability. A review of the chronology of events to see if 
there is a connection between the LabCorp's awareness of Burgener's impairment (or 
perceived impairment) and the LabCorp's subsequent actions. 
Burgener and her doctors notified LabCorp of her disability in April 1997. 
Burgener and her doctors repeatedly requested reasonable accommodations from April 
1997 thru September 24, 1997. Burgener was denied reasonable accommodations, and 
terminated on September 24,1997, the day her Short Term Disabihty Benefits ended, in 
violation of ADA. 
Burgener was regarded as disability because Burgener was certified by LabCorp and 
Fortis, their insurance carrier as disabled based on her medical and psychological 
condition, documented and verified by both of her doctors. Fortis's policy is, and 
"LabCorp testified at the initial hearing on May 5, 1999 
It was LabCorp's testimony that between July 1997 and September 30, 1997 
LabCorp RIF'ed fifteen employees at the Murrray facility. That statement is inaccurrate. 
The figure was six positions, not the reported fifteen as evidenced by Attahment D 
Addendum, which is titled "SALT LAKE CITY (ORG 42) RIF'S (7/1/97-9/30/07)". The 
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document lists the "RIFED EMPLOYEES NAME, JOB TITLE, HIRE DATE and 
ANNUAL SALARY RATE". 
It is interesting to note that neither Burgener's name or position was/is not listed,, 
which was submitted underr oath to Bel Randal and Joseph Gallegoes, the Director of the 
Utah Labor and Antidiscrimination Department, as part of the evidentiary record for the 
hearing in 1998. Attahment D Addendum, 
Additionally, a second interesting point of that document, is that the position 
LabCorp offered Burgener is that of Christine Norris, (with basically the same seniority 
as Burgener). The Service Rep position did not even require a High School Diploma, and 
paid an annual salary of $5,202.60. Burgener's position was that of a Medical 
Laboratory Technician, requiring a 2 Year College Degree in Clinical Laboratory 
Science and the successful completion of the ASCP National Board Exam.. 
Burgener's Annul Salary for the prior year in that position had reached $33,815.26, 
Had Burgener accepted the position as offered, it would have been at a $28*612.66 (and 
a 85%) reduction in pay annually. Attahment ZX Addendum 
The regarded as issue has been addressed and documented from the very moment 
the complaint of discrimination was filed on September 24, 1997, as well as each and 
every stage of this appeal process when Burgener's Short-term disability status was 
included in the initial complaint. 
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Because LabCorp has denied that they regarded Burgener as having a disability, it 
is important to assess whether LabCorp's actions indicate otherwise. It is believed that 
after a carefully scrutinize of Burgener's disqualification including her termination and 
the events that led up to it, any reasonable person would have no difficulty determining 
that there was a causal connection. Burgener's medical leave and Short Term Disability 
records contain ample documentation ad verification that Fortis certified Burgener'r 
disability based on her chronic and recurrent depression and anxiety disorder. 
It is agreed Burgener's use of Prozac as a mitigating factor must be considered, 
However, equally important, several factors about that mitigating measure must also be 
considered. The Prozac only partially controls the symptoms and limitations of the 
impairment and in some instances, does not control the symptoms and limitations at all. If 
Burgener is under more stress, or is tired, or experiencing anxiety or panic attacks the 
Prozac becomes completely ineffective. In certain situations, it may take months to find 
the right medication, or group of medications, to control the symptoms or limitations of 
an impairment. 
Additionally, Burgener's uses of Prozac as a mitigating measure, has proven that 
over time, it has been less effective as evidenced by the need to increase the dosage four 
times thus far. To state that Burgener's Prozac might become more effective in the future 
involves speculation. The Supreme Court's decisions make it clear that the determination 
of whether a charging party is substantially limited, even with the use of a mitigating 
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measure or compensating behavior, must rest on evidence of how well the measure or 
behavior actually worked at the time of the alleged discrimination. In all of the cases, the 
Supreme Court has ruled on in terms or mitigating measures, the Court emphasized that, 
consistent with EEOC's position, the determination of whether a person has a "disability" 
must be made on a case-by-case basis. 
The medical records, including Dr. Castleton's letter on August 29, 1997 On 
August 29th, 1997 Dr. Castleton wrote a letter stating: "Robin Burgener has been under 
my care for the treatment of Depression and Panic Disorder since May 2nd, 1997.1 am 
coordinating treatment with her family physician who is monitoring her medication. He 
recently increased Robin's anti-depressant medications in an attempt to stabilize her 
current condition. Given Robin's current psychiatric state, I, (Dr. Castleton), am 
exploring more intensive treatment alternatives which may include day treatment 
and/or possibly an inpatient stay'9, [id] 
12 Repeated Errors Or Misrepresentations 
LabCorp's Counsel has made several statements that were in error and misleading 
to both The Commission and The Court: 
1. "On May 25,2003, Ms Kandi Steele, "as a para-legal representative and 
roommate having direct knowledge," filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Labor 
Commission on behalf of Burgener" The inference is that Ms. Steele is practicing law 
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without a license. This stated inference is inaccurate. The Motion for Review was filed 
May 28, 2002 by fax with the original hand delivered on the 29th, of May, 2002 as per 
Melissa Mondragon's instructions. Para-legal representation with Utah Labor 
Commission's Administrative actions is a widely accepted and recommended practice, as 
well as within Burgener's rights. 
2. "Ms Steele failed to serve a copy of the Motion for Review on LabCorp, thus 
depriving LabCorp of a chance to respond to Burgener5 s renewed arguments". This 
statement is inaccurate. Date Stamped Copy is attached in Addendum C 
3 "On May 28,2003, Burgener filed a "Representation Notice" with the Labor 
Commission staling that she "was not satisfied with the representation of John Black Jr." 
and "no longer wishfed] to have Mr Black represent" her. She further stated that she 
wanted Ms Steele to represent her in all concerns in this case". There are several 
problems with this statement, a) the statement was written on May 28, 2002, not 2003, 
b} the statement was written only in part and taken out of context, c) A copy of the actual 
letter that was written is attached in Addendum C. 
CONCLUSION 
LabCorp's argument that Burgener was not disabled, because her disability only 
lasted six weeks is obviously in correct as evidenced by the Dr. Castleton's letter dated 
August 29, 1997. 
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Burgener was entitled to reasonable accommodations in 1997, and the argument in 
2002 and 2003 in LabCorp's appeal, that her condition has improved is of no bearing on 
whether Burgener was entitled to the reasonable accommodations, and wrongly 
terminated, in violation of the ADA and the UALD. in 1997. 
To base this case's determination on Burgener's condition in 2002-2003 or any 
time after 1997, would be grossly wrong. If that were the case, every employer could 
deny disabled employees reasonable accommodation at the time of the need, with the 
speculation that if they tied the case up in appeals long enough, the employee may 
improve several years later, and the employer will never have to provide the reasonable 
accommodation, or to put it another way DO THE RIGHT THING. 
Given those facts, Burgener's claims that she was a "disabled person" within the 
meaning of the Act at the time of the discrimination, (for the period of March 24,1997 
thru September 24, 1997); and belief that her case was not properly evaluated and judged 
based on her "actual condition at the time of the discrimination, rather than the 
speculation of what her disabihty conditions would be in the future, specifically 2002 and 
2003, according to the US. EEOC directive for evaluating cases; as well as Burgener's 
claim that she was both a "disabled" person and "regarded as" disabled at the time of the 
discrimination, should prevail 
Burgener respectively submits that the Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse's findings 
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of fact have been successfully contradicted and should be reversed by this Court. 
For the forgoing reasons, This Court should reverse the Administrative Law Judge 
La Jeunesse's decision which erred in finding that Burgener was not a disabled person 
under the Utah Anti-discrimination Act ifrom March 24, 1997 thru September 24, 1997, 
and as such entitled to reasonable accommodations protection under the law,.as well as 
any and all remedies available by law. 
Respectively submitted 
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ADDENDUM A 
CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION 
This font i s aff@ct@d by the Privacy Act of 1974; See Privacy Act Statement before 
completing t h i s Torw. 
AGENCY 
W F E P A 
D EEOC 
CHARGE UimBER 
Utah I n d u s t r i a l Commission A n t l - D l s c r l m i 
State or local Agency, if any 
and EEOC 
HA ME (Indicate Mr., Ms., Mrs.) 
Ms. Robin P . Burgener 
HOME TELEPHONE (Include Area Co, 
(801) 487-^590 
STREET ADDRESS CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE 
1^78 Green Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
DATE OF SI 
ll/06/g 
NAMEO IS THE EMPLOYER, LABOR ORGANIZATION, EMPLOYMENT AGENCY APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTf 
STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY WHO DISCRIMINATED AGAINST ME (if more than one list belosr.) 
NAME 
Labcorp - Attn Mike Fergoson 
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES, MEMBERS 
15 - 100 Employees 
TELEPHONE (Include Area C 
(801) 288-900C 
STREET ADDRESS CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE 




Labcorp - A t t n C E O 
TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area cot 
(910) 584-5171 
STREET ADDRESS CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE 
P O Box 2230, 1447 York Ct, Burlington, N C 27216-2230 
COUNTY 
CAUSE OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON (Cheek appropriate box(es)) 
• RACE • COLOR Q s E X C D RELIGION • NATIONAL ORIGIN 
• RETALIATION O A G E G O DISABILITY • OTHER (Spectry) 
DATE DISCRIMINATION TOOK PLi 
EARLIEST LATEST 
I I 0 9 / 2 3 / 9 
S D CONTINUING ACTION 
THE PARTICULARS ARE (If additional space is needed, attach extra sheet(s)): 
PERSONAL HARM: I was denied requests for reasonable accommodation, not 
given opportunities that other employees were given, and 
terminated from my position of Medical Laboratory Technician. 
RESPONDENT'S REASON: I was told that the position I wanted was being 
changed to a four-year tech, and I was only a two-year tech; and I was 
told that the company didn*t think I had a disability. 
DISCRIMINATION STATEMENT: I have reason to charge this employer with 
unlawful employment discrimination which I attribute to my disability in 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, 
and the Utah Antidiscrimination Act of 1965> as amended? in that: 
Prom April 28, 1997 through September 1997, I made requests for 
reasonable accommodation in the form of being moved to a day shift. A 
day shift came open that I was qualified and I was told that I 
couldn't have it because it was being changed to a four-year tech, and I 
was only a two-year tech. The employee they gave the position to is 
only a two-year tech* and she has less seniority and training than I. I 







STATE OF UTAH 
j 2 > X want this charge f i l e d with both the EEOC and the State orj 
loca l Agency, if any. I w i l l advise the agencies If I change sy 
address or telephone number and cooperate f u l l y with the« in the 
processing of siy charge in accordance with the ir procedures. 
NOTARY - (When necessary for State and Local Requirements) 
I swear or affirst that I have raad the above charge and that 
i t i s true to the best of fay knowledge, information and bells 





SUBSCRIBED AND S M R N ^ ^ E F p f f E ME THIS DATE 
(Day, aonth, and year) ^"^ y^ 
02, S ^ Ml ZZA,,^^^^^^^ 
DISCRIMINATORY ACT; 
In your own words describe what happened and why you beleive it was discrimination. Please be as 
specific as possible (including dates and names). You may attach additional pages to this questionnaire. 
My no~n\£f^ PASSED ^u)^y o^ S-av-^i > JO HAV TfegiO OQOKK/AIG 
ftr LASCCKP Fe& S'/ZL VWs a/0 EIGHTS, JT-UJAJ off tac&K A &E&K Fo£-
Ttt£ Fu^£g.ipiL *IQP Retirrev Bus ad esA4tz&rt/AJG£rt7&&F5~ touetJ X ReruR/Oei> 
TO IdOAMc X fou*)D X &ttS EMOTIOIOALL^ ^*3t> VHHS\CALt*-f UtiA&L£ To* X 0JA5 
S&IE&BLU veetzessep AA>T> U>/VS HAOI^G fhtd\c ATTACKS , X d)g/or t o mu 
DOCTOR (T>&. DOUKJILLE ) AJQD He Gave, me A S>CT<~ EXCUSUOG m£ Ffiosm COOR^ 
U&rtL H~(?-<H * X RETURNED To 1U6 P R * TU6 fOLLoUJiA)G (JOEEK AT LOHtcH 
Tirvi6 H€ ffc(FScRl&EI> fr<0 f\tOriVSP££SS*Mdl- m ^ P i c ^ n p r O A P P EXCUS&D (Y)E 
ffLonn jQOQte u/OrtL Y - / V - 9 7 . /h" THAT 77 w g X AGrt/'AJ fi-mEMpTEO TO 
HeruR^ To IDQgfc* JJAGAt^ BKPe&l£/bC&T> £XT&£rtH£ A&X/ETy Pt&'D P/9/0/C-
ATTACK n*ST> U3ft5 utin&LE Tb do^cEr^T^ATE ^ JO ttLT 7W/5 SEi/EVZELy C/rrj/ n 
mv /13/c/ry re fETZEbfcm wy ^loB < JO u/y-s- IJAJ^SCE re SC^EE/? /*r//tc 
vugftOG TNE p/ty f/?csn TT/str /^c/sur OAJ , ffc/ofc 7 ^ /?yy mcrz-teses VE^r-j 
_T lu&^ lrnJ/9/lsE TO S^E/Ef /^?c/?E 77Ss?/tJ J3 7-c V A^>?3 tJH/ctf a?E/^r c/^ 
ftlrt .SEi/E/e&C rncAJT//^ tf/OD 60H/C/Y /ZESuCrEl? /A) f'/?C&CE/'/S /+SSCC//1?E 
tc/r/Y J^EEP 7><£pgt wrscsQ , f/y F//yj>/c//9/U tfEcos??/*7E?upE£> J: A f £ /? 
7#EA90J5T titffct/ JO 7?/Z? , J~ 3EGrtsC> SET^/sOE Z>& < VA/OAJ/) CAST/ETQ/J 
ofo s~a-97 « 18<?r/j s-fy fu<ys/c/s?yJ /9/Uz> Sfy 77JE/e/9f/sr /?e/?E~E~Z> JO u>* 
AJo &AJ£E/Z /9/3LE T~£ UC/ZK ^ e / J / z u ' ^ S otf A//&//rj> , Bcr/V /Y/li/E /\EtEA 
ME TO /?£Tl/tfAJ 7~Q 0)C/?/< #5 £0/0 & A 5 /T /S /I 73s9y oSVV/^r, J^ ///9i/£ 
~Tl{rt/0Z> /AJ /?yy " /?^C^/93 <f TO /fETC*/?<J T'O ldofcf< tO / T/~/ 7 7 / ^ S7Vfi>U6/ir/ O/L 
££&uesT/A)G A V/))/ <S/V//?T SbS/T/CAJ AQtTH (Lo/yrf?^/3&>{£ &UT/&5 /4/OV P/i 
JC fi//9t/€ 3<£&AJ /?<^C/&L///OG <3Atcser7~&>es*f T>/5tfS/£/ry T7J£oi<£sf T7f/^ (fteoGfS 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO COMPLETE THIS FORM IN ITS ENTIRETY. IF YOU HAVE 
NOT PROVIDED THE INFORMATION WE NEED, WE MAY BE UNABLE TO TAKE ANY 
ACTION ON YOUR BEB^LF. 
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r *j*5 Ajn**/e /Aj/*&xj?i£rj> /}&***r /?/v>y <?f77i</s S/e/s* /tS/t/c U^S Z: &t/&e 
e&pptrp A*Jy ^ r#^^ #/*s7*AJf 77/4r £*>&& #/&&y?&> re -&/& <???/<??? / g i ^ ^ r 
X /Jns /Oct TZID M? rtf/r/cAJ &/ts / ^ / ^ / ^ / z ^ AJ** p)/fs X~ eF/^tteP *AJ 
/t£T&e/i//>TH/£ JX>JB^ #0M/Ty re &k/fir i?<f .s^tcjery ^ n*Qv X t*)#* A)£?C&Z (TC DAT^ 
fiff&e^O T//<£ S#/r>£ &£Vtr/erf/0c& ftfG , X /v&r cJ/r/v DICK/6 f^orvie/Zc
 t Hum* A) 
£e$ou&c€ Mt£- A*00 J"" HUD
 9 Lne M/M***?* n~r /c:3o <m #n 9 - / S - 9 7 To D/5cc^a 
mc| ewpioytYierOr * X PiGfrtK) &nr&T£'D X sULST LO^rJir TO £.€Tli&tO TO A V*y SH/FT 
^cB r)5 f\ 3 y/g TecR uJNfCH X PtM QutitlFiev Fofi v X U)*5 OFFiCirtL^y / / O F ^ A ? 6 
OF TH£ &€oiZG>ftiQ irLATioiO Of &UG\A$T TU6 T>^ PfctofiZ T p THI5 Hi^eTl/^6 *gy 
WICKIG Rome&o, fry rue /*> Pefrsot^ Heert/^G T ODA5 -hco -VHHT TVC6 o/Qty cft 
f OS mod cP D/9V SHIFT UOf\5 fr> l u g / O r U ^ U I R M ftT ft SuVSTrt/OriA L &€t>uct 
/jo Pay (a+o H T>CLL¥\&5 Less £F£~ H ^ R ) > \)JQK\G Ro/yie&o 3^tv su<f~T>iv 
flrtrtFfitOf\r\\j£^ tOg£€ AV&\tt\3L g TO vn€ . X /JOCEU. <^*rr> (F X to ft 5 
6f me &£\/&Zrt/OCC~ fKfy . (^2 u>*C5 ~Bfts£ /fry /3/OD I a ^ P ^ y Fe/cL £73c~H y^ W/<d 
Of Seeuice)* Si-Hr «S/^ iT> ^ K ^ t ? » D O ' T K ^ O U J . J H/^U^f Cf^6^g"P fiT 
L£fr*>T TtOiCe T>rtUW - $T/L± /Oo <qpStOg7g3 > \)^CKi6 fcona£fco TOLD Mt 
ro " J ^ r iZecipt rue i&otztv LAJO/QT e^v xu-£5on^ CSF/^C ~TH6 Lasr T>&S 
of mv| v>\^fi0iL\T^f\
 t X A<zn/^ £e<$ue<;T<r2> A x^/sy 4 o 3 Srtyz/^G X 
Hrtt/g ^ / t c s -ro ^ Y 5<^i£ 5/9/P " QJ^L6- T HrtUP 9 in mv| P j C d r T . Pufi.Se 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO COMPLETE THIS FORM IN ITS ENTIRETY. IF YOU HAVE 
NOT PROVIDED THE INFORMATION WE NEED, WE MAY BE UNABLE TO TAKE ANY 
ACTION ON YOUR BEHALF. 
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fc& Aft?. Tf&^/u'Tty /iy «s*/?<r/?t//s#/e^ V^OA/AJ^ //^'/?/cy< ^ w CCA/TACT^ 
/r?6 /9/s/p /g/?i//s<rp A?^ re rfP^y / ^ / ? 77/<f &s/y S/s/^s //£?y?AT6Lc6y /^cs/r/c 
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Z x<?c/<*t/<FT? AJCT/CA m#r A?y SMc/err&je*** z?/s*&/£/?y &&Q'/^s-3 JL^t/t* 
P~/^!D t/O ?~<33~9 7^ &UT 777/9T T CcUj^Z> St/7/?***/ / ^yg /^A/C-TAAA/ -72'SA/S/1 
mp Sneer-Tunes* p,9#s/<L<ry oPA/cP fPeAns) AtAPtny /AJP<?£A?P2> .T aie^tD AJOT 
QUAUM P'QA /&oc rPA*/ TZAAJ/P/TS S/ACP Z AA? ASCP 7t 4J*#K r>/?ys, T~AA 
L£rfe£ X. A£c/E\fPP OAJ 8~28~?7 ALSO STATZ?T> ZT tocu„/.p -BP TAAW,*)ATP£> 
P&sn CvAccAp AS cP 77^P PA7P Aiy ^//CAP TPA/v p/<>/}/3/t/rv 36/0/A/73 P/OZ> C^' 
7 HAI/P /PAA/QPP (rj&ictioM /?A)CTM£& PA/Picypp') TAAP 7A'& p^y po/r/&/^ r^J 
APA/iTdLoAy 6)#$ P/U£Z> By /l & yye s/^rp 7Ac A id HO AAZ> &&p*j o*/ THA AJ/CA 7 
S///pT> TA/<j PA/A/cyPP A<C5o //AS Co/O^/PPAAS/y IPS 5 SP'/Q/cA/7y77/A/J Ji X>Cy, 
2 PPC^T/Orcy ^EAAAJPP Tfr#r /J AU6U57~ THAAP u)A 5 A P?APUCr/dA) <?/€ fc£o/ZC>fit 
zstr/o/O CP /bss/sesOs, £*ifc0jfrtrj5 &)£&€ of^/f^p VAK/OUJ? c^r/^/Js. mzy Ccucz> 
SCLMP QT/s^/t <?/>7/?/cype5 AC<:O/?Z>/SV/£ 7$ ^&u/o£/ry- 7~//<ry id^/e/f c/^P/r/e&T) 
Q77</f/Z tef/r/e/Ot, AT C&nyt&A016 U)A€£^ rtrfP PuT/^S /$>>& 77Jfy 6CU6Z> 
T jfMi*/& <?&r r//ey<£ ofr/osJs 7?//tr m&e^ tf/^&e&P <?77S<f/e <fA7/>&v&<* t/tsr &/& 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO COMPLETE THIS FORM IN ITS ENTIRETY. IF YOU HAVE 
NOT PROVIDED THE INFORMATION WE NEED, WE MAYfflEUNABLE TO TAKK AMY-
ACTION ON YOUR BEHALF. 
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Under the authority vested in me by the Utah Antidiscrimination Act of 1965, as amended, I 
issue for the Division the following Determination as to the merits of the subject charge. 
I. JURISDICTION 
Lab Corp. employed more than 15 employees and Robin F. Burgener filed this complaint within 
180 days from the last date of the alleged harm. Thus, all jurisdictional requirements have been 
met as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, and the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Act of 1965, as amended. 
II. SUMMARY OF CHARGE 
On September 23, 1997, Robin F. Burgener, hereinafter "Charging Party," alleged that Lab 
Corp., hereinafter "Respondent," discriminated against her based on her Disability, Anxiety 
Disorder and Depression. 
2 
Antidiscrimination Act of 1065, as amended. 
R SUMMARY OF CHARGE 
On September 23rd, 1997, Robin F. Burgener, hereinafter referred to as "Charging Party", alleged 
that LabCorp., herein Respondent," discriminated against her based on her Disability, Anxiety 
Disorder (with Severe Panic Attacks), Major Depression and Sleep Disorder 
HI. RATIONAL FOR REQUEST OF REVIEW 
Subsequent to her Mother's death, ( her Mother had lived with Charging Party for all but five 
years of Ms. Burgener's life and continous for seven years prior to her death), Ms. Burgener 
took three days bereavement between March 24th, 1997 and March 27th, 1997. Ms. Burgener 
attempted to return to work on Friday, March 28th, 1997, but was only able to complete two 
hours of her shift, due to an inability to focus, concentrate as well as experiencing severe 
"Panic Attacks". She was sent home by her supervisor, Yvonne Hendrickson. Ms Burgener 
attempted to return to work the following night, and was again unsuccessful, experiencing the 
same symptoms. She was once again sent home by her supervisor, who had told her that in fact 
she was not released to return to work as yet anyway, and that she needed to go to her doctor for 
an evaluation prior to attempting to return to her duties for the third time. Ms. Burgener was able 
to get an appointment with her then family physician, Dr. Douglas Douville on April 2nd, 1997. 
At that appointment with Dr. Douville Ms. Burgener was diagnosed with "Severe Depression" 
and he wrote a note to LabCorp which stated she should be excused from work until April 6th, 
1997. 
On April 3rd, 1997 Dr. Douville notes stated that: 
Since her Mother's death, she has significant grief reaction with all of the classic 
signs of depression- [Exhibit "P- I T ] 
On April 7th, 1997, Ms. Burgener returned to her doctor prior to her shift for further follow up. 
At that time Dr. Douville determined that she was still suffering from "Severe Depression". He 
again wrote a note to LabCorp which stated she was still unable to return to work due to the 
"Severe Depression". He further stated she should probably be able to return to work on April 
14th, 1997. (Please see his note dated 4/7/97 in the first hearing file with Bel Randell). 
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Respondent asserts that there were three (3) options available to the Charging Party: 1) she could 
continue to receive Short Term Disability (STD) benefits (not to exceed six months) until she 
was released by her physician to return to her third shift position; 2) she could transfer to an 
equivalent position on the day shift, provided Respondent had an available position; or 3) she 
could apply for any other available position on the day shift for which she was qualified. 
Respondent asserts that the Charging Party elected to continue receiving STD benefits. 
Respondent indicates that in June 1997, corporate management made the decision to downsize 
various departments at its Murray, Utah facility in order to remain cost effective due to a 
reduction in the volume of work being performed at the laboratory. Respondent also states that 
during the first week of July 1997, management began downsizing various positions at the 
facility. Respondent also states that between July and September 1997, a total of thirteen (13) 
positions were eliminated. Charging Party's job was one of the positions authorized by 
management to be eliminated. 
Respondent explains that it refrains from eliminating positions when an employee is participating 
in the Company's STD plan. The employee continues to receive disability benefits as long as the 
disability is certified by its insurance carrier. In addition, Respondent asserts that upon the 
employee's return to work, the employee's position is then eliminated in accordance with the 
Company's severance policy. Respondent states that this is done in order to give the employee 
the benefit of continued disability payments. Furthermore, Respondent claims that in the event 
disability continues to the end of the Plan's qualifying period, the employee is removed from the 
active payroll and becomes eligible to apply for long-term disability benefits. 
Respondent indicates in early September 1997, a Medical Technologist position became open on 
the day shift in the Hematology Department, and Charging Party submitted an in-house 
application for the position. Respondent states the minimum qualifications for the Medical 
Technologist position required the employee to have a 4 year degree; and the Charging Party had 
a two year degree and, therefore, was not qualified for the position. 
Respondent submits that on approximately September 22 or 23, 1997, Charging Party called the 
Respondent's Human Resources Representative and informed her that her STD benefits would 
end on September 23,1997 and requested Human Resources guidance regarding her employment 
options with the Respondent. In addition, Respondent states Charging Party informed Human 
Resources once again that she wanted to return to work on a day shift. After contacting the 
Corporate Human Resources office, the local Human Resources representative informed the 
Charging Party that there was not a Medical Technician position available in the Hematology 
Department on the day shift, and that the Charging Party had two options: 1) she could accept an 
available position on the day shift at a lesser pay rate; or 2) she could accept a severance package 
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because her position had been terminated. 
Respondent indicates on September 24,1997, Charging Party informed the local Human 
Resources representative that she would accept the severance package because she would not 
accept a day position at a lesser pay rate. 
Respondent states the Charging Party's allegation that the position of Medical Technologist was 
given to a technician with a two year degree and less seniority is not factual. Respondent asserts 
that a Serology Department Medical Technician was temporarily assigned to assist with certain 
duties on the day shift. Respondent asserts the Medical Technician was assigned to this position 
because she had experience working in the Hematology Department. Respondent asserts that the 
Medical Technician assigned to this position was trained to work in all areas of the laboratory 
and had experience running STAT (emergency) tests for all the departments and Charging Party 
did not. Respondent asserts that had Charging Party been hired into this temporaiy position, it 
would have required training the Charging Party to perform all functions. 
Furthermore, the Respondent asserts that there are functions which the Medical Technician who 
was given the temporary assignment cannot perform because she. is not a Medical Technologist. 
Therefore, Medical Technologists from other departments are providing coverage for these 
functions in the Hematology Department. Respondent asserts that at the time it submitted its 
position statement, the open position had not been filled and Respondent's management 
continues to evaluate the need for a regular position. Respondent asserts that the minimum 
qualifications for the Medical Technologist position were not changed, and that the position has 
always required a Bachelor's Degree in Medical Technology or a related field. 
V. ANALYSIS 
Charging Party brought this action against the Respondent alleging violation of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, and the Utah Antidiscrimination Act of 1965, U.C.A. 
§34A-5-101 et seq., which provide that it is unlawful to discriminate on the basis of Disability, 
Depression and Anxiety Disorder. 
A. Prima Facie Case of Discrimination 
In order to prove a prima facie case of discrimination based upon disability, Charging Party must 
show she is disabled under the meaning of the applicable statutes and that the Respondent knew 
of her disability. Charging Party must also show that she is qualified for her position and could 
perform the essential functions of her position with or without a reasonable accommodation. 
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Further, Charging Party must: a) have requested a reasonable accommodation and/or been 
subject to an adverse employment action; and b) show that Respondent failed to provide a 
reasonable accommodation and/or that there is a causal connection between the adverse 
employment action and her disability. 
A disability is defined as a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities/' The impairment must be substantial, as distinct from minor, and must limit 
a major life activity such as seeing, hearing, speaking, walking, breathing, performing manual 
tasks, learning, caring for oneself, and working. There is sufficient medical evidence in the file to 
indicate the Charging Party is an individual with a disability. Further, the record reflects 
Respondent was aware of Charging Party's medical condition and does not dispute the fact that 
Charging Party was on Short Term Disability Leave (STD) for six months. 
The record indicates that Charging Party could perform the essential functions of her position 
with an accommodation, which was to work the day shift. The record further indicates that 
Charging Party requested this accommodation on more than one (1) occasion. 
The Charging Party was subjected to an adverse employment action in that she was subjected to 
a reduction in force. The reduction in force was necessitated due to business needs and a 
reduction in the size of the workforce at the Respondents Murray, Utah facility. Her position 
was one of thirteen (13) positions eliminated from the facility. 
Regarding evidence of a causal connection between the Charging Party's disability and the 
adverse employment action, the record reflects Charging Party received a medical release to 
work a day shift by her physician as early as April 18, 1997, April 28, 1997 and again on May 
13, 1997. On each of these occasions Charging Party requested a transfer to the day shift. 
Respondent has articulated that on each request for a transfer made by the Charging Party, they 
had no available open positions as a Medical Technician on the day shift. 
The record reflects that the Charging Party applied for a day shift Medical Technologist position 
in September 1997, and was not selected because she did not have a four year degree and, 
therefore, did not meet the minimum qualifications for the position. A further review of the 
record reflects the Respondent selected another employee for the Medical Technologist position 
who did not meet the minimum qualifications in that she also did not have a four year degree. 
Respondent's rationale for selecting another employee for the position in question was that even 
though the employee did not meet the minimum qualifications for the position, she was assigned 
the position temporarily because she had experience working in the Hematology Department and 
the employee was trained to work in all areas of the laboratory, and had experience running 
STAT tests for all the departments. Respondent asserts Charging Party did not have the 
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necessary experience and, therefore, was not as qualified as the selected employee and Charging 
Party would have required some additional training to make her proficient in the position. In 
addition, the Respondent asserts that there are certain functions which the selected employee 
cannot perform because she is not a Medical Technologist. Respondent has stated these functions 
are assigned to other Medical Technologists from other departments. 
A review of the selected employee's personnel file and her performance appraisal dated 
November 12, 1997, reflects the employee needed additional training to become proficient in this 
temporary assignment. In reviewing the Charging Party's employment history and educational 
level, it reflects she had a two year degree, a degree in Clinical Laboratory Technician and had 
fulfilled all of the knowledge and competency requirements to be certified as a Medical 
Laboratory Technician by the Board of Registry, American Society of Clinical Pathologists. In 
addition, the Charging Party had more experience as a Medical Laboratory Technician and had 
been employed by the Respondent longer than the selected employee had been employed. 
Furthermore, according to Respondent's representative, Charging Party was an excellent 
employee. 
The preponderance of the evidence suggests that the Respondent made no determined attempt to 
provide a reasonable accommodation for the Charging Party by allowing her to under fill the day 
shift Medical Technologist position. The record reflects Respondent allowed another Medical 
Technician to under fill the position but did not consider the Charging Party, despite her superior 
qualifications. In addition, the Respondent provided no evidence to suggest that to allow 
Charging Party to under fill the position would have created an undue hardship. Respondent's 
position has been that Charging Party would have required additional training to be proficient in 
the position. The record reflects that the employee who was ultimately placed in the position also 
required additional training. Furthermore, the temporary assignment which was given to another 
Medical Technician began in September, 1997 and continued until February, 1999, at which time 
the incumbent resigned her position. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The evidence is sufficient for the Division to conclude that the Respondent failed to provide 
reasonable accommodation to the Charging Party and that the Charging Party was, subsequently 
discharged resultant from her disability. The evidence is also sufficient for the Division to 
conclude that the Respondent's position that not having provided a reasonable accommodation in 
the form of a transfer to the day shift Medical Technologist position because she was not 
qualified is unworthy of credence. 
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The fact in the record, viewed in their entirety indicate that there is REASONABLE CAUSE to 
believe that Charging Party was subjected to discriminatory practices as alleged. This concludes 
the Division's informal investigative adjudication procedure. 
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)\&0 J? . the Antidiscrimination & Labor Division (Division) of the Labor Commission On 
(ComiAisAon) issued a determination that the Respondent has violated the Utah Antidiscrimination 
Act, Chapter 5, Title 34A, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, as amended. 
In order to conclude this matter, Bel J. Randall will contact Labcorp within 10 days of the date of 
this order to schedule ^conciliation conference. The purpose of the conference is to provide relief 
to the Charging Party. The Respondent is ordered to provide relief. 
Minimum relief includes, but is not limited to, the following: 
RELIEF 
1. Placing the Charging Party in a position commensurate to the one previously held, Medical 
Laboratory Technician, effective immediately. 
2. Payment of all lost wages and benefits, less interim earnings, plus interest, since November 23, 
1997. As of April 15,2000, this has been computed at $33,042.65. Lost wages and benefits will 
accrue at the rate of $14.11 per day (including interest) until the Charging Party is placed in a 
commensurate position. 
3. Reimbursement of reasonable, applicable, and relevant costs for attorney's fees and associated 
expenses. 
4. Cease and desist any further discriminatory treatment based on disability. 
5. Non-retaliation against the Charging Party for having exercised his/her right to file this request 
for agency action. 
6. Expungement of the Charging Party's personnel file of any and all documentation pertaining to 
her charge of employment discrimination. A separate file may be kept for legal purposes only. 
7. Take such affirmative steps as may be necessary to eliminate and keep from its environment any 
employment discrimination prohibited by the Utah Antidiscrimination Act. 
Failure to reach satisfactory resolution in this matter may result in the commencement of a civil 
enforcement action. 
The Respondent may appeal this Order by filing a written request for a formal hearing with the 
Director of the Division within 30 days from the date of this Order. If the Director receives no 
timely request for a hearing, this Order becomes the final order of the Commission and is not subject 
to further appeal. 
Joseph Gallegos Jr. 
Director 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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LABCORP 
P O Box 2230 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6615 
Case No. 8970722 
ROBIN F. BURGENER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
LABORATORY CORPORATION OF 
AMERICA (LABCORP), 
Respondents, 
HEARING: Room 334, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on August 7-8, 2001. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of 
the Commission. 
BEFORE: Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner, Robin Burgener, was present and represented by attorney 
John Black. 
The respondents were represented by attorney Julie Thomas. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 23, 1997 Robin Burgener filed with the Utah Antidiscrimination and Labor 
Division (UALD) a charge of discrimination against Laboratories Corporation of America 
(LabCorp). Ms. Burgener alleged that LabCorp violated Utah Code §34A-5-106 when it 
terminated her employment as a Medical Laboratory Technician. Ms. Burgener claimed that 
LabCorp refused to provide her a reasonable accommodation for her disability. 
On November 5, 1997 LabCorp filed an answer to Ms. Burgener's charge of discrimination. 
LabCorp denied that Ms. Burgener was disabled within the meaning of Utah Code §34A-5-106. 
LabCorp also claimed that it eliminated Ms. Burgener's position pursuant to a general reduction 
in force. 
* FINDINGS OF FACT, 
* CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
* ORDER 
* 
* Judge: Richard M. La Jeunesse 
* 
* 
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II. ISSUES. 
Did LabCorp violate Utah Code §34A-5-106 when it terminated Robin Burgener5s employment 
as a Medical Laboratory Technician? 
III. PROCEEDINGS. 
On April 17, 2000 UALD issued a Determination and Order. On May 5, 2000 LabCorp filed a 
Notice of Appeal and Request for Formal Evidentiary Hearing with respect to UALD's 
Determination and Order. On March 23, 2001 LabCorp filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On May 5, 2001 I Issued an Order denying LabCorp's Motion for Summary Judgment. On 
August 7-8, 2001 I held an evidentiary hearing in this Case. 
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT 
Robin Burgener began her employment with LabCorp as a medical laboratory technician on 
August 26,1991. Ms. Burgener worked in the Hematology Department at LabCoip. During her 
employment with LabCorp, Ms. Burgener generally worked the "graveyard shift" from 8:30 p.m. 
to 5:00 a.m. 
Subsequent to her mother's death on March 24, 1997, Ms. Burgener took bereavement leave for 
three days between March 24, 1997, and March 27,1997. Ms. Burgener attempted to return to 
work on March 28,1997, but could only complete two hours. Ms. Burgener testified that when 
she returned to Work she had a hard time with judgment and organizing her work. Ms. Burgener 
also stated that she suffered a "panic attack." 
On April 3, 1997 Dr. Douglas Douville, Ms. Burgener's treating physician, stated that: 
Since her mother's death, she hats had a very significant grief reaction with all of 
the classic signs of depression. {Exhibit "P-l 1,!]. 
Dr. Douville observed that Ms. Burgener had problems sleeping and prescribed Valium, [id.]. 
On April 7, 1997 Dr. Douville recorded: 
The depression persists and is very problematic as she cannot concentrate. 
*********** 
ASSESSMENT: Grief reaction which is looking more like a major depression, 
[id.]. 
Burgener v. Laboratories Corporation of America 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
page 3 
On April 7, 1997 Dr. Douville began Ms. Burgener on Prozac, [id.]. On April 18, 1997 Dr. 
Douville provided a work release for Ms. Burgener that stated: 
Robin's anxiety and depression continues to make her unable to 
work....Recommend she be moved to day time work when she returns, [id.]. 
On April 18, 1997 Ms. Burgener received notice of her approval for "Short Term Disability" 
benefits effective March 24, 1997. [Exhibit P-13"]. Ms. Burgener's "Short Term Disability" 
benefits continued through September 23, 1997. [id.]. 
On April 28, 1997 Dr. Douville provided a second work release and observed: "Robin continues 
to suffer from depression and is unable to return to evening/night shift work." [Exhibit "P-ll"]. 
On May 2, 1997 Ms. Burgener saw Dr. Donna Castleton DSW LCSW BCD for counseling. 
[Exhibit "P-10"]. Dr. Castleton noted that Ms. Burgener "could not concentrate" and was 
"forgetful." [id.]. Dr. Castleton diagnosed Ms. Burgener with: 
Axis I Bereavement, Adjustment Disorder, Anxiety, and Depression. 
Axis III Mental and physical fatigue 
Axis IV Severe, [id.]. 
On May 15, 1997 Dr. Douville opined: "Robin continues to be unable to work night/PMs shifts 
due to severe depression." [Exhibit "P- l l " ] . On July 3, 1997 Dr. Castleton addressed a note to 
Vicki Romero, the Human Resource Manager for LabCorp. [Exhibit "P-10"]. Dr. Castleton 
stated that: 
Robin Burgener has been a patient of mine since May 2, 1997 for major 
depression following her mother's death. She is medically unable to work 
—evenings or nightSr-fid^^ — 
On August 29, 1997 Dr. Castleton observed that: 
Robin Burgener has been under my care for the treatment of depression and panic 
disorder. I am coordinating treatment with her family physician who is 
monitoring her medication. He recently increased Robin's anti-depressant 
medications in an attempt to stabilize her current condition. Given Robin's 
current psychiatric state, I am exploring more intensive treatment alternatives 
which may include day treatment and/or possibly an inpatient stay. [id.]. 
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At the hearing Ms. Burgener testified concerning her condition during the worst part of her 
depression shortly after the death of her mother. Ms Burgener recounted that her depression 
affected her in a manner she equated to 'living underwater," Ms. Burgener stated that nothing 
came into focus for her. Ms. Burgener said she got out of bed late or not at all. Ms. Burgener 
explained that she lacked the ability to parent her daughter including the provision of discipline 
or help with homework. According to Ms. Burgener, she went days without bathing or 
grooming. Ms. Burgener averred that she performed no housework. Ms. Burgener said lost the 
ability to handle her finances. Ms. Burgener claimed that because her mind drifted, she gave up 
watching television or reading books. Ms. Burgener described how she got lost on walks or 
driving in her neighborhood. Finally, Ms. Burgener alleged that she experienced trouble 
sleeping. 
Ms. Burgener acknowledged that the most disabling period of her depression lasted for about six 
weeks after her mother died. Ms. Burgener acknowledged that once Dr. Douville prescribed 
Prozac, she started to recover her ability to concentrate and focus. Ms. Burgener agreed that she 
successfully managed her depression with Prozac. In fact after her visit with Dr. Castleton on 
August 29, 1997, Ms. Burgener's medical records contained no further notations of any medical 
treatment for her depression other than continued prescription writing for Prozac up through July 
1998. rExhibit"P-12"l. 
Ms. Burgener testified that in July of 1997 her inability to work nights constituted the only 
significant impediment to her return to work as a medical laboratory technician at LabCoip. Ms. 
Burgener claimed that toward the end of July or early August 1997 she learned of an opening 
during the day-shift in the Hematology Department at LabCoip. Ms. Burgener alleged that she 
filled out an application for the day job in Hematology and'submitted it to Vicki Romero, the 
Human Resources manager at LabCoip. Vicki Romero told Ms. Burgener that she lacked the 
necessary qualifications for the job because the position required a four year degree. Ms. 
Burgener admitted that the day .position she sought was for a medical technologist which 
normally required a four year degree. [Exhibit "R-2"]. 
Ms. Burgener maintained that LabCorp should have allowed her to fill or underfill the vacant 
medical technologist position during the day-shift as a reasonable accommodation to her 
disability. Ms. Burgener asserted that Tina Kirkman, another medical laboratory technician, in 
fact underfilled the medical technologist position sought by Ms. Burgener. 
Ms. Burgener testified that on September 18, 1997 Vicki Romero told her LabCorp eliminated 
Ms. Burgener's job during a period of corporate downsizing. Ms. Burgener confirmed her 
awareness of a downsizing commenced by LabCorp in June of 1997. On September 24,1997 
Ms. Burgener accepted a severance package from LabCorp rather than an offer of several lesser 
paying jobs offered to her. 
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On December 28, 1997 Ms. Burgener obtained another job at ARUP Laboratories (ARUP). Ms. 
Burgener started at ARUP working the 2:00 p.m. to 12:30 am. Shift. Eventually Ms. Burgener's 
job at ARUP allowed her to work during the day from 7:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Ms. Burgener still 
worked for ARUP at the time of the hearing. 
On July 7, 1998 Ms. Burgener went to Dr. Christopher Jones M.D. at the Sleep Disorder Clinic 
for some problems she had sleeping. [Exhibit "P-12"]. Dr. Jones stated: 
In summary...probably has a combination of three or four factors disrupting her 
sleep. First of all, she has a constitutional sleep delay tendency and is only getting 
about six hours of sleep per night. As a result of late sleep onset time, this may 
not be adequate sleep time for her...Secondly, she may have restless legs 
symptoms associated with iron deficiency... [id.]. 
Ms. Burgener's medical records contained no further mention of treatment nor any follow-up to 
her visit at the Sleep Disorder Clinic. Dr. Jones never tied Ms. Burgener's sleep problems to her 
prior depression treated by Dr. Douville and Dr. Castleton one year earlier. Further, Dr. Jones 
never described the duration nor severity of the sleep problems. Dr, Jones only speculated that 
six hours sleep per night "may not be adequate sleep time for her." [id.]. 
The preponderance of the evidence in this case confirmed that after the death of her mother on 
March 24, 1997 Ms. Burgener suffered a bout of severe depression, anxiety, and bereavement. 
The undisputed facts in this case confirmed that for six weeks the impairment caused by Ms. 
Burgener's depression and anxiety limited her major life activities of: (1) sleep; (2) self care; (3) 
parenting, and;(4) management of her household. However, after the first six weeks following 
the death of her ipother, the preponderance of the evidence in this case demonstrated that Ms. 
Burgener successfully managed her depression with Prozac. 
By her own admission, working at night constituted the only limitation that Ms. Burgener 
continued to suffer after the first six weeks of the onset of her depression. Yet, as of December 
28, 1997 Ms. Burgener began employment with ARUP on a swing shift from 2:00 p.m to 12:30 
a.m. that had her forking in part at night. Ms. Burgener provided no evidence that after she 
commenced employment with ARUP she continued under any restrictions against nighttime 
employment. 
On July 7, 1998, Ms. Burgener sought help for some sleep disturbance. Nevertheless, the record 
in this case remained bereft of evidence that linked Ms. Burgener's sleep problems on July 7, 
1998 with some ongoing problem caused by her bout of depression and anxiety originally 
occasioned by her mother's death. Further, the record in this case contained little concerning the 
severity and duration of the sleep problems referenced on July 7, 1998. 
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In conclusion, most of the limitations on Ms. Burgener's major life activities caused by her 
depression and anxiety lasted a relatively short six weeks until successfully managed by 
medication. In any event, no evidence existed that any of Ms. Burgener's limitations on major 
life activities endured beyond December of 1997. The preponderance of the evidence in this case 
disclosed that Ms. Burgener factually failed to qualify as disabled under the provisions of Utah 
Code§34A-5-106 
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
After the death of her mother on March 24,1997 Ms. Burgener suffered a bout of severe 
depression, anxiety, and bereavement. For six weeks the impairment caused by Ms. Burgener's 
depression and anxiety limited her major life activities of: (1) sleep; (2) self care; (3) parenting, 
and; (4) management of her household. However, after the first six weeks following the death of 
her mother, Ms. Burgener successfully managed her depression with Prozac. Working at night 
constituted the only limitation that Ms. Burgener continued to suffer after the first six weeks of 
the onset of her depression. Yet, the limitation of Ms. Burgener working at night lasted no later 
than December of 1997. 
On July 7, 1998, Ms. Burgener sought help for some sleep disturbance. Nevertheless, the record 
in this case remained bereft of evidence that linked Ms. Burgener's sleep problems on July 7, 
1998 with some ongoing problem caused by her bout of depression and anxiety occasioned by 
her mother's death. Further, the record in this case contained little concerning the severity and 
duration of the sleep problems referenced on July 7, 1998. 
Utah Code § 34A-5-106(l) states in relevant part that: 
It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice: 
_(a)(i)_JFoi:_an.employer to refuse to hire,jpr^Tn^tp r»r tn Hidr.h r^op HpmntP 
terminate any person, or to retaliate against, harass, or discriminate in matters of 
compensation or in terms, privileges, and conditions of employment against any 
persons otherwise qualified, because of ...disability. 
Utah Code § 34A-5-102(5) defines disability as: 
[a] physical or mental disability as defined and covered by the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12102 (ADA). 
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The United States Supreme Court held that under the ADA: 
[a] disability is defined as: 
(A) A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the 
major life activities of such individual: 
(B) A record of such impairment; or 
(C) Being regarded as having such impairment. §12102(2). Sutton v. United 
Airlines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471, _ , 144 L. Ed 2d 450, _ , 119 S. Ct. 2139, _ (1999). 
[see also: Utah Administrative Code R. 606-1-2.E.]. 
The Court in Sutton went on to hold that: 
The term "substantially limits" means among other things, "[u]nable to perform a 
major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform;" 
or "[significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which 
an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the 
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general 
population can perform that same life activity." (Citation omitted). Finally, 
"[m]ajor [l]ife [ajctivities means functions such as caring for oneself, performing 
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working." (Citation omitted). kL 
The Court in Sutton concluded: 
[i]t is apparent that-if ^  person is^aking-measures^o^orrect-for^r-mitigatej-a 
physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures-both positive ana 
negative-must be taken into account when judging whether that person is 
'substantially limited' in a major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act. 
*********** 
To be sure, a person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by 
mitigating measures still has an impairment, but if the impairment is corrected it 
does not 'substantially limi[t]' a major life activity, id. 
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Ms. Burgener's initial onset of depression and anxiety in fact constituted an impairment that 
substantially limited her with respect to the major life activities of: (1) sleep; (2) self care; (3) 
parenting, and; (4) management of her household. However, after the first six weeks following 
the death of her mother, Ms. Burgener successfully corrected and mitigated her depression with 
Prozac. Therefore, under the holding in Sutton, Ms. Burgener ultimately failed to qualify as 
disabled within the ADA and Utah Code § 34A-5-102(5). 
Ms. Burgener's restriction from working1 at night lasted no later than December 28, 1997. In 
Toyota Motor Mfg v. Williams the United States Supreme Court held that for an individual to be 
"substantially limited:" "The impairment's impact must also be permanent or long term." In the 
present case Ms. Burgener's limitation on working nights qualified as neither permanent nor long 
term under the evidence produced in this case. 
Ms. Burgener provided some evidence of sleep problems as late as July 7, 1998. Ms. Burgener 
sought help for some sleep disturbance. Nevertheless, the record inthis case remained bereft of 
evidence that linked Ms. Burgener's sleep problems on July 7, 1998 with some ongoing problem 
caused by her bout of depression and anxiety originally occasioned by her mother's death. 
Further, the record in this case contained little concerning the severity and duration of the sleep 
problems referenced on July 7,1998. 
In the case of Pack v. KMART Corp. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the ADA 
claim of Terisita Pack who claimed her moderate to severe depression interfered with her major 
life functions of inter alia sleeping. Pack v. KMART Corp., 166 F. 3d 1300, (10th Cir. 1999). 
The Tenth Circuit determined that "sleeping is a major life activity." idL However, the Tenth 
Circuit in Pack found that Ms. Pack's "episodes of sleep disruption" and "waking without feeling 
refreshed" over a two year period of time were not severe, long term, nor permanent in impact, 
id. The Tenth Circuit concluded that "Pack failed to satisfy her burden to present evidence of 
Jherimpairment-and the extent to jwMcli_thejbnpair^ of sleeping." 
ii 
In the present case, the evidence presented concerning Ms. Burgener's sleep problems came short 
of that even presented by Ms. Pack. Accordingly, Ms. Burgener failed to provide sufficient 
evidence that her.sleep problems constituted a severe, long term impairment on her major life 
activity of sleeping. 
In conclusion, Ms. Burgener factually and legally failed to qualify as disabled under the 
provisions of Ut$h Code §34A-5-106. 
lrThe Court in Sutton concluded that a qualified disability under the ADA with respect the 
major life activity of working required an inability "to work a broad range of jobs. id. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ROBIN F. BURGENER, 
Applicant, 
v. 
LABORATORY CORPORATION OF 
AMERICAN (LABCORP), 
Defendant. 
Robin F. Burgener asks the Utah Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law 
Judge's dismissal of Ms. Burgener's complaint of unlawful employment discrimination under the 
Utah Antidiscrimination Act (Utah Code Ann. Title 34A, Chapter 5). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-5-107(l 1). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Ms. Burgener asks the Commission to review the ALJ's determination that Ms. Burgener was 
not a disabled person within the meaning of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission affirms and adopts the findings of fact set forth in the ALJ's decision. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Utah Antidiscrimination Act prohibits employment discrimination because of disability. 
As,the ALJ correctly observed, proof of disability in the context of Ms. Burgener's case requires a 
showing that her impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. This in turn 
requires evidence that the impairment's impact is permanent or long-term. 
Having carefully considered the arguments raised in Ms. Burgener's motion for review, the 
Commission nevertheless concurs with the ALJ's analysis and determination. For the reasons stated 
in the ALJ's decision, the Commission agrees with the ALJ's conclusion that Ms. Burgener is not 
"disabled" within the meaning of the Act because her impairments are neither permanent nor long 
term. 
* 
* ORDER DENYING 
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The Commission affirms and adopts the ALJ's decision in this matter and denies Ms. 
Burgener's motion for review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this
 v'ffl day of August, 2002. 
illertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
1^^C<^, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days 
of the date of this order. 
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Case No. 8-97-0722 
Robin F. Burgener asks the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its previous decisidh 
affirming the Administrative Law Judge's dismissal of Ms. Burgener's complaint of unlawful 
employment discrimination under the Utah Antidiscrimination Act (Utah Code Ann. Title 34A, 
Chapter 5). The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-13. 
ISSUE AND DISCUSSION 
The central issue in this case is whether Ms. Burgener qualifies as "disabled" under the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Act so as to trigger the protective provisions of the Act. To be considered 
disabled, Ms. Burgener must prove an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities. This in turn requires proof that the impairment is permanent or long-term. 
Having once again considered the evidence, the Commission remains of the opinion that Ms. 
Burgener's alleged impairment is neither long-term nor permanent. For that reason, the Commission 
concludes that the ALJ correctly dismissed Ms. Burgener5s complaint against Labcorp. 
ORDER 
The Commission reaffirms its prior decision and denies Ms. Burgener's request for 
reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
/* 
/ 
Dated this- ? / (lay of October, 2002. ^ 
R. Lee Ellertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
ODER DENYING RECONSIDERATION 
ROBIN F. BURGENER 
PAGE 2 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petilion for review 
with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 3 0 days of the date 
of this order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Reconsideration in the matter of Robin 
F. Burgener, Case No. 8-97-0722, was mailed first class postage prepaid this Jgfjday of October, 
2002, to the following: 
ROBIN F. BURGENER 
11302 BELL RIDGE DR 
SANDY UT 84094 
MARK MORRIS, ATTORNEY 
15 W SOUTH TEMPLE #1200 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-1004 
KANDI STEELE 
PARALEGAL REPRESENTATTVE 
11302 BELL RIDGE DRIVE 
SANDY UT 84094 
and by Interdepartmental Mail to: 
JOE GALLEGOS, DIRECTOR 
UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND LABOR DIVISION 
Sara Danielson 
Support Specialist 
Utah Labor Commission 
Orders\8-97-0722 
Ifc 
Kandi Steele, MSW, CSW, Paralegal Representative 
6910 South Fargo Road 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBIN F.BURGENER, ; 
Petitioner ] 
vs. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, ] 
Respondent ) 
) PETITION FOR REVIEW 
) Appeal No. 
> Agency Decision Case No. 8-97-0722 
Notice is hereby given that ROBIN F. BURGENER, petitioner, petitions the Utah 
Court of Appeals to review the order of the respondent made in this matter on October 31st, 2002. 
This petition seeks review of the entire order. 
Petitioner requests the court to direct the respondent to prepare and certify to the court its 
entire record, which shall include all of the proceedings and evidence taken in this matter. 
cs~ & l/rts&Lj C / 
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J / / / .s 
Kandi Steele, MSW, CSW 
Paralegal of Record 
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Kandi Steele, Paralegal Representative 
11302 Bell Ridge Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
(801) 571-3939 
Adjudication Division of the 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Fax 530-6999 
Re Case No* 8970722 
Motion for Review 
Filed by Fas and Received oas 
5/28/02 at 16:52 (4tS2 p.in.) 
Verified by Labor Commission Fas 
Activity Report #7429 and re-sent 
signature pages #7430 of representative 
Note: 5/25/02 was Saturday 
5/26/02 was Sunday 
5/27/02 was Memorial Day 
Message-
Additional Supplemental Supporting Documents to the Timely Filed Motion For 
Review, (which are already in the Labor Commission's entire Case Files, since 
9/23/97) but resubmitted for the Commission's convenience), and to be hand delivered 
within the following three days, and so noted as per Melissa Mondragon instructions 
Secondly: 
As mentioned and addressed m our Timely Filed Motion For Review the question still 
arises: 
If, Burgener v LabCorp's original favorable Determination of Disability 
decision dated 4/17/2000, [from charges of Discrimination based on Disability, 
filed on 9/23/1997] is reversed by Judge La Jeaunesse, based entirely 
on the Supreme Court Decision Sntton v. United Airlines, Inc. , (which 
we would argue does not apply to this case of Disability determination 
based on its merits); that which received a 
favorable Determination of Disability to the Sutton decision, 
is now and ? 
^ ^ ^ —
Z
^ I M X A - 1t>£?>u/ 
Robin F. Burgener v. Lab Corp 
Fact Finding Conference 
5/18/99 
UALD 97-0722 
When was your date of hire ? 
2. What was yourjob title at the time you were hire ? 
3. Were you ever promoted or demoted ? 
4. To the best of your knowledge, what were the minimum qualifications for the position _ r . 
you held as a Medical Technician ? ^ / ^ -~//^- c^-^^^^C ' v * / ^ < <r^ r-f£/ 
5. Did you meet the minimum qualifications for the position ? 
Yes ^ No 
6. Lab Corp Management has asserted that you were not placed in the Medical Technologist 
position that was available on the day shift because you did not meet the Minimum 
Qualifications for the position, is that correct ? 
C5J) No 
Dis you meet the M. Q.'JJ for the position ? 
Yes (No , -
Ifno.whyno,? ^ ^ ^ / ^^~~^f^ 
7. Your position as a Medical Technician was eliminated by the company, is that correct ? 
•r eliminating your position ? /u * < -I What reason did the company ,give you f^or li i ti  r siti  ? 
-^€S X*7 <r* ^. {A. - ^ Z^( <TA\ sCs£ &f/c >! 5 / M 
Whefr your position was eliminated, were you given a severance package ? 
Yes / No 
v 
If yes, what was the severance package ? 
^^( 3 - c^A'±< ->* *^<-^^cr /"'Vy^ fC 
9. Since you were unable to work the day shift, did the company offer you any other 
positions^ 
<TYes^ No 
Tf U A V ff A* 9 / ^ ^ 7 > > ^ l $L'!>'( <?&*<**- I 
If yes, when were the positions offered to you ? ^ 
If yes, what were the positions offered to you (job title)? 
Did yoirjfeciine any of the positions offered to you by the company ? J #* 
If yes, why did you decline the positions ? ^ „ ^ s / ?7^ °* ^ i / ^ ' / ^ / (?**L*<f^ -
How did the company notify you that your position was being eliminated ? ^  jT_ ^  ^ >^ ^_. 
10. While employed by Lab Corp how was your performance and were you evaluated orta _ 
regular basis ? J^ Z ^  * V^  ^ / ^ 7 ^ / 
Below Standard Standard Abovp Standard Excellent A-s^l". '/ /, 
Prior to your termination, when did you receive your last performance evaluation ? 
11. Was the company fully aware of your qualifications and technical credentials ? 
Yes No 
You have presented me with copies of credentials you have achieved, was the company 
fully aware of these credentials ? 
fYes) No 
Were they^part of your personnel file ? / / / , ^ 
(Yes X NO X/- c ^ C^ A ^ " ^ ^ X 
, / / 12. When did first make a request for an accommodation ? x ' ^ s-i-^^^/' 
Itch Date I . ^ ^ X ^ / / ^ ^ ^ ^ 
_. A . / Did you make more than one request for an accommodation ? 
A ^ l ^T^ No 
/ > / / ^ ' 
/ - £V ^ If yes, explain. - . y 
13. Who did you make your request to ? 
Name 
13. When you madg your request(s) for an accommodation, what were youtoldj? 
Who told you this? ^ L ^ / ^ / / 
14. Who was the individual (employee) who assisted you in this process ? 
15. What was your understanding of the company's medical leave or short term disability 
program? / ^ tf^^zcS'TZC / > £ ^ ^ < < ^ ) 
Explain. J 
sp*" \6.jjr^Jmxy do you believe your position was chosen to be eliminated during the downsizing of 
ic** / ' S ' " the company? /tr-^^<~, y#/C7 /^-^-^ / W i ^ - sAy^~ Z_ <?',/, 
^ V / / Explain' ^ ^ ^ - ^ - ^ ^ - z y e<^ 
^/^ 17. It has been well documented that you are a person with a disability and that your 
disabiHtyis^depression and anxiety, is that correct ? 
C Y e s y No 
Are youjjnder a physicians care for this medical condition ? 
(Yes J No 
18. Did the company ever discuss with you or offer you an opportunity to perform the duties 
that Tina Kirkman was allowed to perform when she was allowed to perform some of the 
duties and responsibilities of the Medical Technologist position ? 
Yes No 1 
Do you believe you could have performed these same duties and responsibilities ? ^ 
18. If it is found that the Respondent discriminated against you, what are you looking for in-^ , / ^ 
terms of a settlement ? /y%^ <^/£ ^ ^ - ^ 
P-%1- _ Yes . "°7?s^^ 
<&f*-*&(--/4-cf' / A - V t ^ > A.r^- /^^'^ t <rr-7'-7^-^^<>-Zi?L4- A4O 
~7M^ A£2?t*C7?0A/ 7/0 T^/ZC^ Crf/W<? 
/4cca/>?0Z>/) 7~/<?/ds /7s?z> ^-T'S'/O 
^&0/a/t/7y /O/I/JP A0/£'7f tO/ff 
£/?/7g/e//9 - J^ /¥/9Z> &<7T?f i 
//7 o/epe/t -rt_^/*/flJ7&/J_jtyj£fitfc0£ 
u)tf/cH J^~ AJ0/7/.P f//i(/S Ctofr/&&e£Z> 
eSfff/rfcty JSASCS' S7y 77077/<S/£ ///?#_ 
?/S2 -
7^UiptfZ> U//f/9//S7/?y 7?A%> 
A/frt/rrstaGcf ^ sV/i>^JcS7> 3y 
/ # / ~7Z/9/0f<r/e//>75 ? Jtf&e&S' /%& 
/Icsf cS/tr;frc/i7-/a/J. 
t{JOU+2> 7//?(7<S . 
r I / 
2 ^ 
-77/^ ''T^vy^ye^'y fbx/770/J 
777/97" ~J7AJ/9 (§&7~ - trftf/ctf 
/AJ /frcr. 70(?fittz> /7/?7<? 7A57S2) 
tt/S77C_ /*/?&*/ ^ 77//S ?S#£. 
i j r ^ / _d^airrSA M& //OfTfiU/VSTTTf 
_Z^ -///&>- ^ZZAJ -7^/?//0^T> //J 
7/77v9cr /S/fp. <?<?/JS' 7Z fUst'V/? 
-yAky/t7/yi7^ • _ 
REMEDY SHEET 
UTAH STATE LAW PROHIBITS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND PROVIDES THAT 
IF YOU ARE A VICTIM OF AN UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT ACT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO 
REMEDIES. REMEDIES ARE DESIGNED TO RETURN TO YOU LOSSES WHICH YOU 
SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF THE DISCRIMINATION. REMEDIES INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT 
NECESSARILY LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
* OFFER OF EMPLOYMENT 




* EXPUNGEMENT OF YOUR PERSONNEL FILE 
* VACATION, SICK LEAVE AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT CREDITS 




The US. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
These instructions, issued to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) field 
offices on July 26, 1999, summarize the Supreme Court's decisions in Bragdon v. Abbot, Sutton 
v. United Airlines, Inc., Murphy v. United Per eel Service, Inc., Cleveland v. Policy Management 
Systems Corp., and Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg and explain their impact on the processing of 
charges under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 
The instructions are not enforcement guidance or policy statements. Rather, they modify 
previous field instructions and emphasize the individualized analysis that must be used in 
determining whether a Charging Party has a "disability" as defined by the ADA and whether a 
person is "qualified." In addition, they offer valuable, practical advice to field staff responsible 
for collecting and analyzing evidence under the ADA. 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FIELD OFFICES: ANALYZING 
ADA CHARGES AFTER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
ADDRESSING "DISABILITY" AND "QUALIFIED" 
Background 
The Supreme Court over the past two terms has issued several ADA decisions involving the 
determination of: 
(1) whether a person has a "disability" as defined by the ADA. (See Bragdon v. 
Abbott 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.. 527 U.S. , 67 
U.S.L.W. 4537 (June 22,1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.. 527 U.S. 
_ _ (1999); and Albertsons. Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. (1999)); and 
(2) whether a person with a disability is "qualified." (See Cleveland v. Policy 
Management Systems Corp.. 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999); and Albertsons. Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg. 527 U.S. (1999)). 
Since these cases involve fundamental issues that are addressed in many ADA charges, the 
Office of Legal Counsel has prepared these instructions for the field to aid in gathering and 
analyzing evidence. 
Last year, the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the terms "impairment," "major life activity," 
and "substantial limitation" in Bragdon, holding that a woman with asymptomatic HIV infection 
had an ADA "disability." Consistent with the Court's approach, the EEOC will continue to give a 
broad interpretation to these terms. 
This year, the Supreme Court held in Sutton and Murphy that the determination of whether a 
person has an ADA "disability" must take into consideration whether the person is 
substantially limited in a major life activity when using a mitigating measure, such as 
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medication, a prosthesis, or a hearing aid. A person who experiences no substantial limitation in 
any major life activity when using a mitigating measure does not meet the ADA's first definition 
of "disability" (a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity). In 
Albertsons, the Court extended this analysis to individuals who specifically develop 
compensating behaviors to mitigate the effects of an impairment. In so ruling, the Supreme Court 
rejected the Commission's position that the beneficial effects of mitigating measures should not 
be considered when determining whether a person meets the first definition of "disability." 
In all of these cases, the Supreme Court emphasized that, consistent with EEOC's position, the 
determination of whether a person has a "disability" must be made on a case-by-case basis. The 
Court stated that it could not be assumed that everyone with a particular type of impairment who 
uses a particular mitigating measure automatically was included - or excluded — from the 
ADA's definition of "disability." Nor does the definition of "disability" depend on general 
information about the limitations of an impairment. Rather, one must assess the specific 
limitations, or lack of limitations, experienced by a Charging Party (CP) who uses a mitigating 
measure or compensating behavior to lessen or eliminate the limitations caused by an 
impairment. 
The Court also emphasized that the disability determination must be based on a person's actual 
condition at the time of the alleged discrimination. Therefore, if a CP did not use a 
mitigating measure at that time, an Investigator must determine whether s/he was substantially 
limited in a major life activity based solely on his/her actual condition. For the purpose of 
determining whether a CP meets the definition of "disability," speculation regarding whether the 
person would have been substantially limited if s/he used a mitigating measure is irrelevant. 
The instructions below, consistent with these Supreme Court decisions, modify previous field 
instructions and emphasize the individualized analysis that must be used in determining whether 
a particular CP has an ADA "disability." 
• Part One addresses each of the three definitions of "disability" as they apply to CPs who 
use mitigating measures. (Pages 2-16) It also highlights certain issues relating to any 
"regarded as" case. (Pages 12-16) 
• Part Two addresses special issues that may arise when a Respondent claims to rely on 
federal safety standards in determining that a CP is not "qualified" because of a disability. 
(Pages 16-17) 
• Part Three discusses the relationship between application for, or receipt of, disability 
benefits and a determination of whether a CP is "qualified." (Pages 17-19) (A summary of 
the decisions in Albertsons and Cleveland is found on pages 16 and 17, respectively.) 
If an Investigator is uncertain whether a CPwho uses a mitigating measure is substantially 
limited in a major life activity, s/he should contact the OLCADA Division attorney assigned to 
the field office 
PART ONE: THE THREE DEFINITIONS OF "DISABILITY" 
First Definition of "Disability": CP Has a Substantially Limiting Impairment 
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All of the questions below seek information about a CPfs condition at the time of the 
alleged discrimination. 
In determining whether a CP, or a potential CP, has a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits a major life activity, an Investigator must do the following: 
I. Identify the CP's physical or mental impairment(s). 
n. Ask whether the CP uses a mitigating measure to control or eliminate symptoms or 
limitations of the impairment 
A. Ask the CP to identify the precise mitigating measure used (e.g., medication, insulin, 
prosthetic limb, hearing aid). 
• If a CP uses more than one mitigating measure (e.g., a CP uses two 
medications), be sure to get information on how well each mitigating measure 
controls a CP's symptoms, the respective side effects of each, and whether the 
two medications together cause limitations because of the interaction between 
them. 
B. Ask the CP to identify any behaviors s/he may have specifically developed to cope 
with the limitations of an impairment. 
• For example, an individual with monocular vision might have developed 
specific compensating behaviors in head or eye movements to see effectively 
at long distances. 
C. If the CP is not using a mitigating measure, then discuss what limitations, if any,the 
CP experiences in performing a major life activity due to the impairment. 
Ill Ask whether the mitigating measure or compensating behavior fully or only partially 
controls the symptoms or limitations of the impairment. 
A. A number of questions should be asked to determine whether a mitigating measure 
fully controls, partially controls, or has little effect in controlling the symptoms and 
limitations of an impairment. Examples include: 
1. Describe what symptoms and limitations you experienced before using the 
mitigating measure (e.g., 3 seizures a week; frequent and severe headaches, 
blurred vision, urination, thirst, and other symptoms of high levels of blood 
sugar (hyperglycemia) for a person with diabetes; chronic, severe shaking due 
to Parkinson's disease; ability to hear only certain high-pitched sounds). 
• This question seeks information to establish what major life activity 
(ies)may be affected by the CP's impairment, despite the use of a 
mitigating measure or compensating behavior. Remember that major 
life activities are broadly defined and that the list of major life 
activities in the EEOC regulations and enforcement guidances is 
not exhaustive. 
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« Bragdon took an expansive view of the terms "major life activity" and 
"substantial limitation." Investigators should continue to consult the 
Compliance Manual and EEOC guidances for additional information on 
identifying major life activities and assessing whether a CP is 
substantially limited. (Also, see Sutton, 67 U.S.L.W. 4537,4542 (June 
22, 1999) for a discussion of "substantial limitation.") 
• See pages 7-9 for a listing of some of the major life activities that you 
should review with a CP to determine if s/he still experiences 
limitations in performing them, despite the use of a mitigating measure. 
2. How well does the mitigating measure control the symptoms and limitations 
identified above? 
• Does the mitigating measure control the symptoms or limitations all of 
the time or only some of the time? (e.g., medication has reduced the 
number of seizures from 3 per week to 1 per week; the treatment of 
diabetes through diet, medication, and insulin has limited the frequency 
and severity of the incidents of hyperglycemia; the shaking only occurs 
when the CP is tired and is not as severe as it used to be; the hearing aid 
enables the CP to hear low and high-pitched sounds, but not words). 
• A CP who uses a prosthetic hand or arm may continue to 
experience substantial limitation in the major life activity of 
performing manual tasks because the device does not permit fine 
motor manipulation. 
• If a CP uses a behavior specifically developed to compensate for a 
limitation resulting from an impairment, how well does that behavior 
compensate for the limitation? Do any limitations remain for which the 
compensating behavior is ineffective? 
• For example, a CP with monocular vision might be able to turn 
his/her head to compensate sufficiently for a decrease in his/her 
field of vision. This will not compensate for the loss of depth 
perception. To deal with that limitation, a CP may have learned to 
judge long distances by relying on monocular cues such as linear 
perspective, overlay of contours, and distribution of highlights 
and shadows. However, this behavior may not compensate for 
limitations in seeing at shorter distances. Therefore, a CP who 
uses certain compensating behaviors might still experience 
limitations in performing numerous tasks involving close range 
vision. The limitation in close range vision is relevant to 
determining whether the CP is substantially limited in seeing or 
any other major life activities. 
3. How long has the CP been using the mitigating measure or compensating 
behavior? 
• If a CP has been using a mitigating measure or compensating behavior 
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for only a short period, initially it may not be very effective in 
controlling the limitations. 
• Whether a mitigating measure, over time, might become more effective 
involves speculation. The Supreme Court's decisions make it clear that 
the determination of whether a CP is substantially limited, even with the 
use of a mitigating measure or compensating behavior, must rest on 
evidence of how well the measure or behavior actually worked at the 
time of the alleged discrimination. 
4. Does the mitigating measure tend to become less effective under certain 
conditions? If certain conditions interfere with the effectiveness of a 
mitigating measure, how often and for how long a period do these conditions 
arise? For example: 
• If the CP is under great stress, or is tired, does the mitigating measure 
work as well? 
• Do adverse weather conditions or other environmental changes impact 
the effectiveness of a mitigating measure? 
• Do illnesses, such as a cold or the flu, change the effectiveness of a 
mitigating measure? 
• For women, do monthly hormonal changes impact the effectiveness of a 
mitigating measure? 
5. Does the mitigating measure tend to be effective only for awhile? 
• For example, while a CP with bipolar disorder who uses medication 
does not experience severe symptoms of the disorder for a period of 
time, he then experiences symptoms for several weeks and undergoes a 
severe manic episode. Following the manic episode, the CP again 
experiences few or no symptoms while using the mitigating measure. 
• Mitigating measures used to treat degenerative illnesses, such as 
Parkinson's disease, may only work for a period of time before the 
condition worsens, making the mitigating measure ineffective. 
6. Has the CP had to change mitigating measures because previous ones became 
less effective? If yes, how many previous mitigating measures has the CP 
used, and what happened when each one became less effective? How long did 
each mitigating measure remain effective? Is the current mitigating measure 
different from previous ones so that it is less likely to fail? Or, conversely, is 
there any indication that the current mitigating measure is becoming less 
effective? 
7. Are there any symptoms or limitations that are unaffected by the mitigating 
measure? If yes, what are they and how severely do they limit the CP from 
engaging in a major life activity? 
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8. Has the impairment caused any complications that are not controlled by a 
mitigating measure and may substantially limit a major life activity? 
• For example, complications from diabetes may result in substantial 
limitations in major life activities. This can include complications such 
as eye disease (seeing); nerve damage (sitting, standing, walking, 
eating); blood vessel disease (walking); and difficulties with 
reproduction. These are all complications that are not controlled by 
insulin. 
Ask whether the mitigating measure itself causes any limitations in performing a 
major life activity. 
A. Investigators need to ask CPs whether they experience any symptoms, side effects, 
or limitations in performing certain activities as a result of using a mitigating 
measure. If a CP does experience limitations, the Investigator needs to probe their 
severity and duration. 
• If a CP uses medication, it is critical to identify the specific medication and 
the specific side effects caused by it. Not all medications produce the same 
side effects. Moreover, the same medication does not produce the same side 
effects in all individuals. 
B. If a CP uses two or more mitigating measures, and they are not substantially limiting 
by themselves, determine if the combined negative effects of all the mitigating 
measures together substantially limit one or more major life activities. 
• For example, a CP with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) and depression 
may take medications to treat each condition. Each medication, by itself, 
affects the ability to sleep (a major life activity), but does not substantially 
limit it. However, the combined effect of the two medications substantially 
limits the CPs ability to sleep. 
C. A number of major life activities may be severely affected by a mitigaiting measure. 
(These major life activities may also be directly affected by the impairment despite 
the use of a mitigating measure.) 
1. Thinking, concentrating, and other cognitive functions may be substantially 
limited when a CP uses certain drugs to treat many different impairments, 
including psychiatric illnesses and epilepsy. It may take much greater effort to 
engage in cognitive functions because the medication causes a person to feel 
groggy, disoriented, or slow. Or, a CP may have difficulty with memory 
because of certain medications. 
2. Walking, standing, and lifting may be substantially limited even with the use 
of a prosthetic foot, leg, arm, or hand. 
• For neurological reasons, some people experience "pain" or 
"discomfort" from a missing limb. A CP may experience problems in 
the remaining limb resulting from over-use to compensate for the 
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missing limb. Significant pain may accompany wearing a prosthetic 
device. A CP may need to minimize the amount of walking in order to 
wear the prosthetic leg for longer periods. Or, a person using a 
prosthetic leg may be able to walk without significant problems, but can 
only wear the leg for 8 hours per day, and then must rely on a 
wheelchair or crutches for mobility. 
• A prosthetic limb may cause serious chafing, rubbing, blisters, and 
ulcers, depending on a number of factors, including the materials used, 
the tightness of the fit, how the amputation occurred, and what body 
part the prosthetic device is replacing. These side effects could affect 
the ability to wear the prosthetic device for prolonged periods and/or 
affect the CPs ability to engage in walking, standing, or lifting, as well 
as the major life activities of performing manual tasks and caring for 
oneself. 
3. Eating is a major life activity that may be affected by the use of a mitigating 
measure if a CP is required to adhere to substantial dietary restrictions because 
of medication or a device. Or, a CP may be less able to eat or may have to 
maintain a rigid eating schedule because of certain medications or devices. 
Certain medications can cause severe nausea, which in turn will affect a CPs 
ability to eat. An Investigator should ask whether a CPs ability to eat and/or 
eating habits had to be altered, and if so in what ways. 
• Both food and lack of food can cause severe short and/or long-term 
medical problems for people with diabetes. They must consider the 
impact on the disease of everything they eat, how much they eat, and 
when they eat. 
4. Caring for oneself'may be substantially limited as a result of using a 
mitigating measure. 
• Medication and prosthetic devices may cause extreme fatigue, which in 
turn may affect a CPs ability to care for him/herself 
• For CPs with diabetes, the ability to care for themselves may require 
significant changes and/or disruptions to their daily activities to control 
the frequency and severity of incidents of high blood sugar 
(hyperglycemia) and low blood sugar (hypoglycemia). The serious short 
and long-term consequences of hyperglycemia include headaches, 
blurry vision, breathing difficulties, eye disease, kidney disease, nerve 
damage, blood vessel disease, and death; the consequences of 
hypoglycemia include disorientation, weakness, nervousness, seizure, 
coma, and death. To avoid these serious consequences, CPs with 
diabetes must be constantly vigilant in closely controlling blood sugar 
levels. This involves monitoring body signals for fluctuations in blood 
sugar levels, checking blood sugar levels mechanically, and, based on 
those levels, adjusting food intake, physical activity, and medications 
(including insulin and oral medications). People with diabetes must 
maintain a delicate balance between these elements in order to avoid 
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hyperglycemia and hypoglycemia. 
• There also may be a significant impact on the ability to care for oneself 
as a result of experiencing a medical episode. The inability of a 
mitigating measure to prevent such an episode may cause so much fear 
that it seriously affects a CP's ability to care for himself. For example, a 
CP with epilepsy may have had traumatic experiences having a seizure 
in public where strangers reacted badly. As a result, he may not be able 
to go out alone to run routine errands or buy groceries, and may require 
that someone familiar with his epilepsy always accompany him. 
Alternatively, a CP may fear possible injury from a seizure, and 
therefore may be unable to engage in basic activities of caring for 
oneself, such as cooking and bathing, unless another person is present. 
• A person who wears a prosthetic limb may have to curtail activities that 
are part of caring for oneself, such as household chores and grocery 
shopping, because the limb can only be worn for a certain period of 
time. 
5. Sleeping may be affected by certain medications. Some may cause extreme 
drowsiness, while others have the opposite effect. 
6. Performing manual tasks may be affected by certain drugs which can interfere 
with fine motor skills. 
7. Reproduction may be affected by use of a mitigating measure. Many 
medications prescribed to control seizures or psychiatric illnesses can cause 
birth defects, thus creating a substantial limitation in procreation. (See 
Bragdon.) 
8. Working may be affected by use of a mitigating measure. Investigators should 
always review this major life activity last. For a discussion on the impact of 
the Supreme Court decisions on identifying a class of jobs or broad range of 
jobs in various classes, see pages 14-16. 
V. Relevant witnesses for gathering this information 
o After reviewing all of the questions above with the CP, the Investigator should 
interview other relevant witnesses who may be able to corroborate or supplement the 
CP's information. These would include: 
• family members, friends, and coworkers; 
• rehabilitation specialists who work with the CP to address functional 
limitations; and 
• doctors (if they have knowledge about the CP's specific functional 
limitations). 
VI. Based on the evidence collected from asking these and other relevant questions, does 
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the CP who uses a mitigating measure have a substantially limiting impairment? 
A. A CP meets the first definition of "disability" where, despite, or because 
of, the use of a mitigating measure, the CP is substantially limited in 
performing a major life activity. 
B. Determining whether a CP meets this definition does not rest on 
identifying a multitude of major life activities that are merely affected 
by CP's impairment, even with the use of a mitigating measure. Rather, 
such a determination depends on evidence that shows that the CP is 
substantially limited in performing at least one major life activity. 
C. Problems in performing numerous tasks may signal a substantial 
limitation in performing a specific major life activity. 
• For example, a CP with epilepsy may be substantially limited in 
caring for herself because she cannot live independently due to 
the fact that her epilepsy necessitates assistance with running a 
household (e.g., preparing meals, cleaning, bathing, grocery 
shopping). Even if running a household is not a separate major 
life activity, it is part of the major life activity of caring for 
oneself. 
D. Always look for evidence concerning the length of time a CP has 
experienced limitations, the frequency with which they occur, and their 
severity in order to determine whether the CP is substantially limited. 
Second Definition of "Disability": CP Has a Record of a Substantially Limiting Impairment 
I. In all charges where a CP indicates that s/he uses a mitigating measure, the 
Investigator should determine whether the CP has a record of a disability for the 
period before the CP began using the mitigating measure. 
A. The Investigator should ask questions about what limitations the CP experienced in 
performing major life activities because of the impairment prior to using a 
mitigating measure. 
B. Questions should seek detailed information and include the following: 
1. What major life activities were limited or precluded prior to using a mitigating 
measure? 
• For example, if a CP with epilepsy has been seizure-free for a 
substantial period of time and there are few or no side effects from 
medication, detailed information needs to be obtained concerning CPfs 
seizures, and their impact on performing major life activities, before CP 
began using the current medication. 
2. How long did the CP experience these limitations prior to using a mitigating 
measure? 
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3. Was the CP precluded from or limited in performing a major life activity all of 
the time or only some of the time? That is, were any limitations present only 
during certain periods? of limitations in performing a major life activity were 
episodic rather than constant, how often and for how long a period did these 
limitations occur? How severe were the limitations when they did occur? 
• For example, a CP with major depression may have experienced 
episodes of severe depression that lasted several months before taking 
medication. 
4. Before using a mitigating measure that effectively controls the symptoms or 
limitations of an impairment, did the CP try any unsuccessful mitigating 
measures? 
• In certain situations, it may take months to find the right medication, or 
group of medications, to control the symptoms or limitations of an 
impairment. During this period, the CP may have been substantially 
limited in performing a major life activity. 
C. Additional questions include: 
1. Can the CP provide information on any "records" or files that document a 
former substantially limiting impairment or an erroneous record of a 
substantially limiting impairment (e.g., school records, Dept. of Veterans 
Affairs documents, workers' compensation records, vocational or other 
rehabilitation records, medical files)? 
2. Was the Respondent aware of the CPs record or history of a disability? 
• The Respondent does not need to be aware of the CPs record of a 
substantially limiting impairment for coverage purposes. However, 
there must be evidence that the Respondent acted on the basis of the 
CPs record of a disability in order to find that discrimination occurred. 
II Based on the evidence collected from asking these and other relevant questions, does 
the CP have a record of a substantially limiting impairment prior to using a 
mitigating measure? 
o A CP meets the second definition of "disability" where, prior to using a mitigating 
measure that effectively controls the symptoms and limitations of an impairment, the 
CP was substantially limited in performing a major life activity. 
Third Definition of "Disability": CP is Regarded as Having a Substantially Limiting Impairment 
I. If an Investigator determines that there is insufficient evidence to establish that a CP 
who uses a mitigating measure or compensating behavior is covered under the first 
two definitions of "disability," or is uncertain whether a CP meets one of the first two 
definitions, then the Investigator should assess whether the Respondent regarded the 
CP as having a substantially limiting impairment 
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n. An Investigator should take the following steps to determine if the CP meets this 
definition: 
A. Identify the impairment that Respondent knew or believed the CP to have. 
B. Identify the reason given by the Respondent to disqualify, terminate, or in any 
way affect an employment opportunity of the CP* Examples of possible reasons 
that a Respondent might offer include: 
• failure to meet a physical qualification standard (e.g., hearing or lifting 
requirements); 
• inability to work under stressful conditions; 
• insufficient stamina or endurance to work effectively; 
• concerns that the CP might pose a health or safety risk to self or others; and 
• failure to obtain required licenses. 
C. Determine whether the Respondent believes that the CPfs impairment is the cause 
of the perceived problem. For example, is there evidence that the Respondent 
believes that CP's impairment is the reason that s/he: (1) failed to meet a 
qualification standard, (2) cannot tolerate stressful working conditions, (3) has 
insufficient stamina or endurance to work; (4) poses a health or safety risk,or (5) 
cannot obtain a required license? 
D. Determine whether the Respondent's reason for disqualifying the CP involves 
performance of a major life activityfe.g., the perceived inability to lift 5 pounds 
involves the perception that the CP is unable to perform the major life activity of 
lifting). 
1. To show that a Respondent regarded a CP as having a disability, the 
Respondent's reason for disqualifying the CP must involve or relate to 
performance of a major life activity. 
• For example, the perceived inability to stand more than a few minutes 
involves die major life activity of standing; the perceived inability to 
work under stressful conditions involves the major life activity of 
working). 
2. While in many cases the Respondent's reason for disqualifying the CP may 
indicate a belief that the CP cannot engage in the major life activity of 
working, Investigators should first determine whether any other major life 
activity is implicated (e^g,, walking, breathing, standing). 
• See (F) below for further instructions on the major life activity of 
working. 
E. Determine whether the Respondent believed that the CP was substantially limited 
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/field-ada.html 10/21/2003 
in performing the major life activity. 
1. Actions speak louder than words. This means that Investigators should 
carefully scrutinize the CPs disqualification and the events that led up to it. 
Because Respondents are likely to deny that they regarded a CP as having a 
disability, it is important to assess whether the Respondent's actions indicate 
otherwise. 
• For example, medical leave or workers' compensation files may contain 
evidence relevant to the issue of whether the Respondent perceived that 
a CP was substantially limited in performing a major life activity. 
2. Review the chronology of events to see if there is a connection between the 
Respondent's awareness of the CP's impairment (or perceived impairment) 
and the Respondent's subsequent actions. 
3. Determine whether the Respondent's underlying reason for disqualifying the 
CP is related to myths, fears, stereotypes or other attitudes about a 
particular disability (e.g.. myths about a person's frailty due to a medical 
condition or fears about rising health insurance costs). 
• For example, does the Respondent believe that a person with a moderate 
hearing loss cannot be a secretary because a hearing aid will not allow 
her to hear phones and clients needing assistance. 
F. If working is the major life activity at issue, an Investigator must delermine 
whether the Respondent's reason for disqualifying the CP indicates a belief that the 
CP is substantially limited in working, i.e., unable to work in a class of jobs or 
broad range of jobs in various classes. 
1. If the Respondent can show that its reason for disqualifying the CP applies to 
something unique about the Respondent's job or workplace, then the 
Respondent only viewed the CP as unable to work in one specific job. 
• In Sutton, the Supreme Court determined that a global airline pilot is 
only one job and not a class of jobs. Since United Airlines only viewed 
Sutton as unable to work as a "global pilot," it did not regard her as 
unable to work in the class of pilot jobs, which would include other 
types of positions, such as regional pilots, pilot instructors, and freight 
pilots. 
• In Murphy, the Supreme Court determined that UPS's mechanics job, 
which required the ability to drive commercial vehicles, was a single 
job and not representative of the class of mechanics jobs. Thus, 
according to the Court, UPS only viewed Murphy as unable to perform 
its unique job requiring a mechanic to drive a commercial vehicle, and 
not as unable to work in the class of mechanics jobs, which would 
include diesel mechanics, automotive mechanics, gas-engine repairers, 
and gas-welding equipment mechanics - none of which require an 
individual to drive commercial vehicles. 
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2. The fact that a CP is unable to satisfy a Respondent's physical or other job 
requirement does not alone constitute sufficient evidence that the Respondent 
regards the CP as substantially limited in working. 
• Therefore, the Investigator should carefully question the CP to 
determine whether the Respondent said or did anything to suggest that 
the CP was viewed as substantially limited in the ability to perform a 
class or broad range of jobs. 
• The Investigator also should seek evidence from the Respondent as to 
whether it viewed the job from which the CP was disqualified as 
representative of a class or broad range of jobs. 
• For example, a CP with epilepsy who does not actually have a 
substantially limiting impairment may be covered under the 
"regarded as" definition if evidence shows that the Respondent 
has a generalized fear of seizures, and not a specific fear about 
the consequences of a seizure due to something unique about the 
Respondent's job or workplace. 
• Similarly, if a Respondent has a generalized fear that a person 
with a psychiatric illness may become violent, without any 
objective information regarding this particular CP, then the 
Respondent is acting on generalized fears and misconceptions 
that would indicate the Respondent believes the CP could not 
work in most jobs. 
• Respondents may claim that the CP's inability to meet a physical or 
other job requirement shows that the CP is not "qualified " This claim 
involves the merits of the charge and must be analyzed separately from 
the determination of whether the Respondent regarded the CP as 
having a disability. The Supreme Court's decision in Albertsons (see 
page 16) underscores the necessity of assessing each qualification 
standard to determine whether it is valid and whether a CP is 
"qualified." 
3. Investigators should assess whether the Respondent's reasons for disqualifying 
the CP would also result in his/her disqualification from other jobs in the 
Respondent's workplace. 
• Investigators should document how many jobs in the Respondent's 
workplace, and what kind of jobs, were also closed to the CP based on 
the Respondent's reasoning. 
• For example, if a Respondent had all of the different types of mechanic 
jobs discussed in (F)(1) above, and refused to hire a CP for any of them 
because of his/her disability, then the Respondent could be regarding 
the CP as substantially limited in working in the class of mechanics 
jobs. 
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III. Based on the evidence collected from asking these and other relevant questions, did 
the Respondent regard the CP as having a substantially limiting impairment? 
o A CP meets the third definition of "disability" where a Respondent regards a CP as 
having a substantially limiting impairment. 
PART TWO: IS A CP "QUALIFIED" IF S/HE FAILS TO 
MEET A FEDERAL REGULATORY SAFETY 
STANDARD? 
After determining that a CP meets one of the definitions of "disability," the next issue is whether 
the CP is "qualified." In Albertsons, the Supreme Court determined that an employer can require 
a CP to meet an applicable federal safety standard, even if the standard can be waived under an 
experimental program. The following instructions apply to any CP who meets the ADA definition 
of "disability\" regardless of whether s/he uses a mitigating measure. 
In cases where Respondents allege that a CP cannot meet a federally-mandated safety standard, 
Investigators need to do the following: 
I. Carefully review a Respondent's claim that a CP is not qualified because s/he fails to 
meet a federally-mandated safety requirement. 
A. Does the regulatory requirement absolutely prohibit the Respondent from hiring the 
CP due to a disability? Does the regulation apply to the particular position the CP 
holds or desires, and/or does it apply to the CP's specific disability? Or, is the 
Respondent voluntarily choosing to adopt a federal safety standard? 
B. If a Respondent is required by federal law to impose a safety standard on a CP that 
results in screening out the CP based on disability, does the regulatory requirement 
establish any exceptions, waivers, or other mechanisms by which the CP would meet 
the safety concerns embodied in the regulatory requirement? 
1. If there is an exception, waiver, etc., is it part of the regulatory requirement? 
Does a person who qualifies for the exception, waiver, etc. meet the safety 
requirements of the federal regulation, or does the exception, waiver, etc., 
constitute an exemption from meeting the regulation's safety requirements? 
2. For example, in Albertsons, the Supreme Court determined that an employer 
does not have to follow an experimental waiver program designed to permit 
persons with monocular vision to qualify for DOT certification to operate 
commercial motor vehicles. This type of waiver program did not modify the 
general safety standard that precludes persons with monocular vision from 
obtaining certification. Rather, the waiver program was designed to obtain 
data to determine if changes should be made in the general safety standard. 
• The type of program at issue in Albertsons would be different from a 
waiver program based on data already collected that has shown that 
people qualifying for the waiver meet the generalized safety 
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requirements. Furthermore, an employer could not require an 
individual to meet the general safety standard if the waiver program 
specifically modified the general safety standard. 
n. A Respondent cannot disqualify a CP for failure to meet a general safety standard if 
the CP receives a waiver from, or is eligible for an exception to, that standard. A 
Respondent must give deference to the waiver or exception if it is predicated on 
maintaining safety, constitutes or contains an alternative way to maintain safety, and 
modifies the general safety standard. 
PART THREE: WHAT IMPACT DOES A CP'S 
APPLICATION FOR, OR RECEIPT OF, DISABILITY 
BENEFITS HAVE ON A DETERMINATION AS TO 
WHETHER A CP IS "QUALIFIED?" 
In Cleveland, the Supreme Court adopted EEOCs position that application for, or receipt of, 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits does not automatically preclude an 
individual from meeting the ADA's definition of "qualified." 
I. There is no inherent conflict between being eligible for SSDI benefits and meeting the 
ADA's definition of "qualified/1 
A. Thus, there is no presumption that application for, or receipt of, SSDI benefits 
defeats a CFs claim that s/he is "qualified" as defined by the ADA. 
B. The analysis used by the Supreme Court to compare an application for SSDI 
benefits and a CFs claim that s/he is "qualified" also would apply to applications for 
other types of disability benefits, such as Long Term Disability benefits or workers* 
compensation. 
C. A CP must be able to explain his/her statements on the benefits application that s/he 
is unable to work, and thus qualifies for benefits, while also maintaining that s/he 
can perform the essential functions of the position at issue in the ADA charge, with 
or without reasonable accommodation. 
• For example, because SSDI and the ADA serve different purposes, they use 
different approaches to assess whether a person can work. Therefore, it is 
possible for a CP to meet the ADA's definition of "qualified" and also be 
eligible for SSDI benefits. 
D. Below is a general summary of the steps to follow in an ADA investigation 
involving the receipt of disability benefits. For more detailed information on 
questions to ask and evidence to seek, Investigators should refer to the EEOC 
Enforcement Guidance on the Effect of Representations Made in Applications for 
Benefits on the Determination of Whether a Person is a "Qualified Individual with a 
Disability" Under the ADA. 
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11 Investigators should do the following: 
A. Review the CPs application for disability benefits. Determine if there appears to be 
any discrepancies between claims made on the application and the CPs contention 
that s/he is "qualified." Carefully review apparent discrepancies to determine 
whether they can be explained by differences in definitions or formulas. 
• For example, a CPs claim of "total disability" does not necessarily indicate 
that s/he cannot perform the essential functions of a job, with or without 
reasonable accommodation. To the contrary, "total disability" is a Social 
Security term that, in this context, only means that s/he meets the criteria for 
SSDI benefits. 
B. In reviewing the CPs application for disability benefits, determine whether the CP 
was merely checking off boxes or fully describing his/her disability and ability to 
work. To the extent that there appears to be a discrepancy in finding a CP to be 
"qualified," greater weight should be given to a CPfs narrative description of his/her 
disability and ability to work on a benefits application form than information 
captured when a CP checked off a box. 
C. Determine whether the CP can perform the essential functions of the position at 
issue, with or without reasonable accommodation* 
• In many of these cases, a CPs ADA charge will include an allegation of 
denial of reasonable accommodation. Whether a person can work with 
reasonable accommodation generally is not a consideration in determining 
whether a person is eligible for disability benefits. 
• For example, the Social Security Administration does not consider whether a 
person could work if given a reasonable accommodation, but focuses only on 
an SSDI applicant's ability to work without accommodation. If the CP could 
have performed the essential functions with a reasonable accommodation, 
then there is no conflict between statements made on the SSDI application and 
a CPs claim to be "qualified." 
D. Determine whether the CPs condition changed over time. If it did, then a statement 
about the CPs disability on a benefits application might not reflect his/her ability to 
perform the essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation, at the 
time of the Respondent's employment decision. 
• For example, a CP alleges that s/he was wrongfully terminated in January. 
The following June, the CP filed an SSDI application. If the CP could have 
performed the essential functions in January, but by June his/her disability had 
deteriorated so that s/he could no longer work, the CP would still be 
"qualified" during the relevant period of time for the ADA charge. 
If an Investigator has questions about anything in these Instructions, please contact the OLC 
ADA Division attorney assigned to your field office. 
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The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and 
Psychiatric Disabilities 
ADDENDUM 
Since the Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric 
Disabilities was published, the Supreme Court has ruled that the determination of 
whether a person has an ADA "disability" must take into consideration whether the 
person is substantially limited in performing a major life activity when using a mitigating 
measure. This means that if a person has little or no difficulty performing any major life 
activity because s/he uses a mitigating measure, then that person will not meet the 
ADA'S first definition of "disability." The Supreme Court's rulings were in Sutton v. 
United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. (1999), and Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 
527 U.S. _ (1999), 
As a result of the Supreme Court's ruling, this document's guidance on mitigating 
measures is superseded. Following the Supreme Court's ruling, whether a person has 
an ADA "disability" is determined by taking into account the positive and negative 
effects of mitigating measures used by the individual. The Supreme Court's ruling does 
not change anything else in this document. The superseded guidance is found in: 
• Question 6 
• Question 7 
• Question 11. 
For more information on the Supreme Court rulings and their impact on determining 
whether specific individuals meet the definition of "disability," consult the Instructions for 
Field Offices: Analyzing ADA Charges After Supreme Court Decisions Addressing 
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Enforcement Guidance: The Americans With Disabilities Act and Psychiatric 
Disabilities 
INTRODUCTION 
The workforce includes many individuals with psychiatric disabilities who 
face employment discrimination because their disabilities are stigmatized 
or misunderstood. Congress intended Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) 1 to combat such employment discrimination as well 
as the myths, fears, and stereotypes upon which it is based.2 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission") 
receives a large number of charges under the ADA alleging employment 
discrimination based on psychiatric disability.3 These charges raise a 
wide array of legal issues including, for example, whether an individual 
has a psychiatric disability as defined by the ADA and whether an employer 
may ask about an individual's psychiatric disability. People with 
psychiatric disabilities and employers also have posed numerous questions 
to the EEOC about this topic. 
This guidance is designed to: 
facilitate the full enforcement of the ADA with respect to 
individuals alleging employment discrimination based on psychiatric 
disability; 
respond to questions and concerns expressed by individuals with 
psychiatric disabilities regarding the ADA; and 
answer questions posed by employers about how principles of ADA 
analysis apply in the context of psychiatric disabilities. 4 
WHAT IS A PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY UNDER THE ADA? 
Under the ADA, the term "disability" means: "(a) A physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of [an] individual; (b) a record of such an impairment; or (c) 
being regarded as having such an impairment. "5 
This guidance focuses on the first prong of the ADA's definition of 
"disability" because of the great number of questions about how it is 
applied in the context of psychiatric conditions. 
Impairment 
1. What is a "mental impairment" under the ADA? 
The ADA rule defines "mental impairment" to include "[a]ny mental or 
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psychological disorder, such as . . . emotional or mental illness. "6 
Examples of "emotional or mental illness [es] " include major depression, 
bipolar disorder, anxiety disorders (which include panic disorder, 
obsessive compulsive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder), 
schizophrenia, and personality disorders. The current edition of the 
American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (now the fourth edition, DSM-IV) is relevant for 
identifying these disorders. The DSM-IV has been recognized as an 
important reference by courts7 and is widely used by American mental 
health professionals for diagnostic and insurance reimbursement purposes. 
Not all conditions listed in the DSM-IV, however, are disabilities, or 
even impairments, for purposes of the ADA. For example, the DSM-IV lists 
several conditions that Congress expressly excluded from the ADA'S 
definition of "disability. "8 While DSM-IV covers conditions involving drug 
abuse, the ADA provides that the term "individual with a disability" does 
not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of 
drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of that use. 9 The DSM-IV 
also includes conditions that are not mental disorders but for which 
people may seek treatment (for example, problems with a spouse or 
child).10 Because these conditions are not disorders, they are not 
impairments under the ADA. 11 
Even if a condition is an impairment, it is not automatically a 
"disability." To rise to the level of a "disability," an impairment must 
"substantially limit" one or more major life activities of the 
individual.12 
2. Are traits or behaviors in themselves mental impairments? 
No. Traits or behaviors are not, in themselves, mental impairments. For 
example, stress, in itself, is not automatically a mental impairment. 
Stress, however, may be shown to be related to a mental or physical 
impairment. Similarly, traits like irritability, chronic lateness, and 
poor judgment are not, in themselves, mental impairments, although they 
may be linked to mental impairments. 13 
Major Life Activities 
An impairment must substantially limit one or more major life activities 
to rise to the level of a "disability" under the ADA. 14' 
3. What major life activities are limited by mental impairments? 
The major life activities limited by mental impairments differ from person 
to person. There is no exhaustive list of major life activities. For 
some people, mental impairments restrict major life activities such as 
learning, thinking, concentrating, interacting with others,15 caring for 
oneself, speaking, performing manual tasks, or working. Sleeping is also 
a major life activity that may be limited by mental impairments. 16 
4. To establish a psychiatric disability, must an individual always show 
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that s/he is substantially limited in working? 
No. The first question is whether an individual is substantially 
limited in a major life activity other than working (e.g., sleeping, 
concentrating, caring for oneself) . Working should be analyzed only if no 
other major life activity is substantially limited by an impairment. 17 
Substantial Limitation 
Under the ADA, an impairment rises to the level of a disability if it 
substantially limits a major life activity. 18 "Substantial limitation" is 
evaluated in terms of the severity of the limitation and the length of 
time it restricts a major life activity. 19The determination that a 
particular individual has a substantially limiting impairment should be 
based on information about how the impairment affects that individual and 
not on generalizations about the condition. Relevant evidence for EEOC 
investigators includes descriptions of an individual's typical level of 
functioning at home, at work, and in other settings, as well as evidence 
showing that the individual's functional limitations are linked to his/her 
impairment. Expert testimony about substantial limitation is not 
necessarily required. Credible testimony from the individual with a 
disability and his/her family members, friends, or coworkers may suffice. 
5. When is an impairment sufficiently severe to substantially limit a 
major life activity? 
An impairment is sufficiently severe to substantially limit a major life 
activity if it prevents an individual from performing a major life 
activity or significantly restricts the condition, manner, or duration 
under which an individual can perform a major life activity, as compared 
to the average person in the general population. 20 An impairment does not 
significantly restrict major life activities if it results in only mild 
limitations. 
6. Should the corrective effects of ra^ c'j.cauqrs be considered when deciding 
if an impairment is so severe that it substantially limits a major life 
activity? 
No. The ADA legislative history unequivocally states that the extent to 
which an impairment limits performance of a major life activity is 
assessed without regard to mitigating measures, including medications.21 
Thus, an individual who is taking medication for a mental impairment has 
an ADA disability if there is evidence that the mental impairment, when 
left untreated, substantially limits a major life activity.22 Relevant 
evidence for EEOC investigators includes, for example, a description of 
how an individual's condition changed when s/he went off medication23 or 
needed to have dosages adjusted, or a description of his/her condition 
before starting medication.24 
7. How long does a mental impairment have to last to be substantially 
limiting? 
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An impairment is substantially limiting if it lasts for more than several 
months and significantly restricts the performance of one or more major 
life activities during that time. It is not substantially limiting if it 
lasts for only a brief time or does not significantly restrict an 
individuals ability to perform a major life activity.25 Whether the 
impairment is substantially limiting is assessed without regard to 
mitigating measures such as medication. 
Example A: An employee has had major depression for almost a 
year. He has been intensely sad and socially withdrawn (except for going 
to work) , has developed serious insomnia, and has had severe problems 
concentrating. This employee has an impairment (major depression) that 
significantly restricts his ability to interact with others, sleep, and 
concentrate. The effects of this impairment are severe and have lasted 
long enough to be substantially limiting. 
In addition, some conditions may be long-term, or potentially long-term, 
in that their duration is indefinite and unknowable or is expected to be 
at least several months. Such conditions, if severe, may constitute 
disabilities.26 
Example B: An employee has taken medication for bipolar 
disorder for a few months. For some time before starting medication, he 
experienced increasingly severe and frequent cycles of depression and 
mania; at times, he became extremely withdrawn socially or had difficulty 
caring for himself. His symptoms have abated with medication, but his 
doctor says that the duration and course of his bipolar disorder is 
indefinite, although it is potentially long-term. This employeefs 
impairment (bipolar disorder) significantly restricts his major life 
activities of interacting with others and caring for himself, when 
considered without medication. The effects of his impairment are severe, 
and their duration is indefinite and potentially long-term. 
However, conditions that are temporary and have no permanent or long-term 
effects on an individuals major life activities are not substantially 
limiting. 
Example C: An employee was distressed by the end of a 
romantic relationship. Although he continued his daily routine, he 
sometimes became agitated at work. He was most distressed for about a 
month during and immediately after the breakup. He sought counseling and 
his mood improved within weeks. His counselor gave him a diagnosis of 
"adjustment disorder" and stated that he was not expected to experience 
any long-term problems associated with this event. While he has an 
impairment (adjustment disorder) , his impairment was short-term, did not 
significantly restrict major life activities during that time, and was not 
expected to have permanent or long-term effects-. This employee does not 
have a disability for purposes of the ADA. 
8. Can chronic, episodic disorders be substantially limiting? 
Yes. Chronic, episodic conditions may constitute substantially limiting 
impairments if they are substantially limiting when active or have a high 
likelihood of recurrence in substantially limiting forms. For some 
individuals, psychiatric impairments such as bipolar disorder, major 
depression, and schizophrenia may remit and intensify, sometimes 
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repeatedly, over the course of several months or several years.27 
9. When does an impairment substantially limit an individual's ability to 
interact with others? 
An impairment substantially limits an individual's ability to interact 
with others if, due to the impairment, s/he is significantly restricted as 
compared to the average person in the general population. Some 
unfriendliness with coworkers or a supervisor would not, standing alone, 
be sufficient to establish a substantial limitation in interacting with 
others. An individual would be substantially limited, however, if his/ 
her relations with others were characterized on a regular basis by severe 
problems, for example, consistently high levels of hostility, social 
withdrawal, or failure to communicate when necessary. 
These limitations must be long-term or potentially long-term, as opposed 
to temporary, to justify a finding of ADA disability. 
Example: An individual diagnosed with schizophrenia now works 
successfully as a computer programmer for a large company. Before finding 
an effective medication, however, he stayed in his room at home for 
several months, usually refusing to talk to family and close friends. 
After finding an effective medication, he was able to return to school, 
graduate, and start his career. This individual has a mental impairment, 
schizophrenia, which substantially limits his ability to interact with 
others when evaluated without medication. Accordingly, he is an individual 
with a disability as defined by the ADA. 
10. When does an impairment substantially limit an individual's ability 
to concentrate? 
An impairment substantially limits an individual's ability to concentrate 
if, due to the impairment, s/he is significantly restricted as compared to 
the average person in the general population.28 For example, an individual 
would be substantially limited if s/he was easily and frequently 
distracted, meaning that his/her attention was frequently drawn to 
irrelevant sights or sounds or to intrusive thoughts; or if s/he 
experienced his/her "mind going blank" on a frequent basis. 
Such limitations must be long-term or potentially long-term, as opposed to 
temporary, to justify a finding of ADA disability. 29 
Example A: An employee who has an anxiety disorder says that 
his mind wanders frequently and that he is often distracted by irrelevant 
thoughts. As a. result, he makes repeated errors at work on detailed or 
complex tasks, even after being reprimanded. His doctor says that the 
errors are caused by his anxiety disorder and may last indefinitely. This 
individual has a disability because, as a result of an anxiety disorder, 
his ability to concentrate is significantly restricted as compared to the 
average person in the general population. 
Example B: An employee states that he has trouble 
concentrating when he is tired or during long meetings. He attributes 
this to his chronic depression. Although his ability to concentrate may 
be slightly limited due to depression (a mental impairment), it is not 
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significantly restricted as compared to the average person in the general 
population. Many people in the general population have difficulty 
concentrating when they are tired or during long meetings. 
11. When does an impairment substantially limit an individual's ability 
to sleep? 
An impairment substantially limits an individual' s ability to sleep if, 
due to the impairment, his/her sleep is significantly restricted as 
compared to the average person in the general population. These 
limitations must be long-term or potentially long-term as opposed to 
temporary to justify a finding of ADA disability. 
For example, an individual who sleeps only a negligible amount without 
TiT]^£?':"71 f° r many months, due to post-traumatic stress disorder,, would 
be significantly restricted as compared to the average person in the 
general population and therefore would be substantially limited in 
sleeping.30 Similarly, an individual who for several months typically 
slept about two to three hours per night without medication, due to 
depression, also would be substantially limited in sleeping. 
By contrast, an individual would not be substantially limited in sleeping 
if s/he had some trouble getting to sleep or sometimes slept fitfully 
because of a mental impairment. Although this individual may be slightly 
restricted in sleeping, s/he is not significantly restricted as compared 
to the average person in the general population. 
12. When does an impairment substantially limit an individual's ability 
to care for him/herself? 
An impairment substantially limits an individualf s ability to care for 
him/herself if, due to the impairment, an individual is significantly 
restricted as compared to the average person in the general population in 
performing basic activities such as getting up in the morning, bathing, 
dressing, and preparing or obtaining food. These limitations must be 
long-term or potentially long-term as opposed to temporary to justify a 
finding of ADA disability. 
Some psychiatric impairments, for example major depression, may result in 
an individual sleeping too much. In such cases, an individual may be 
substantially limited if, as a result of the impairment, s/he sleeps so 
much that s/he does not effectively care for him/herself. Alternatively, 
the individual may be substantially limited in working. 
DISCLOSURE OF DISABILITY 
Individuals with psychiatric disabilities may have questions about whether 
and when they must disclose their disability to their employer under the 
ADA* They may have concerns about the potential negative consequences of 
disclosing a psychiatric disability in the workplace, and about the 
confidentiality of information that they do disclose. 
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13. May an employer ask questions on a job application about history of 
treatment of mental illness, hospitalization, or the existence of mental 
or emotional illness or psychiatric disability? 
No. An employer may not ask questions that are likely to elicit 
information about a disability before making an offer of employment. 31 
Questions on a job application about psychiatric disability or mental or 
emotional illness or about treatment are likely to elicit information 
about a psychiatric disability and therefore are prohibited before an 
offer of employment is made. 
14. When may an employer lawfully ask an individual about a psychiatric 
disability under the ADA? 
An employer may ask for disability-related information, including 
information about psychiatric disability, only in the following limited 
circumstances: 
Application Stage. Employers are prohibited from asking 
disability-related questions before making an offer of employment. An 
exception, however, is if an applicant asks for reasonable accommodation 
for the hiring process. If the need for this accommodation is not 
obvious, an employer may ask an applicant for reasonable documentation 
about his/her disability. The employer may require the applicant to 
provide documentation from an appropriate professional concerning his/her 
disability and functional limitations. 32 A variety of health professionals 
may provide such documentation regarding psychiatric disabilities 
including primary health care professionals,33 psychiatrists, 
psychologists, psychiatric nurses, and licensed mental health 
professionals such as licensed clinical social workers and licensed 
professional counselors.34 
An employer should make clear to the applicant why it is requesting such 
information, i.e., to verify the existence of a disability and the need 
for an accommodation. Furthermore, the employer may request only 
information necessary to accomplish these limited purposes. 
Example A: An applicant for a secretarial job asks to take a 
typing test in a quiet location rather than in a busy reception area 
"because of a medical condition." The employer may make 
disability-related inquiries at this point because the applicant's need 
for reasonable accommodation under the ADA is not obvious based on the 
statement that an accommodation is needed "because of a medical 
condition." Specifically, the employer may ask the applicant to provide 
documentation showing that she has an impairment that substantially limits 
a major life activity and that she needs to take the typing test in a 
quiet location because of disability-related functional limitations. 35 
Although an employer may not ask an applicant if s/he will need reasonable 
accommodation for the job, there is an exception if the employer could 
reasonably believe, before making a job offer, that the applicant will 
need accommodation to perform the functions of the job. For an individual 
with a non-visible disability, this may occur if the individual 
voluntarily discloses his/her disability or if s/he voluntarily tells the 
employer that s/he needs reasonable accommodation to perform the job. The 
employer may then ask certain limited questions, specifically: 
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whether the applicant needs reasonable accommodation; and 
what type of reasonable accommodation would be needed to 
perform the functions of the job. 36 
After making an offer of employment, if the employer requires a 
post-offer, preemployment medical examination or inquiry. After an 
employer extends an offer of employment, the employer may require a 
medical examination (including a psychiatric examination) or ask questions 
related to disability (including questions about psychiatric disability) 
if the employer subjects all entering employees in the same job category 
to the same inquiries or examinations regardless of disability. The 
inquiries and examinations do not need to be related to the job. 37 
During employment, when a disability-related inquiry or medical 
examination of an employee is "job-related and consistent with business 
necessity. "38 This requirement may be met when an employer has a 
reasonable belief, based on objective evidence, that: (1) an employee1s 
ability to perform essential job functions39 will be impaired by a medical 
condition; or (2) an employee will pose a direct threat due to a medical 
condition. Thus, for example, inquiries or medical examinations are 
permitted if they follow-up on a request for reasonable accommodation when 
the need for accommodation is not obvious, or if they address reasonable 
concerns about whether an individual is fit to perform essential functions 
of his/her position. In addition, inquiries or examinations are permitted 
if they are required by another Federal law or regulation. 40 In these 
situations, the inquiries or examinations must not exceed the scope of the 
specific medical condition and its effect on the employee fs ability, with 
or without reasonable accommodation, to perform essential job functions or 
to work without posing a direct threat.41 
Example B: A delivery person does not learn the route he is 
required to take when he makes deliveries in a particular neighborhood. 
He often does not deliver items at all or delivers them to the wrong 
address. He is not adequately performing his essential function of making 
deliveries. There is no indication, however, that his failure to learn 
his route is related in any way to a medical condition. Because the 
employer does not have a reasonable belief, based on objective evidence, 
that this individual's ability to perform his essential job function is 
impaired by a medical condition, a medical examination (including a 
psychiatric examination) or disability-related inquiries would not be 
job-related and consistent with business necessity.42 
Example C: A limousine service knows that one of its best 
drivers has bipolar disorder and had a manic episode last year, which 
started when he was driving a group of diplomats to around-the-clock 
meetings. During the manic episode, the chauffeur engaged in behavior 
that posed a direct threat to himself and others (he repeatedly drove a 
company limousine in a reckless manner) . After a short leave of absence, 
he returned to work and to his usual high level of performance. The 
limousine service now wants to assign him to drive several business 
executives who may begin around-the-clock labor negotiations during the 
next several weeks. The employer is concerned, however, that this will 
trigger another manic episode and that, as a result, the employee will 
drive recklessly and pose a significant risk of substantial harm to 
himself and others. There is no indication that the employeefs condition 
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As background information for all employees, an employer may find it 
helpful to explain the requirements of the ADA, including the obligation 
to provide reasonable accommodation, in its employee handbook or in its 
employee orientation or training. 
REQUESTING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
An employer must provide a reasonable accommodation to the known physical 
or mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability unless 
it can show that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship. 45 An 
employeefs decision about requesting reasonable accommodation may be 
influenced by his/her concerns about the potential negative consequences 
of disclosing a psychiatric disability at work. Employees and employers 
alike have posed numerous questions about what constitutes a request for 
reasonable accommodation. 
17. When an individual decides to request reasonable accommodation, what 
must s/he say to make the request and start the reasonable accommodation 
process? 
When an individual decides to request accommodation, the individual or 
his/her representative must let the employer know that s/he needs an 
adjustment or change at work for a reason related to a medical condition. 
To request accommodation, an individual may use "plain English" and need 
not mention the ADA or use the phrase "reasonable accommodation. "46 
Example A: An employee asks for time off because he is 
"depressed and stressed." The employee has communicated a request for a 
change at work (time off) for a reason related to a medical condition 
(being "depressed and stressed" may be "plain English" for a medical 
condition) . This statement is sufficient to put the employer on notice 
that the employee is requesting reasonable accommodation. However, if the 
employee's need for accommodation is not obvious, the employer may ask for 
reasonable documentation concerning the employee's disability and 
functional limitations.47 
Example B: An employee submits a note from a health 
professional stating that he is having a stress reaction and needs one 
week off. Subsequently, his wife telephones the Human Resources department 
to say that the employee is disoriented and mentally falling apart and 
that the family is having him hospitalized. The wife asks about 
procedures for extending the employee' s leave and states that she will 
provide the necessary information as soon as possible but that she may 
need a little extra time. The wife's statement is sufficient to 
constitute a request for reasonable accommodation. The wife has asked for 
changes at work (an exception to the procedures for requesting leave and 
more time off) for a reason related to a medical condition (her husband 
had a stress reaction and is so mentally disoriented that he is being 
hospitalized) . As in the previous example, if the need for accommodation 
is not obvious, the employer may request documentation of disability and 
clarification of the need for accommodation. 48 
Example C: An employee asks to take a few days off to rest 
after the completion of a major project. The employee does not link her 
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"nan7 
has changed in the last year, or that his manic episode last year was not 
precipitated by the assignment to drive to around-the-clock meetings. The 
employer may make disability-related inquiries, or requirebacmedical 
examination, because it has a reasonable belief, based on obg&ctive 
evidence, that the employee will pose a direct threat to hdmself or others 
due to a medical condition. orie 
Example D: An employee with depression seeks to return to 
work after a leave of absence during which she was hospitali&ibd and her 
medication was adjusted. Her employer may request a fitness-for-duty 
examination because it has a reasonable belief, based on the employee's 
hospitalization and medication adjustment, that her abilifryrt® perform 
essential job functions may continue to be impaired by a meitt&al 
condition. This examination, however, must be limited to tMeteffect of 
her depression on her ability, with or without reasonable accommodation, 
to perform essential job functions. Inquiries about her e4tfe£e 
psychiatric history or about the details of her therapy sessions wculd, 
for example, exceed this limited scope. 
15. Do ADA confidentiality requirements apply to informati<&& about a 
psychiatric disability disclosed to an employer? say 
Yes. Employers must keep all information concerning the medical condition 
or history of its applicants or employees, including information about 
psychiatric disability, confidential under the ADA. This^fBMudes medical 
information that an individual voluntarily tells his/her emp&€yer. 
Employers must collect and maintain such information on sepa^&te forms and 
in separate medical files, apart from the usual personnel -'Mils. 43 There 
are limited exceptions to the ADA confidentiality requirements: 
E 
supervisors and managers may be told about necesS^r^1 restrictions 
on the work or duties of the employee and about necessary-a$&€>mmodations; 
?
^pre 
first aid and safety personnel may be told if the'disabilj ty 
might require emergency treatment; and ^mol 
z ne 
government o f f i c i a l s i n v e s t i g a t i n g compl iance w i t n xne ADA must 
be g i v e n r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n on r e q u e s t . 44 *- ^ x 
£ 
16. How can an employer respond when employees ask question* about a 
coworker who has a disability? 
,5
»t t 
If employees ask questions about a coworker who has a disaMMty, the 
employer must not disclose any medical information in respond. Apart 
from the limited exceptions listed in Question 15, the ADAr confidentiality 
provisions prohibit such disclosure. 'tie 
3 a 
An employer a l s o may n o t t e l l employees whether i t i s p r o v i d i n g a 
r e a s o n a b l e accommodation for a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l . A s t a t e m e n t t h a t an 
i n d i v i d u a l r e c e i v e s a r e a s o n a b l e accommodation d i s c l o s e s tna% t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l p r o b a b l y h a s a d i s a b i l i t y b e c a u s e on ly i n d i v i d u a l s ' wi th 
d i s a b i l i t i e s a r e e n t i t l e d t o r e a s o n a b l e accommodation u n d e r ^ f e ADA. I n 
r e s p o n s e t o coworker q u e s t i o n s , however , t h e employer may ek^flain t h a t i t 
i s a c t i n g for l e g i t i m a t e b u s i n e s s r e a s o n s o r i n c o m p l i a n c e wi th f e d e r a l 
l a w . E : 
- com} 
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need for a few days off to a medical condition. Thus, even though she has 
requested a change at work (time off) , her statement is not sufficient to 
put the employer on notice that she is requesting reasonable 
accommodation. 
18. May someone other than the employee request a reasonable 
accommodation on behalf of an individual with a disability? 
Yes, a family member, friend, health professional, or other representative 
may request a reasonable accommodation on behalf of an individual with a 
disability.49 Of course, an employee may refuse to accept an accommodation 
that is not needed. 
19. Do requests for reasonable accommodation need to be in writing? 
No. Requests for reasonable accommodation do not need to be in writing. 
Employees may request accommodations in conversation or may use any other 
mode of communication.50 
20. When should an individual with a disability request a reasonable 
accommodation to do the job? 
An individual with a disability is not required to request a reasonable 
accommodation at the beginning of employment. S/he may request a 
reasonable accommodation at any time during employment.51 
21. May an employer ask an employee for documentation when the employee 
requests reasonable accommodation for the job? 
Yes. When the need for accommodation is not obvious, an employer may ask 
an employee for reasonable documentation about his/her disability and 
functional limitations. The employer is entitled to know that the 
employee has a covered disability for which s/he needs a reasonable 
accommodation. 52 A variety of health professionals may provide such 
documentation with regard to psychiatric disabilities. 53 
Example A: An employee asks for time off because he is 
"depressed and stressed." Although this statement is sufficient to put 
the employer on notice that he is requesting accommodation, 54 the 
employee's need for accommodation is not obvious based on this statement 
alone. Accordingly, the employer may require reasonable documentation that 
the employee has a disability within the meaning of the ADA and, if he has 
such a disability, that the functional limitations of the disability 
necessitate time off. 
Example B: Same as Example A, except that the employer 
requires the employee to submit all of the records from his health 
professional regarding his mental health history, including materials that 
are not relevant to disability and reasonable accommodation under the ADA. 
This is not a request for reasonable documentation. All of these records 
are not required to determine if the employee has a disability as defined 
by the ADA and needs the requested reasonable accommodation because of his 
disability-related functional limitations. As one alternative, in order 
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to determine the scope of its ADA obligations, the employer may ask the 
employee to sign a limited release allowing the employer to submit a list 
of specific questions to the employee's health care professional about his 
condition and need for reasonable accommodation. 
22. May an employer require an employee to go to a health care 
professional of the employer's (rather than the employee's) choice for 
purposes of documenting need for accommodation and disability? 
The ADA does not prevent an employer from requiring an employee to go to 
an appropriate health professional of the employer's choice if the 
employee initially provides insufficient information to substantiate that 
s/he has an ADA disability and needs a reasonable accommodation. Of 
course, any examination must be job-related and consistent with business 
necessity. 55 If an employer requires an employee to go to a health 
professional of the employer's choice, the employer must pay all costs 
associated with the visit(s). 
SELECTED TYPES OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
Reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis because workplaces and jobs vary, as do 
people with disabilities. Accommodations for individuals with psychiatric 
disabilities may involve changes to workplace policies, procedures, or 
practices. Physical changes to the workplace or extra equipment also may 
be effective reasonable accommodations for some people. 
In some instances, the precise nature of an effective accommodation for an 
individual may not be immediately apparent. Mental health professionals, 
including psychiatric rehabilitation counselors, may be able to make 
suggestions about particular accommodations and, of equal importance, help 
employers and employees communicate effectively about reasonable 
accommodation.56 The questions below discuss selected types of reasonable 
accommodation that may be effective for certain individuals with 
psychiatric disabilities.57 
23. Does reasonable accommodation include giving an individual with a 
disability time off from work or a modified work schedule? 
Yes. Permitting the use of accrued paid leave or providing additional 
unpaid leave for treatment or recovery related to a disability is a 
reasonable accommodation, unless (or until) the employee's absence imposes 
an undue hardship on the operation of the employer's business. 58 This 
includes leaves of absence, occasional leave (e.g., a few hours at a 
time), and part-time scheduling. 
A related reasonable accommodation is to allow an individual with a 
disability to change his/her regularly scheduled working hours, for 
example, to work 10 AM to 6 PM rather than 9 AM to 5 PM, barring undue 
hardship. Some medications taken for psychiatric disabilities cause 
extreme grogginess and lack of concentration in the morning. Depending on 
the job, a later schedule can enable the employee to perform essential job 
functions. 
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24. What t y p e s of p h y s i c a l changes t o t h e workp lace or equ ipment can 
se rve a s accommodations f o r p e o p l e with p s y c h i a t r i c d i s a b i l i t i e s ? 
Simple p h y s i c a l changes t o t h e workplace may be e f f e c t i v e accommodations 
for some i n d i v i d u a l s w i th p s y c h i a t r i c d i s a b i l i t i e s . For example , room 
d i v i d e r s , p a r t i t i o n s , o r o t h e r soundproof ing o r v i s u a l b a r r i e r s between 
workspaces may accommodate i n d i v i d u a l s who have d i s a b i l i t y - r e l a t e d 
l i m i t a t i o n s i n c o n c e n t r a t i o n . Moving an i n d i v i d u a l away from n o i s y 
machinery o r reduc ing o t h e r workplace n o i s e t h a t can be a d j u s t e d ( e . g . , 
l ower ing t h e volume or p i t c h of t e l ephones ) a r e s i m i l a r r e a s o n a b l e 
accommodat ions . P e r m i t t i n g an i n d i v i d u a l t o wear headphones t o b l o c k out 
no i sy d i s t r a c t i o n s a l s o may be e f f e c t i v e . 
Some i n d i v i d u a l s who have d i s a b i l i t y - r e l a t e d l i m i t a t i o n s i n c o n c e n t r a t i o n 
may b e n e f i t from access t o equipment l i k e a t a p e r e c o r d e r f o r r e v i e w i n g 
even t s such as t r a i n i n g s e s s i o n s or m e e t i n g s . 
25 . I s i t a r e a sonab l e accommodation t o modify a workplace p o l i c y ? 
Yes. I t i s a r e a sonab l e accommodation t o modify a workplace p o l i c y when 
n e c e s s i t a t e d by an i n d i v i d u a l ' s d i s a b i l i t y - r e l a t e d l i m i t a t i o n s , b a r r i n g 
undue h a r d s h i p . 59 For example , i t would be a r e a s o n a b l e accommodation t o 
a l low an i n d i v i d u a l wi th a d i s a b i l i t y , who h a s d i f f i c u l t y c o n c e n t r a t i n g 
due t o t h e d i s a b i l i t y , t o t a k e d e t a i l e d n o t e s d u r i n g c l i e n t p r e s e n t a t i o n s 
even though company p o l i c y d i s c o u r a g e s employees from t a k i n g e x t e n s i v e 
no t e s d u r i n g such s e s s i o n s . 
Example: A r e t a i l employer does n o t a l low i n d i v i d u a l s working 
as c a s h i e r s t o d r i n k b e v e r a g e s a t checkout s t a t i o n s . The r e t a i l e r a l s o 
l i m i t s c a s h i e r s t o two 15 -minu t e breaks d u r i n g an e i g h t - h o u r s h i f t , i n 
a d d i t i o n t o a meal b r e a k . An i n d i v i d u a l w i t h a p s y c h i a t r i c d i s a b i l i t y 
needs t o d r i n k beverages a p p r o x i m a t e l y once an hour i n o r d e r t o combat dry 
mouth, a s i d e - e f f e c t of h i s p s y c h i a t r i c m e d i c a t i o n . This i n d i v i d u a l 
r e q u e s t s r e a s o n a b l e accommodation. In t h i s example , t h e employer should 
c o n s i d e r e i t h e r modifying i t s p o l i c y a g a i n s t d r i n k i n g b e v e r a g e s a t 
checkout s t a t i o n s or modi fy ing i t s p o l i c y l i m i t i n g c a s h i e r s t o two 
15-minute b r e a k s each day p l u s a meal b r e a k , b a r r i n g undue h a r d s h i p . 
Gran t ing an employee t ime o f f from work o r an a d j u s t e d work s c h e d u l e as a 
r e a s o n a b l e accommodation may i n v o l v e modi fy ing l e a v e or a t t e n d a n c e 
p r o c e d u r e s o r p o l i c i e s . As an example, i t would be a r e a s o n a b l e 
accommodation t o modify a p o l i c y r e q u i r i n g employees t o s c h e d u l e v a c a t i o n 
t ime i n advance i f an o t h e r w i s e q u a l i f i e d i n d i v i d u a l wi th a d i s a b i l i t y 
needed t o u s e accrued v a c a t i o n t ime on an u n s c h e d u l e d b a s i s b e c a u s e of 
d i s a b i l i t y - r e l a t e d medica l p r o b l e m s , b a r r i n g undue h a r d s h i p . 6 0 I n 
a d d i t i o n , an employer, i n s p i t e of a " n o - l e a v e " p o l i c y , may, i n 
a p p r o p r i a t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , be r e q u i r e d t o p r o v i d e l e a v e t o an employee 
with a d i s a b i l i t y as a r e a s o n a b l e accommodation, u n l e s s t h e p r o v i s i o n of 
l eave would impose an undue h a r d s h i p . 61 
26. I s a d j u s t i n g s u p e r v i s o r y methods a form of r e a s o n a b l e accommodation? 
Yes. S u p e r v i s o r s p l a y a c e n t r a l r o l e i n a c h i e v i n g e f f e c t i v e r e a s o n a b l e 
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accommodations for their employees. In some circumstances, supervisors 
may be able to adjust their methods as a reasonable accommodation by, for 
example, communicating assignments, instructions, or training by the 
medium that is most effective for a particular individual (e.g., in 
writing, in conversation, or by electronic mail) . Supervisors also may 
provide or arrange additional training or modified training materials. 
Adjusting the level of supervision or structure sometimes may enable an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability to perform essential job 
functions. For example, an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability who experiences limitations in concentration may request more 
detailed day-to-day guidance, feedback, or structure in order to perform 
his job.62 
Example: An employee requests more daily guidance and 
feedback as a reasonable accommodation for limitations associated with a 
psychiatric disability. In response to his request, the employer consults 
with the employee, his health care professional, and his supervisor about 
how his limitations are manifested in the office (the employee is unable 
to stay focused on the steps necessary to complete large projects) and how 
to make effective and practical changes to provide the structure he needs. 
As a result of these consultations, the supervisor and employee work out a 
long-term plan to initiate weekly meetings to review the status of large 
projects and identify which steps need to be taken next. 
27. Is it a reasonable accommodation to provide a job coach? 
Yes. An employer may be required to provide a temporary job coach to 
assist in the training of a qualified individual with a disability as a 
reasonable accommodation, barring undue hardship. 63 An employer also may 
be required to allow a job coach paid by a public or private social 
service agency to accompany the employee at the job site as a reasonable 
accommodation. 
28. Is it a reasonable accommodation to make sure that an individual 
takes medication as prescribed? 
No. Medication monitoring is not a reasonable accommodation. Employers 
have no obligation to monitor medication because doing so does not remove 
a barrier that is unique to the workplace. When people do not take 
medication as prescribed, it affects them on and off the job. 
29. When is reassignment to a different position required as a reasonable 
accommodation? 
In general, reassignment must be considered as a reasonable accommodation 
when accommodation in the present job would cause undue hardship64 or 
would not be possible. 65 Reassignment may be considered if there are 
circumstances under which both the employer and employee voluntarily agree 
that it is preferable to accommodation in the present position. 66 
Reassignment should be made to an equivalent position that is vacant or 
will become vacant within a reasonable amount of time. If an equivalent 
position is not available, the employer must look for a vacant position at 
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a lower level for which the employee is qualified. Reassignment is not 
required if a vacant position at a lower level is also unavailable. 
CONDUCT 
Maintaining satisfactory conduct and performance typically is not a 
problem for individuals with psychiatric disabilities. Nonetheless, 
circumstances arise when employers need to discipline individuals with 
such disabilities for misconduct. 
30. May an employer discipline an individual with a disability for 
violating a workplace conduct standard if the misconduct resulted from a 
disability? 
Yes, provided that the workplace conduct standard is job-related for the 
position in question and is consistent with business necessity. 67 For 
example, nothing in the ADA prevents an employer from maintaining a 
workplace free of violence or threats of violence, or from disciplining an 
employee who steals or destroys property. Thus, an employer may 
discipline an employee with a disability for engaging in such misconduct 
if it would impose the same discipline on an employee without a 
disability. 68 Other conduct standards, however, may not be job-related for 
the position in question and consistent with business necessity. If they 
are not, imposing discipline under them could violate the ADA. 
Example A: An employee steals money from his employer. Even 
if he asserts that his misconduct was caused by a disability, the employer 
may discipline him consistent with its uniform disciplinary policies 
because the individual violated a conduct standard — a prohibition 
against employee theft — that is job-related for the position in question 
and consistent with business necessity. 
Example B: An employee at a clinic tampers with and 
incapacitates medical equipment. Even if the employee explains that she 
did this because of her disability, the employer may discipline her 
consistent with its uniform disciplinary policies because she violated a 
conduct standard — a rule prohibiting intentional damage to equipment — 
that is job-related for the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity. However, if the employer disciplines her even though 
it has not disciplined people without disabilities for the same 
misconduct, the employer would be treating her differently because of 
disability in violation of the ADA. 
Example C: An employee with a psychiatric disability works in 
a warehouse loading boxes onto pallets for shipment. He has no customer 
contact and does not come into regular contact with other employees. Over 
the course of several weeks, he has come to work appearing increasingly 
disheveled. His clothes are ill-fitting and often have tears in them. He 
also has become increasingly anti-social. Coworkers have complained that 
when they try to engage him in casual conversation, he walks away or gives 
a curt reply. When he has to talk to a coworker, he is abrupt and rude. 
His work, however, has not suffered. The employer!s company handbook 
states that employees should have a neat appearance at all times. The 
handbook also states that employees should be courteous to each other. 
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When told that he is being disciplined for his appearance and treatment of 
coworkers, the employee explains that his appearance and demeanor have 
deteriorated because of his disability which was exacerbated during this 
time period. 
The dress code and coworker courtesy rules are not job-related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity because this 
employee has no customer contact and does not come into regular contact 
with other employees. Therefore, rigid application of these rules to this 
employee would violate the ADA. 
31. Must an employer make reasonable accommodation for an individual with 
a disability who violated a conduct rule that is job-related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity? 
An employer must make reasonable accommodation to enable an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability to meet such a conduct standard in 
the future, barring undue hardship. 69 Because reasonable accommodation is 
always prospective, however, an employer is not required to excuse past 
misconduct.70 
Example A: A reference librarian frequently loses her temper 
at work, disrupting the library atmosphere by shouting at patrons and 
coworkers. After receiving a suspension as the second step in uniform, 
progressive discipline, she discloses her disability, states that it 
causes her behavior, and requests a leave of absence for treatment. The 
employer may discipline her because she violated a conduct standard — a 
rule prohibiting disruptive behavior towards patrons and coworkers — that 
is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity. The employer, however, must grant her request for a leave of 
absence as a reasonable accommodation, barring undue hardship, to enable 
her to meet this conduct standard in the future. 
Example B: An employee with major depression is often late 
for work because of medication side-effects that make him extremely groggy 
in the morning. His scheduled hours are 9:00 AM to 5:30 PM, but he 
arrives at 9:00, 9:30, 10:00 or even 10:30 on any given day. His job 
responsibilities involve telephone contact with the company's traveling 
sales representatives, who depend on him to answer urgent marketing 
questions and expedite special orders. The employer disciplines him for 
tardiness, stating that continued failure to arrive promptly during the 
next month will result in termination of his employment. The individual 
then explains that he was late because of a disability and needs to work 
on a later schedule. In this situation, the employer may discipline the 
employee because he violated a conduct standard addressing tardiness that 
is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity. The employer, however, must consider reasonable accommodation, 
barring undue hardship, to enable this individual to meet this standard in 
the future. For example, if this individual can serve the company's sales 
representatives by regularly working a schedule of 10:00 AM to 6:30 PM, a 
reasonable accommodation would be to modify his schedule so that he is not 
required to report for work until 10:00 AM. 
Example C: An employee has a hostile altercation with his 
supervisor and threatens the supervisor with physical harm. The employer 
immediately terminates the individual's employment, consistent with its 
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policy of immediately terminating the employment of anyone who threatens a 
supervisor. When he learns that his employment has been terminated, the 
employee asks the employer to put the termination on hold and to give him 
a month off for treatment instead. This is the employee's first request 
for accommodation and also the first time the employer learns about the 
employee's disability. The employer is not required to rescind the 
discharge under these circumstances, because the employee violated a 
conduct standard — a rule prohibiting threats of physical harm against 
supervisors — that is job-related for the position in question and 
consistent with business necessity. The employer also is not required to 
offer reasonable accommodation for the future because this individual is 
no longer a qualified individual with a disability. His employment was 
terminated under a uniformly applied conduct standard that is job-related 
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity. 71 
32. How should an employer deal with an employee with a disability who is 
engaging in misconduct because s/he is not taking his/her medication? 
The employer should focus on the employee's conduct and explain to the 
employee the consequences of continued misconduct in terms of uniform 
disciplinary procedures. It is the employee's responsibility to decide 
about medication and to consider the consequences of not taking 
medication.72 
DIRECT THREAT 
Under the ADA, an employer may lawfully exclude an individual from 
employment for safety reasons only if the employer can show that 
employment of the individual would pose a "direct threat."73 Employers 
must apply the "direct threat" standard uniformly and may not use safety 
concerns to justify exclusion of persons with disabilities when persons 
without disabilities would not be excluded in similar circumstances.74 
The EEOC's ADA regulations explain that "direct threat" means "a 
significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the 
individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable 
accommodation."75 A "significant" risk is a high, and not just a slightly 
increased, risk.76 The determination that an individual poses a "direct 
threat" must be based on an individualized assessment of the individual's 
present ability to safely perform the functions of the job, considering a 
reasonable medical judgment relying on the most current medical knowledge 
and/or the best available objective evidence.77 With respect to the 
employment of individuals with psychiatric disabilities, the employer must 
identify the specific behavior that would pose a direct threat.78 An 
individual does not pose a "direct threat" simply by virtue of having a 
history of psychiatric disability or being treated for a psychiatric 
disability.79 
33. Does an individual pose a direct threat in operating machinery solely 
because s/he takes medication that may as a side effect diminish 
concentration and/or coordination for some people? 
No. An individual does not pose a direct threat solely because s/he takes 
a medication that may diminish coordination or concentration for some 
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people as a side effect. Whether such an individual poses a direct threat 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis, based on a reasonable medical 
judgment relying on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best 
available objective evidence. Therefore, an employer must determine the 
nature and severity of this individual's side effects, how those side 
effects influence his/her ability to safely operate the machinery, and 
whether s/he has had safety problems in the past when operating the same 
or similar machinery while taking the medication. If a significant risk 
of substantial harm exists, then an employer must determine if there is a 
reasonable accommodation that will reduce or eliminate the risk. 
Example: An individual receives an offer for a job in which 
she will operate an electric saw, conditioned on a post-offer medical 
examination. In response to questions at this medical examination, the 
individual discloses her psychiatric disability and states that she takes 
a medication to control it. This medication is known to sometimes affect 
coordination and concentration. The company doctor determines that the 
individual experiences negligible side effects from the medication because 
she takes a relatively low dosage. She also had an excellent safety 
record at a previous job, where she operated similar machinery while 
taking the same medication. This individual does not pose a direct 
threat. 
34. When can an employer refuse to hire someone based on his/her history 
of violence or threats of violence? 
An employer may refuse to hire someone based on his/her history of 
violence or threats of violence if. it can show that the individual poses a 
direct threat. A determination of "direct threat" must be based on an 
individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely 
perform the functions of the job, considering the most current medical 
knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence. To find that an 
individual with a psychiatric disability poses a direct threat, the 
employer must identify the specific behavior on the part of the individual 
that would pose the direct threat. This includes an assessment of the 
likelihood and imminence of future violence. 
Example: An individual applies for a position with Employer X. 
When Employer X checks his employment background, she learns that he was 
terminated two weeks ago by Employer Y, after he told a coworker that he 
would get a gun and "get his supervisor if he tries anything again." 
Employer X also learns that these statements followed three months of 
escalating incidents in which this individual had had several altercations 
in the workplace, including one in which he had to be restrained from 
fighting with a coworker. He then revealed his disability to Employer Y. 
After being given time off for medical treatment, he continued to have 
trouble controlling his temper and was seen punching the wall outside his 
supervisor's office. Finally, he made the threat against the supervisor 
and was terminated. Employer X learns that, since then, he has not 
received any further medical treatment. Employer X does not hire him, 
stating that this history indicates that he poses a direct threat. 
This individual poses a direct threat as a result of his disability 
because his recent overt acts and statements (including an attempted fignr 
with a coworker, punching the wall, and making a threatening statement 
about the supervisor) support the conclusion that he poses a "significant 
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risk of substantial harm." Furthermore, his prior treatment had no effect 
on his behavior, he had received no subsequent treatment, and only two 
weeks had elapsed since his termination, all supporting a finding of 
direct threat. 
35. Does an individual who has attempted suicide pose a direct threat 
when s/he seeks to return to work? 
No, in most circumstances. As with other questions of direct threat, an 
employer must base its determination on an individualized assessment of 
the person's ability to safely perform job functions when s/he returns to 
work. Attempting suicide does not mean that an individual poses an 
imminent risk of harm to him/herself when s/he returns to work. In 
analyzing direct threat (including the likelihood and imminence of any 
potential harm) , the employer must seek reasonable medical judgments 
relying on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available 
factual evidence concerning the employee. 
Example: An employee with a known psychiatric disability was 
hospitalized for two suicide attempts, which occurred within several weeks 
of each other. When the employee asked to return to work, the employer 
allowed him to return pending an evaluation of medical reports to 
determine his ability to safely perform his job. The individual's 
therapist and psychiatrist both submitted documentation stating that he 
could safely perform all of his job functions. Moreover, the employee 
performed his job safely after his return, without reasonable 
accommodation. The employer, however, terminated the individual's 
employment after evaluating the doctor's and therapist's reports, without 
citing any contradictory medical or factual evidence concerning the 
employee's recovery. Without more evidence, this employer cannot support 
its determination that this individual poses a direct threat. 80 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
Individuals may have difficulty obtaining state-issued professional 
licenses if they have, or have a record of, a psychiatric disability. 
When a psychiatric disability results in denial or delay of a professional 
license, people may lose employment opportunities. 
36. Would an individual have grounds for filing an ADA charge if an 
employer refused to hire him/her (or revoked a job offer) because s/he did 
not have a professional license due to a psychiatric disability? 
If an individual filed a charge on these grounds, EEOC would investigate 
to determine whether the professional license was required by law for the 
position at issue, and whether the employer in fact did not hire the 
individual because s/he lacked the license. If the employer did not hire 
the individual because s/he lacked a legally-required professional 
license, and the individual claims that the licensing process 
discriminates against individuals with psychiatric disabilities, EEOC 
would coordinate with the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 
Disability Rights Section, which enforces Title II of the ADA covering 
state licensing requirements. 
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1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117, 12201-12213 (1994) (codified as amended). 
2 H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 31-32 (1990) [hereinafter House 
Judiciary Report]. 
3 Between July 26, 1992, and September 30, 1996, approximately 12.7% of 
ADA charges filed with EEOC were based on emotional or psychiatric 
impairment. These included charges based on anxiety disorders, 
depression, bipolar disorder (manic depression), schizophrenia, and other 
psychiatric impairments. 
4 The analysis in this guidance applies to federal sector complaints of 
non-affirmative action employment discrimination arising under section 501 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. § 791(g) (1994). It also 
applies to complaints of non-affirmative action employment discrimination 
arising under section 503 and employment discrimination under section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793(d), 794(d) (1994). 
5 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1996). See 
generally EEOC Compliance Manual § 902, Definition of the Term 
"Disability," 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7251 (1995). 
6 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (1996). This ADA regulatory definition also 
refers to mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, and specific 
learning disabilities. These additional mental conditions, as well as 
other neurological disorders such as Alzheimer's disease, are not the 
primary focus of this guidance. 
7 See, e.g., Boldini v. Postmaster Gen., 928 F. Supp. 125, 130, 5 AD Cas. 
(BNA) 11, 14 (D.N.H. 1995) (stating, under section 501 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, that "in circumstances of mental impairment, a court 
may give weight to a diagnosis of mental impairment which is described in 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American 
Psychiatric Association . . . . " ) . 
8 These include various sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, 
kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive substance use disorders resulting 
from current illegal use of drugs. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (1994); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.3(d) (1996). 
9 42 U.S.C. § 12210(a) (1994). However, individuals who are not currently 
engaging in the illegal use of drugs and who are participating in, or have 
successfully completed, a supervised drug rehabilitation program (or who 
have otherwise been successfully rehabilitated) may be covered by the ADA. 
Individuals who are erroneously regarded as engaging in the current 
illegal use of drugs, but who are not engaging in such use, also may be 
covered. Id. at § 12210(b). 
Individuals with psychiatric disabilities may, either as part of 
their condition or separate from their condition, engage in the illegal 
use of drugs. In such cases, EEOC investigators may need to make a 
factual determination about whether an employer treated an individual 
adversely because of his/her psychiatric disability or because of his/her 
illegal use of drugs. 
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10 See DSM-IV chapter "Other Conditions That May Be a Focus of Clinical 
Attention." 
11 Individuals who do not have a mental impairment but are treated by 
their employers as having a substantially limiting impairment have a 
disability as defined by the ADA because they are regarded as having a 
substantially limiting impairment. See EEOC Compliance Manual § 902.8, 
Definition of the Term "Disability," 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7282 (1995). 
12 This discussion refers to the terms "impairment" and "substantially 
limit" in the present tense. These references are not meant to imply that 
the determinations of whether a condition is an impairment, or of whether • 
there is substantial limitation, are relevant only to whether an 
individual meets the first part of the definition of "disability," i.e., 
actually has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a 
major life activity. These determinations also are relevant to whether an 
individual has a record of a substantially limiting impairment or is 
regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment. See id. §§ 902.7, 
902.8, Definition of the Term "Disability," 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 
405:7276-78, 7281 (1995). 
13 Id. § 902.2(c)(4), Definition of the Term "Disability," 8 FEP Manual 
(BNA) 405:7258 (1995). 
14 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1) (1996). See 
also EEOC Compliance Manual § 902.3, Definition of the Term "Disability," 
8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7261 (1995). 
15 Interacting with others, as a major life activity, is not substantially 
limited just because an individual is irritable or has some trouble 
getting along with a supervisor or coworker. 
16 Sleeping is not substantially limited just because an individual has 
some trouble getting to sleep or occasionally sleeps fitfully. 
17 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (1996) ("[i]f an individual is 
not substantially limited with respect to any other major life activity, 
the individual's ability to perform the major life activity of working 
should be considered . . . . " ) ; see also EEOC Compliance Manual § 
902.4(c) (2), Definition of the Term "Disability," 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 
405:7266 (1995). 
18 42 U . S . C . §• 1 2 1 0 2 ( 2 ) ( 1 9 9 4 ) . 
19 See g e n e r a l l y EEOC Compliance Manual § 9 0 2 . 4 , D e f i n i t i o n of t h e Term 
" D i s a b i l i t y , " 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7262 (1995) . 
20 S e e 29 C . F . R . § 1 6 3 0 . 2 ( j ) ( 1 9 9 6 ) . 
21 S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 
(1990); House Judiciary Report, supra n.2, at 28-29. See also 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (1996). 
22 ADA c a s e s in which c o u r t s have d i s r e g a r d e d t h e p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s of 
m e d i c a t i o n s or o t h e r t r e a t m e n t i n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of d i s a b i l i t y i n c l u d e 
Canon v . C la rk , 883 F. Supp . 718, 4 AD Cas . (BNA) 734 (S.D. F l a . 1995) 
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(finding that individual with insulin-dependent diabetes stated an ADA 
claim), and Sarsycki v. United Parcel Ser., 862 F. Supp. 336, 340, 3 AD 
Cas. (BNA) 1039 (W.D. Okla. 1994) (stating that substantial limitation 
should be evaluated without regard to medication and finding that an 
individual with insulin-dependent diabetes had a disability under the 
ADA) . Pertinent Rehabilitation Act cases in which courts have mads 
similar determinations include Liff v. Secretary of Transp., 1994 WL 
579912, at *3-*4 (D.D.C. 1994) (deciding under the Rehabilitation <\ct, 
after acknowledging pertinent ADA guidance, that depression controlled by 
medication is a disability), and Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 641, 2 AD 
Cas. (BNA) 60 (2d Cir. 1991) (determining under the Rehabilitation Act 
that an individual who could not function without kidney dialysis had a 
substantially limiting impairment). 
Cases in which courts have found that individuals are not 
substantially limited after considering the positive effects of medication 
are, in the Commissions view, incorrectly decided. See, e.g., Mackie v. 
Runyon, 804 F. Supp. 1508,1510-11, 2 AD Cas. (BNA) 260 (M.D. Fla. 1992) 
(holding under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act that bipolar disorder 
stabilized by medication is not substantially limiting) ; Chandler v. City 
of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1390-91, 2 AD Cas. (BNA) 1326 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(holding under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act that an individual 
with insulin-dependent diabetes did not have a disability) , cert, 
denied,114 S. Ct. 1386, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 512 (1994). 
23 Some individuals do not experience renewed symptoms when they stop 
taking medication. These individuals are still covered by the ADA, 
however, if they have a record of a substantially limiting impairment 
(i.e., if their psychiatric impairment was sufficiently severe ana 
long-lasting to be substantially limiting). 
24 If medications cause negative side effects, these side effects should 
be considered in assessing whether the individual is substantially 
limited. See, e.g., Guice-Mills v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 794, 2 AD Cas. 
(BNA) 187 (2d Cir. 1992) . 
25 EEOC Compliance Manual § 902.4(d), Definition of the Term "Disability," 
8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7273 (1995). 
26 Id., 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7271. 
27 See, e.g., Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 861 F. Supp. 512, 3 AD 
Cas. (BNA) 1066 (E.D. Va. 1994) (vacating its earlier ruling (at 3 AD Cas. 
(BNA) 780) that plaintiff's recurrent major depression did not constitute 
a "disability" under the ADA). 
28 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (ii) (1996); EEOC Compliance Manual § 902.3(b), 
Definition of the Term "Disability," 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7261 (1995). 
29 Substantial limitation in concentrating also may be associated with 
learning disabilities, neurological disorders, and physical trauma to the 
brain (e.g., stroke, brain tumor, or head injury in a car accident). 
Although this guidance does not focus on these particular impairments, the 
analysis of basic ADA issues is consistent regardless of the nature of the 
condition. 
30 A 1994 survey of 1,000 American adults reports that 71% averaged 5-8 
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hours of sleep a night on weeknights and that 55% averaged 5-8 hours a 
night on weekends (with 37% getting more than 8 hours a night on 
weekends). See The Cutting Edge: Vital Statistics — America's Sleep 
Habits, Washington Post, May 24, 1994, Health Section at 5. 
31 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(a) (1996). See 
also EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment Disability-Related Questions 
and Medical Examinations at 4, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7192 (1995). 
32 Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment Disability-Related Questions and 
Medical Examinations at 6, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7193 (1995). 
33 When a primary health care professional supplies documentation about a 
psychiatric disability, his/her credibility depends on how well s/he knows 
the individual and on his/her knowledge about the psychiatric disability. 
34 Important information about an applicant's functional limitations also 
may be obtained from non-professionals, such as the applicant, his/her 
family members, and friends. 
35 In response to the employer's request for documentation, the applicant 
may elect to revoke the request for accommodation and to take the test in 
the reception area. In these circumstances, where the request for 
reasonable accommodation has been withdrawn, the employer cannot continue 
to insist on obtaining the documentation. 
36 EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment Disability-RelatedQuestions 
and Medical Examinations at 6-7, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7193-94 (1995). 
37 If an employer uses the results of these inquiries or examinations to 
screen out an individual because of disability, the employer must prove 
that the exclusionary criteria are job-related and consistent with 
business necessity, and cannot be met with reasonable accommodation, in 
order to defend against a charge of employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(b)(6) (1994); 29 C.F.R.§§ 1630.10, 1630.14(b)(3), 1630.15(b) 
(1996). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c) (1996). 
39 A "qualified" individual with a disability is one who can perform the 
essential functions of a position with or without reasonable 
accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). An employer does not have to 
lower production standards, whether qualitative or quantitative, to enable 
an individual with a disability to perform an essential function. See 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(n) (1996). 
40 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) (1996) ("It may be a defense to a charge of 
discrimination . . . that a challenged action is required or necessitated 
by another Federal law or regulation . . . .") . 
41 There may be additional situations which could meet the "job-related 
and consistent with business necessity" standard. For example, periodic 
medical examinations for public safety positions that are narrowly 
tailored to address specific job-related concerns and are shown to be 
consistent with business necessity would be permissible. 
42 Of course, an employer would be justified in taking disciplinary action 
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in these circumstances. 
43 For a discussion of other confidentiality issues, see EEOC Enforcement 
Guidance: Preemployment Disability-Related Questions and Medical 
Examinations at 21-23, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7201-02 (1995). 
44 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (3) (B) , (4) (C) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (1) 
(1996) . The Commission has interpreted the ADA to allow employers to 
disclose medical information to state workers1 compensation offices, state 
second injury funds, or workers1 compensation insurance carriers in 
accordance with state workers' compensation laws. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. 
§ 1630.14(b) (1996). The Commission also has interpreted the ADA to 
permit employers to use medical information for insurance purposes. Id. 
See also EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment Disability-Related 
Questions and Medical Examinations at 21 nn.24, 25, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 
405:7201 nn.24, 25 (1995). 
45 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9), 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994); 29 C.F.R.§ 1630.2(o), 
.9 (1996); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (1996). 
46 Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 1141 (D. 
Or. 1994) (an employee's request for reasonable accommodation need not use 
"magic words" and can be in plain English). See Bultemeyer v. Ft. Wayne 
Community Sens., 6 AD Cas. (BNA) 67 (7th Cir. 1996) (an employee with a 
known psychiatric disability requested reasonable accommodation by stating 
that he could not do a particular job and by submitting a note from his 
psychiatrist). 
47 See Question 21 infra about employers requesting documentation after 
receiving a request for reasonable accommodation. 
48 In the Commission's view, Miller v. Natfl Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627, 4 AD 
Cas. (BNA) 1089 (8th Cir. 1995) was incorrectly decided. The court in 
Miller held that the employer was not alerted to Miller !s disability and 
need for accommodation despite the fact that Miller's sister phon€id the 
employer repeatedly and informed it that Miller was falling apart mentally 
and that the family was trying to get her into a hospital. See also 
Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1653(5th Cir. 1996). 
49 Cf. Beck v. Univ. of Wis., 75 F.3d 1130, 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 304 (7th Cir. 
1996) (assuming, without discussion, that a doctor's note requesting 
reasonable accommodation on behalf of his patient triggered the reasonable 
accommodation process); Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 3 AD 
Cas. (BNA) 1141 (D. Or. 1994) (stating that a doctor need not be expressly 
authorized to request accommodation on behalf of an employee in order to 
make a valid request) . 
In addition, because the reasonable accommodation process presumes open 
communication between the employer and the employee with the disability, 
the employer should be receptive to any relevant information or requests 
it receives from a third party acting on the employee's behalf. 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (1996). 
50 Although individuals with disabilities are not required to keep 
records, they may find it useful to document requests for reasonable 
accommodation in the event there is a dispute about whether or when they 
requested accommodation. Of course, employers must keep all employment 
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records, including records of requests for reasonable accommodation, for 
one year from the making of the record or the personnel action involved, 
whichever occurs later. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (1996). 
51 As a practical matter, it may be in the employee's interest to request 
a reasonable accommodation before performance suffers or conduct problems 
occur. 
52 EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment Disability-Related Questions 
and Medical Examinations at 6, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7193 (1995). 
53 See supra nn. 32-34 and accompanying text. See also Bultemeyer v. Ft. 
Wayne Community Sens., 6 AD Cas. (BNA) 61 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that, 
if employer found the precise meaning of employee's request for reasonable 
accommodation unclear, employer should have spoken to the employee or his 
psychiatrist, thus properly engaging in the interactive process). 
54 See Question 17, Example A, supra. 
55 Employers also may consider alternatives like having their health 
professional consult with the employee's health professional, with the 
employee's consent. 
5 6 The Job Accommodation Network (JAN) also provides advice free-of-charge 
to employers and employees contemplating reasonable accommodation. JAN is 
a service of the President's Committee on Employment of People with 
Disabilities which, in turn, is funded by the U.S. Department of Labor. 
JAN can be reached at 1-800-ADA-WORK. 
57 Some of the accommodations discussed in this section also may prove 
effective for individuals with traumatic brain injuries, stroke, and other 
mental disabilities. As a general matter, a covered employer must provide 
reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability, barring undue hardship. 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). 
58 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (1996). Courts have recognized 
leave as a reasonable accommodation. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't 
of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 1636 (7th Cir. 1995) (defendant 
had duty to accommodate plaintiff's pressure ulcers resulting from her 
paralysis which required her to stay home for several weeks) ; Vializ v. 
New York City Bd. of Educ, 1995 WL 110112, 4 AD Cas. (BNA) 345 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (plaintiff stated claim under ADA where she alleged that she would 
be able to return to work after back injury if defendant granted her a 
temporary leave of absence); Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 3 
AD Cas. (BNA) 1141 (D. Or. 1994) ("[A] leave of absence to obtain medical 
treatment is a reasonable accommodation if it is likely that, following 
treatment, [the employee] would have been able to safely perform his 
duties . . . .") . 
59 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (B) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2) (ii) (1996). 
60 See Dutton v. Johnson County Bd., 1995 WL 337588, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 1614 
(D. Kan. 1995) (it was a reasonable accommodation to permit an individual 
with a disability to use unscheduled vacation time to cover absence for 
migraine headaches, where that did not pose an undue hardship and employer 
knew about the migraine headaches and the need for accommodation) . 
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61 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.15(b), (c) (1996). 
62 Reasonable accommodation, however, does not require lowering standards 
or removing essential functions of the job. Bolstein v. Reich, 1995 WL 
46387, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 1761 (D.D.C. 1995) (attorney with chronic 
depression and severe personality disturbance was not a qualified 
individual with a disability because his requested accommodations of more 
supervision, less complex assignments, and the exclusion of appellate work 
would free him of the very duties that justified his GS-14 grade) , motion 
for summary affirmance granted, 1995 WL 686236 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The 
court in Bolstein noted that the plaintiff objected to a reassignment to a 
lower grade' in which he could have performed the essential functions of 
the position. 1995 WL 46387, * 4, 3 AD Cas. (BNA) 1761, 1764 (D.D.C. 
1995). 
63 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (1996) (discussing supported 
employment); U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, "A Technical 
Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act," at 3.4, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7001 (1992) 
[hereinafter Technical Assistance Manual] . A job coach is a professional 
who assists individuals with severe disabilities with job placement and 
job training. 
64 For example, it may be an undue hardship to provide extra supervision 
as a reasonable accommodation in the present job if the employee's current 
supervisor is already very busy supervising several other individuals and 
providing direct service to the public. 
65 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (B) (1994). For example, it may not be possible to 
accommodate an employee in his present position if he works as a 
salesperson on the busy first floor of a major department store and needs 
a reduction in visual distractions and ambient noise as a reasonable 
accommodation. 
See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Workers' Compensation and the ADA 
at 17, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7399-7400 (1996) (where an employee can no 
longer perform the essential functions of his/her original position, with 
or without a reasonable accommodation, because of a disability, an 
employer must reassign him/her to an equivalent vacant position for which 
s/he is qualified, absent undue hardship) . 
66 Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 63, at 3.10(5), 8 FEP Manual 
(BNA) 405:7011-12 (reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable 
accommodation); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (B) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(0) (2) (ii) (1996). 
67 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10, .15(c) (1996). 
68 See EEOC Compliance Manual § 902.2, n.ll, Definition of the Term 
"Disability," 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7259, n.ll (1995) (an employer "does 
not have to excuse . . . misconduct, even if the misconduct results from 
an impairment that rises to the level of a disability, if it does not 
excuse similar misconduct from its other employees"); see 56 Fed. Reg. 
35,733 (1991) (referring to revisions to proposed ADA rule that "clarify 
that employers may hold all employees, disabled (including those disabled 
by alcoholism or drug addiction) and nondisabled, to the same performance 
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and conduct standards") . 
69 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (1996). 
70 Therefore, it may be in the employee's interest to request a reasonable 
accommodation before performance suffers or conduct problems occur. See 
Question 20 supra. 
71 Regardless of misconduct, an individual with a disability must be 
allowed to file a grievance or appeal challenging his/her termination when 
that is a right normally available to other employees. 
72 If the employee requests reasonable accommodation in order to address 
the misconduct, the employer must grant the request, subject to undue 
hardship. 
73 See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994). 
74 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(r) (1996). 
75 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (r) (1996). To determine whether an individual would 
pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include: (1) duration 
of the risk; (2) nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) likelihood 
that the potential harm will occur; and (4) imminence of the potential 
harm. Id. 
76 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(r) (1996). 
77 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1996). 
78 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(r) (1996). 
79 House Judiciary Report, supra n.2, at 45. 
80 Cf. Of at v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm'n, 1995 WL 310051, 4 AD Cas. (BNA) 
753 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (finding against employer, under state law, on 
issue of whether employee who had panic disorder with agoraphobia could 
safely return to her job after disability-related leave, where employer 
presented no expert evidence about employee's disability or its effect on 
her ability to safely perform her job but only provided copies of pages 
from a medical text generally discussing the employee's illness) . 
This page was last modi fled on February 1, 2000, 
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In t h e 
United States Court of .Appeals 
For the Seventh Circuit 
No. 99-2509 
Cheryl A. Gile, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
U n i t e d A i r l i n e s , I n c . , 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
Appea l from t h e Un i t ed S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t 
f o r t h e N o r t h e r n D i s t r i c t o f I l l i n o i s , E a s t e r n D i v i s i o n . 
No. 94 C 1692—Rebecca R> Pa l lmeye r , J u d g e . 
Argued J a n u a r y 18, 2000—Decided May 2 2 , 2000 
B e f o r e E a s t e r b r o o k , Kanne and Diane P. Wood, C i r c u i t 
J u d g e s . 
Kanne, C i r c u i t Judge . C h e r y l G i l e worked e i g h t 
y e a r s f o r Un i t ed A i r l i n e s , I n c . ( "Uni ted") b e f o r e 
she began s u f f e r i n g from a c l u s t e r of 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s o r d e r s t h a t made i t i n c r e a s i n g l y 
d i f f i c u l t f o r h e r t o p e r f o r m he r j o b . G i l e 
i n i t i a l l y had v o l u n t e e r e d f o r n i g h t s h i f t d u t y , 
b u t i n s o m n i a and e x h a u s t i o n from s l e e p 
d e p r i v a t i o n were a g g r a v a t i n g h e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
c o n d i t i o n . A f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n wi th a 
p s y c h o l o g i s t , s h e asked U n i t e d t o accommodate h e r 
c o n d i t i o n by r e a s s i g n i n g 1 h e r t o a day t ime s h i f t , 
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but United refused Gile's repeated requests and 
suggested that she consider quitting her job 
instead. Gile sued under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), sees. 42 
U.S.C. 12101-12213, for United's failure to 
accommodate her disability and won both 
compensatory and punitive damages at trial. 
United now appeals the district court's denial of 
judgment as a matter of law on compensatory 
damages, the jury instruction barring 
consideration of mitigating measures in assessing 
disability under the ADA and the denial of 
judgment as a matter of law on punitive damages 
under the Supreme Court's- decision last term in-
Kolstad v, American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526r 
119 S.Ct. 2118 (1999). We affirm the judgment for 
Gile but reverse the award of punitive damages-
I. History 
In March 1984, Cheryl G i l e began working f o r 
U n i t e d a s a d a t a e n t r y o p e r a t o r i n t h e a i r 
f r e i g h t d e p a r t m e n t a t O'Hare* I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
A i r p o r t i n Ch icago , I l l i n o i s . Her mother had 
worked e i g h t e e n yea r s f o r U n i t e d and recommended 
Un i t ed a s an employer , so G i l e was e x c i t e d a b o u t 
t h e j o b . A l t h o u g h Uni ted t r a n s f e r r e d G i l e s e v e r a l 
t i m e s o v e r t h e next f i v e y e a r s between t h e day 
and n i g h t s h i f t s , she r e c e i v e d good per fo rmance 
e v a l u a t i o n s d e s c r i b i n g h e r a s a " v a l u a b l e a s s e t " 
and a " v e r y competen t , t h o r o u g h and a c c u r a t e 
e m p l o y e e . " I n January 1989, a t h e r r e q u e s t , G i l e 
r e c e i v e d a t r a n s f e r t o t h e n i g h t s h i f t , r u n n i n g 
from 10 p .m. t o 6:30 a . m . , and worked n i g h t s 
w i t h o u t c o m p l a i n t for s e v e r a l y e a r s . 
However, when Gi l e r e t u r n e d t o work from 
m a t e r n i t y l e a v e i n March 1992 , she began f e e l i n g 
c h r o n i c a l l y d e p r e s s e d and s u f f e r e d from insomnia 
and c o n s t a n t a n x i e t y . She s l e p t o n l y a few h o u r s 
a day , s t r u g g l e d t o pe r fo rm mundane household 
c h o r e s , e r u p t e d i n t o s p o n t a n e o u s o u t b u r s t s of 
c r y i n g , f e l l a s l e e p wh i l e d r i v i n g and f e l t 
p e r p e t u a l l y f a t i g u e d . In J u n e 1992, G i l e 
i n i t i a t e d semi -week ly c o n s u l t a t i o n s about h e r 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n w i t h B e t t y O r l and i no , a 
l i c e n s e d c l i n i c a l s o c i a l worke r l i s t e d by U n i t e d 
i n i t s c a t a l o g of h e a l t h c a r e p r o v i d e r s 
recommended t o employees . 
G i l e t o l d O r l a n d i n o t h a t s h e had been a b l e t o 
s l e e p o n l y a few hours a day s i n c e r e t u r n i n g t o 
work i n March, G i l e r e p o r t e d t h a t s h e "cou ld n o t 
f u n c t i o n p r o p e r l y " and was " g o i n g c r a z y . " 
O r l a n d i n o d i a g n o s e d Gi le w i t h d e p r e s s i o n and 
a n x i e t y d i s o r d e r because G i l e was s u f f e r i n g from 
f e e l i n g s of " h o p e l e s s n e s s and h e l p l e s s n e s s " and 
e x p e r i e n c i n g " f a t i g u e , i r r i t a b i l i t y , 
d i s t r a c t i b i l i t y , [andj d i f f i c u l t y c o n c e n t r a t i n g . " 
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O r l a n d i n o n o t e d t h a t G i l e ' s a n t i c i p a t o r y a n x i e t y 
o v e r g e t t i n g enough s l e e p each n i g h t and the 
s h e e r e x h a u s t i o n from insomnia e x a c e r b a t e d G i l e ' s 
c o n d i t i o n , and she i n s t r u c t e d G i l e t o seek 
t r a n s f e r t o a d a y t i m e s h i f t . Soon a f t e r w a r d , G i l e 
informed he r s u p e r v i s o r James K i n z l e r t h a t she 
was s t r u g g l i n g w i t h d e p r e s s i o n and t h a t she 
needed a s h i f t t r a n s f e r . Al though K i n z l e r 
t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t he d i d n o t r e c a l l t h i s 
m e e t i n g , G i l e s a i d K i n z l e r t o l d h e r t h a t he would 
l e t her know a b o u t any new o p e n i n g s on t h e day 
s h i f t . K i n z l e r n e v e r spoke t o G i l e a b o u t a 
t r a n s f e r a g a i n . 
On August 2 8 , 1992, G i l e had an emo t iona l 
"breakdownH a t work- She s t a r t e d c r y i n g 
u n c o n t r o l l a b l y and t o l d s u p e r v i s o r Frank Mancini 
t h a t she t h o u g h t she was l o s i n g h e r mind . G i l e 
t r i e d r e s t i n g f o r a s p e l l then r e t u r n i n g t o work, 
b u t Mancini a l l o w e d he r t o go home when t h a t d i d 
n o t a l l e v i a t e h e r a n x i e t y a t t a c k . G i l e c a l l e d 
O r l a n d i n o i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r a r r i v i n g home and saw 
O r l a n d i n o on August* 3 1 . A f t e r c o n s u l t i n g a 
p h y s i c i a n , p s y c h o l o g i s t and two p s y c h i a t r i c 
s o c i a l w o r k e r s , O r l a n d i n o f o r m a l l y recommended 
t h a t G i l e be p l a c e d on medica l l e a v e and g iven 
a n t i - d e p r e s s a n t and a n t i - a n x i e t y m e d i c a t i o n . 
O r l a n d i n o p r o v i d e d G i l e a n o t e , wh ich G i l e 
p r e s e n t e d t o Mancin i a few days l a t e r , s t a t i n g 
t h a t G i l e was " e x p e r i e n c i n g a d e p r e s s i v e r e a c t i o n 
w i t h a n x i e t y s t a t e " and "he r p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n a t 
U n i t e d and t h e n i g h t s h i f t a r e a g g r a v a t i n g he r 
c o n d i t i o n . " 
U n i t e d ? s R e g i o n a l Medical D i r e c t o r Dr. Robert 
McGuffin h a n d l e d G i l e ' s c l a im p u r s u a n t t o h i s 
d u t i e s of e v a l u a t i n g t h e med ica l c o n d i t i o n and 
work f i t n e s s of U n i t e d employees a t O'Hare 
A i r p o r t . He t e l e p h o n e d O r l a n d i n o , who t o l d him 
t h a t G i l e ' s c o n d i t i o n was d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to 
G i l e working t h e n i g h t s h i f t . On Sep tember 22, 
1992 , McGuffin met w i t h Gi l e b u t d i d n o t t ake h e r 
m e d i c a l h i s t o r y o r conduct a p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
e x a m i n a t i o n . G i l e e x p l a i n e d h e r symptoms and t o l d 
McGuffin t h a t s h e was s e e i n g O r l a n d i n o twice 
weekly for d e p r e s s i o n . McGuffin r e t o r t e d t h a t " i f 
[ s h e ] was t h a t unhappy, [ then] why d i d n * t [she] 
j u s t r e s i g n and s t a y home." G i l e an swered t h a t 
s h e d i d no t want t o s t a y home and t h a t she wanted 
t o work; she i n s i s t e d t h a t i t M i d n ^ t m a t t e r i f 
i t was l a t e r a l , d i d n ' t m a t t e r i f i t was a 
d e m o t i o n . [She] would t a k e a n y t h i n g a s l ong a s 
[ s h e ] could b e on a r e g u l a r s h i f t , a r e g u l a r 
d a y t i m e s h i f t . " McGuffin t o l d h e r t o s e e him ih-
a coup le of weeks and t e r m i n a t e d t h e f i f t e e n -
m i n u t e m e e t i n g . McGuffin approved G i l e ' s r e q u e s t 
f o r medica l l e a v e b u t deemed G i l e ' s c o n d i t i o n a 
" n o n o c c u p a t i o n a l i l l n e s s . " 
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T h r e e days l a t e r , on September 2 5 r 1992, G i l e 
a p p l i e d f o r a " c o m p e t i t i v e t r a n s f e r . " Un i t ed 
r e g u l a r l y p o s t e d new j o b openings a t O fHare and 
i n v i t e d employees t o submi t t h e i r resumes and 
most r e c e n t p e r f o r m a n c e e v a l u a t i o n s a s 
" c o m p e t i t i v e t r a n s f e r " a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e s e 
p o s i t i o n s . G i l e a p p l i e d fo r two n o n - d a t a e n t r y 
j o b o p e n i n g s , one i n r e s e r v a t i o n s and one i n t h e 
a i r f r e i g h t h e a d q u a r t e r s , bu t n e v e r h e a r d back 
a b o u t h e r a p p l i c a t i o n s . 
D i s a p p o i n t e d by M c G u f f i n ' s summary c o n c l u s i o n , 
O r l a n d i n o s e n t a l e t t e r d a t e d September 29 , 1992, 
t o McGuffin r e p e a t i n g t h a t Gi le needed 
r e a s s i g n m e n t t o t h e day s h i f t b e c a u s e G i l e ' s 
p r o b l e m s stemmed d i r e c t l y from h e r n i g h t s h i f t 
p o s i t i o n - The l e t t e r a v e r r e d t h a t " [ a j l t h o u g h t h e 
e t i o l o g y of Mrs. G i l e ' s c o n d i t i o n i s n o n -
o c c u p a t i o n a l as t o h e r j o b d u t i e s , i t i s d i r e c t l y 
r e l a t e d t o t h e s h i f t s h e had been a s s i g n e d t o . " 
T h e r e f o r e , t h e l e t t e r r e q u e s t e d t h a t "a change i n 
s h i f t be c o n s i d e r e d f o r Cheryl G i l e . " McGuffin 
t e s t i f i e d a*t t r i a l t h a t he r e a l i z e d " t h e r e was 
some th ing wrong w i t h {Gi l e ] m e n t a l l y " and h e d i d 
n o t d i s a g r e e wi th t h e d i a g n o s i s of d e p r e s s i o n and 
a n x i e t y or " t ake i s s u e " w i t h Or land ino* s 
a s s e s s m e n t . F u r t h e r m o r e , though U n i t e d c h a l l e n g e d 
O r l a n d i n o ^ p r o f e s s i o n a l c r e d e n t i a l s a t t r i a l and 
i n i t s a p p e l l a t e b r i e f s , n e i t h e r McGuffin nor any 
o t h e r U n i t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ever r e q u e s t e d t h a t 
G i l e be t r e a t e d o r e v a l u a t e d by a n o t h e r p h y s i c i a n 
o r p s y c h o l o g i s t . 
When G i l e saw McGuffin a g a i n on November 2 , 
1992 , G i l e r e p o r t e d ongo ing " s e v e r e , s e v e r e 
d e p r e s s i o n " and a g a i n "begged him t o p l e a s e h e l p 
[ h e r ] . " G i l e s a i d t h a t s h e would b e happy t o go 
b a c k t o work i f he would " p l e a s e j u s t h e l p [her ] 
g e t a ]ob t h a t [ she] would be working t h e day 
s h i f t . " McGuffin h u f f e d t h a t " i t sounded l i k e a 
p e r s o n a l problem . . . n o t an i l l n e s s . " McGuffin 
e x p l a i n e d a t t r i a l t h a t he d i d n o t e x p e d i t e 
r e a s s i g n m e n t t o t h e d a y s h i f t p a r t l y b e c a u s e he 
was c o n c e r n e d t h a t o t h e r employees migh t e x p e c t 
o r r e q u e s t a t r a n s f e r o u t of t h e n i g h t s h i f t as 
w e l l . He a l s o t h o u g h t t h a t a "change i n work 
s c h e d u l e more a c c u r a t e l y a d d r e s s e d p e r s o n a l and 
l i f e and fami ly i s s u e s r a t h e r than an i l l n e s s . " 
McGuffin took no f u r t h e r a c t i o n o t h e r t h a n 
t e l l i n g G i l e t o seek a nonmedical t r a n s f e r , which 
s h e had a l r e a d y t r i e d , a n d i s s u i n g G i l e a work 
r e l e a s e n o t e fo r c o n t i n u e d d u t y on t h e n i g h t 
s h i f t . 
Upon h e a r i n g McGuffin*s a s s e s s m e n t , O r l a n d i n o 
c a l l e d McGuffin t o i n s i s t t h a t G i l e ' s n i g h t s h i f t 
a s s i g n m e n t was a "major f a c t o r " i n G i l e ' s 
c o n d i t i o n . McGuffin s t e a d f a s t l y d i s a g r e e d and 
s a i d t h a t " i f [Gi leJ d i d n ' t l i k e i t , s h e cou ld 
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quit." A few days later, Orlandino faxed McGuffin 
a letter recommending that Gile be placed on 
temporary disability until January when United 
annually rearranged work shift schedules. Gile 
gave McGuffin's work release note to her 
supervisor but explained that Orlandino had not 
released her to work the night shift. As a 
result, United placed Gile on authorized leave 
without pay. 
United annually reshuffled its employee shift 
assignments and permitted employees each November 
to bid according to seniority for shift 
reasslgnments. By the November 1992 bidding, Gile 
had accrued sufficient seniori-ty to win an 
evening shift, running from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. , 
beginning in January 1993. Gile testified that, 
she would have been happy to work the evening 
shift because it was basically a daytime shift, 
however Gile was home on authorized leave at the 
time of November bidding and did not place a bid 
at all for the 1993 work year. 
Since United had placed Gile on indefinite 
authorized leave, Gile was understandably 
surprised when she received a termination letter 
from United on January 14, 1993, notifying her 
that United had terminated her employment for 
abandonment of her job. Gile contacted United for 
clarification, but United did not respond. 
Buffeted by the stress of her apparent 
termination, Gile^ psychological condition 
worsened, and she began seeing psychiatrist Dr. 
Alan Hirsch on Orlandino's recommendation in 
April 1993. Hirsch examined Gile four times over 
the next six months and confirmed Orlandino's 
diagnoses of clinical depression and severe 
anxiety. During these sessions with Hirschr Gile 
reported loss of self-esteem from her termination 
and explained that she had seriously contemplated 
suicide. Hirsch prescribed additional medication 
and forwarded his diagnoses to United. In 
addition, Orlandino continued to lobby United on 
several occasions, urging it to reinstate Gile 
and permit her to work a daytime shift. United 
acknowledges that daytime positions remained open 
throughout all the events of this case, even 
after November bidding closed. 
After a series of persistent inquiries by 
Gile's lawyer, United contacted Gile on September 
23, 1993, and negotiated her return to work in 
April 1994. At trial, United explained that it 
had mailed the termination letter by mistake and 
"unfired" Gile when it unraveled the confusion. 
For her part, Gile was "more than happy to come 
back" to United. Upon her return, Gile worked the 
day shift for two months while another employee 
was ill, then worked the evening shift after the 
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ill employeefs return. Working during the day and 
evening served Gile well, just as Orlandino 
predicted. Gile testified that "[i]t was 
immensely helpful to be bsck at work, " and her 
condition "started to stabilize,M though it did 
not clear up overnight. 
Before her return to work, however, Gile sued 
United in the Northern District of Illinois on 
March 18, 1994, alleging that United violated the 
ADA in failing to accommodate reasonably her 
disability by transferring her out of the night 
shift. In its defense, United pointed to its 
"Reasonable Accommodation Policy, " which read in 
pertinent part: 
In keeping with its commitment to equal 
employment opportunity and through implementation 
of our Affirmative Action Plan for the Disabled, 
United Airlines is obligated to make reasonable 
accommodations whenever possible for disabled 
applicants and/or employees who are selected for 
hire, promotion, job retention or training. 
By way of explanation, United has a Reasonable 
Accommodation procedure applicable to employees 
or applicants with physical or mental work 
restrictions.... 
* * * * 
R e g u l a t i o n s s t a t e : "An employer must make a 
r e a s o n a b l e accommodation t o t h e p h y s i c a l and 
mental l i m i t a t i o n s of an e m p l o y e e / a p p l i c a n t , 
u n l e s s t h e employer can d e m o n s t r a t e an 
accommodation would impose an "undue h a r d s h i p " on 
t h e Company." 
* * * * 
The key t o t h i s p r o c e s s i s t o i d e n t i f y t he work 
r e s t r i c t i o n ( s ) and then e s t a b l i s h t h e f i n a n c i a l 
and p r o d u c t i v i t y l o s s which may be a s s o c i a t e d 
wi th an accommodat ion . In some i n s t a n c e s , t h e s e 
r e s t r i c t i o n s a r e i n s i g n i f i c a n t t o t h e pe r fo rmance 
of t he j o b b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d . In t h e s e cases, 
Reasonable Accommodation i s a c h i e v e d wi th no 
s i g n i f i c a n t f i n a n c i a l or p r o d u c t i v i t y l o s s . 
* * * * 
A. Reasonable Accommodation—Employees 
(internal) 
Same procedures as for new-hire accommodations. 
If the accommodation can be made, proceed 
accordingly. If the recommendation is to deny 
accommodation, and that decision is upheld by the 
Accommodations Committee, the Staff 
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Representat ive-Personnel suppor t ing the operation 
w i l l work in conjunction with the employment 
of f ices to find a l t e r n a t i v e job oppor tun i t i e s for 
the employee. 
At a l l re levant t imes , McGuffm and G i l e ' s 
supervisors knew and understood United*s 
reasonable accommodation po l i cy . 
After several content ious d i scovery disputes 
during which United refused t o produce a number 
of documents/ the d i s t r i c t cour t granted summary 
judgment in favor of United, ho ld ing tha t United 
was not required t o t r ans fe r Giie- a s a rea-sonable-
acGommodation for her d i s a b i l i t y . Gile appealed 
severa l d i s t r i c t cour t discovery r u l i n g s and the 
grant of summary judgment, and we reversed and 
remanded in Gile v . United A i r l i n e s , I n c . , 95 
F.3d 492 (7th Ci r . 1996). The case proceeded to 
t r i a l on February 8, 1999, and a j-ury granted 
judgment for Gile four days l a t e r , awarding 
$200,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in 
pun i t ive damages. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t denied 
United1 s renewed motions for judgment as a matter 
of law, or in t he a l t e r n a t i v e , a new t r i a l , but 
l im i t ed G i l e ' s t o t a l damages t o $300,000 as 
required under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981a(b)(3) . United 
now appeals the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of i t s 
motions for judgment as a matter of law regarding 
compensatory damages, denial of U n i t e d ' s 
r eques t ed^u ry i n s t r u c t i o n on cons ide ra t ion of 
mi t iga t ing measures in assessing G i l e ' s 
d i s a b i l i t y and den ia l of Uni ted ' s motion for 
judgment as* a ma t t e r of law regard ing punitive-
damages. 
I I . Analysis 
A. Judgment as a Matter of Law 
on Compensatory Damages 
The d i s t r i c t cour t denied a l l t h r e e of United 's 
motions under Rule 50 of the Federa l Rules of 
C iv i l Procedure for judgment as a mat te r of law 
on l i a b i l i t y for compensatory damages, and United 
now appeals arguing t h a t (1) t h e r e was no l ega l ly 
s u f f i c i e n t ev iden t i a ry basis for a reasonable 
j u ry t o find t h a t Gile was a q u a l i f i e d individual 
under the ADA; and (2) Gile was s o l e l y 
responsible for a breakdown in t h e required 
i n t e r a c t i v e process by fa i l ing t o a v a i l hersel f 
of the bidding procedures for an employee to 
request a sh i f t t r a n s f e r . 
In appealing a d e n i a l of a motion for judgment 
as a matter of law a f t e r the j u r y has decided 
aga ins t i t , United assumes a herculean burden. We 
reverse only i f no r a t i o n a l ju ry could have found 
for the p l a i n t i f f , even when viewing the evidence 
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in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See 
Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 335 (7th Cir. 
1998) . Careful to avoid substituting our judgment 
for that of the factfinder at trial, we ascertain 
whether there exists- sufficient evidence upon 
which any rational jury could reach the trial 
verdict. See Tincher v. Wal-Mart Stores-, Inc., 
118 F.3d 1125, 1129 (7th Cir. 1997). Moreover, we 
apply this standard stringently in discrimination 
cases, where witness credibility is typically 
crucial, See Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 
F.3d 944, 948 (7th cir. 1998). We review this 
question de novo. See Collins, 143 F,3d at 335. 
First, United cla-ims that the Jury lacked, 
sufficient evidentiary basis to find: that Gile 
was a qualified individual with a disability 
under the ADA. Specifically, United argues that 
Gile did not provide the jury with a reasonable 
basis to find that her requested accommodation—a 
transfer from the night, shift to a daytime shift-^  
-would have enabled her to perform the essential 
functions of her job. The ADA requires 
accommodation only for a "qualified individual 
with a disability" who can perform her job with 
or without reasonable accommodation. See Vollmert 
v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 297 
(7th Cir. 1999). The ADA thus mandates that an 
employer make reasonable accommodations only if 
accommodation would permit the disabled employee 
to perform her job, and an employer need not 
grant a disabled employee's request for an 
accommodation that would be an ^inefficacious 
change," Vande Za-nde v. Wisconsin Dep't of 
Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995). 
In Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 469 
(7th Cir. 1997), we affirmed summary judgment for 
the defendant and held that the plaintiff failed 
to show that she was a qualified individual under 
the ADA. The plaintiff, who undisputedly could 
not work without accommodation, rested her claim 
entirely on a doctor's affidavit that "there was 
a good chance" that she could return to work with 
her requested accommodation of extended: medical 
leave, which the employer had rejected. Thxs bare 
assertion without any further explanation was 
"simply too conclusory and unin formative to be 
given any weight" because "we [were] left totally 
in the dark" about the bases for the doctor's 
opinion, Weigel, 122 F-3d at 4&9, The doctor 
indicate4 nothing about the plaintiffrs 
condition,- past r-esponsdvity to trea-tment or the 
reasons that Weigelf s condition would improve 
with accommodation^ Without any additional 
evidence that she could perform her job with 
reasonable accommodation, Weigel could not show 
that she was a qualified individual under the 
ADA. 
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C o n t r a r y t o U n i t e d 1 s a s s e r t i o n s , however , G i l e 
p r e s e n t e d f a r more c r e d i b l e ev idence a b o u t h e r 
c o n d i t i o n and t h e e x p e c t e d e f f e c t of a t r a n s f e r 
t o a d a y t i m e s h i f t t h a n t h e l o n e , c o n c l u s o r y 
a f f i d a v i t p r e s e n t e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f i n W e i g e l . 
U n l i k e t h e p l a i n t i f f i n W e i g e i , Gi le p r e s e n t e d an 
e n d l e s s s t r e a m of documen ta t i on from O r l a n d i n o 
abou t h e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l symptoms and t h e need fo r 
a t r a n s f e r t o a dayt ime s h i f t . Or land ino 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t G i l e ' s a n t i c i p a t o r y a n x i e t y o v e r 
b e i n g a b l e t o ge t enough s l e e p each n i g h t and t h e 
s h e e r e x h a u s t i o n from in somnia e x a c e r b a t e d G i l e r s 
c o n d i t i o n . She and G i l e e x p l a i n e d t o McGuffin 
t h a t r e g u l a r day t ime work would have s t a b i l i s e d 
h e r s l e e p p a t t e r n s and r e d u c e d the a n x i e t y and 
s t r e s s a t t e n d a n t t o h e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . 
A l though a s h i f t t r a n s f e r may not have c u r e d 
G i l e ' s c o n d i t i o n a l t o g e t h e r , a r a t i o n a l j u r y 
e a s i l y c o u l d conc lude t h a t a s h i f t t r a n s f e r would 
have a l l e v i a t e d he r symptoms such t h a t G i l e c o u l d 
have pe r fo rmed he r j o b . I n d e e d , once G i l e 
r e t u r n e d t o work on d a y t i m e s h i f t s i n A p r i l 1994, 
G i l e ' s c o n d i t i o n d i d b e n e f i t from t h e r e g u l a r 
work and s l e e p s c h e d u l e . G i l e s u f f i c i e n t l y 
e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t she was a q u a l i f i e d i n d i v i d u a l 
w i th a d i s a b i l i t y who c o u l d have performed h e r 
j o b w i t h r e a s o n a b l e accommodation. 
Second, U n i t e d c l a ims t h a t i t i s e n t i t l e d t o 
judgment a s a m a t t e r of l aw because , a c c o r d i n g t o 
U n i t e d , G i l e o b s t r u c t e d t h e i n t e r a c t i v e p r o c e s s 
by f a i l i n g t o a v a i l h e r s e l f of U n i t e d l s b i d d i n g 
and c o m p e t i t i v e t r a n s f e r p r o c e d u r e s . To b e g i n , 
Un i t ed m i s t a k e s G i l e ' s o b l i g a t i o n i n t h e 
i n t e r a c t i v e p r o c e s s . In Hendr icks -Robinson v . 
Excel C o r p . , 154 F.3d 685, 693 (7th C i r . 1 9 9 8 ) , 
we p r e s e n t e d t h e r e s p e c t i v e o b l i g a t i o n s of 
employer and d i s a b l e d employee i n e x e c u t i n g t h e 
accommodation p r o c e s s . The employee f i r s t mus t 
s t a r t by in fo rming t h e employer of her 
d i s a b i l i t y . See i d . G i l e d u l y n o t i f i e d U n i t e d of 
he r d i s a b i l i t y and r e q u e s t e d accommodation. At 
t h a t p o i n t , t h e ADA o b l i g a t e s t h e employer t o 
"engage w i t h t h e employee i n an ' i n t e r a c t i v e 
p r o c e s s ' t o de t e rmine t h e a p p r o p r i a t e 
accommodation under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " Bombard 
v . F o r t Wayne Newspapers, J h i c , 92 F.3d 560 , 563 
(7th C i r . 1996) . This s t e p "imposes a d u t y upon 
employers t o engage i n a f l e x i b l e , i n t e r a c t i v e 
p r o c e s s w i t h t h e d i s a b l e d employee needing 
accommodation so t h a t , t o g e t h e r , they might 
i d e n t i f y t h e employee ' s p r e c i s e l i m i t a t i o n s and 
d i s c u s s accommodation which might enab le t h e 
employee t o c o n t i n u e w o r k i n g . " Rendr i cks -
Robinson , 154 F.3d a t £93 ( i n t e r n a l c i t a t i o n s 
o m i t t e d ) ; s e e a l s o M i l l e r v . I l l i n o i s D e p ' t of 
C o r r e c t i o n s , 107 F.3d 483, 486-87 (7th C i r . 1997) 
( h o l d i n g t h a t t h e employer must " a s c e r t a i n 
httpc/fcasetaw. lp.firrifaw.ccm/scripts/getcase.pJ?Gourt- 7th&navby^case^no=9^.,. 12/23/2002 
whether he has some job that the employee might 
be able to fill."). Although United argues that 
Gile's proposed accommodation would have been 
ineffective, United had the affirmative 
obligation to- seek Gile out and work with her to 
craft a reasonable accommodation, if possible, 
that would have permitted her return to work. See 
Hendricks, 154 F. 3d at 693; Bultemeyer v. Fort 
Wayne Community Sen., 100 F.3d 1281, 1286 (7th 
Cir. 1996). 
It is here that United flunked its. obligations 
under the ADA. In the face of Gile's repeated 
pleas for a shift transfer. United refused her 
request for a modest accommodation, then did 
nothing to engage with Gile in determining 
alternative accommodations that might permit Gile 
to continue working. McGuffin provided no help at 
all except to suggest that Gile "just resign and 
stay home." United's only action in the 
subsequent months was to terminate Gile in 
January—a move that United subsequently 
disclaimed. Unlike Weiler v. Household Finance 
Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 526 (7th Cir. 1996), where 
the plaintiff requested a transfer which would 
have required either creation of a new position 
or bumping another employee, and the defendant 
contacted the plaintiff about five available 
positions as alternative accommodations, United 
made no effort to accommodate Gile. 
However, United contends that it did not 
approach Gile and engage in the interactive 
process because Gile readily posse~s&e<i the mea-ns 
to obtain reasonable accommodation by herself 
without Unitedrs help. United concedes that 
daytime and evening positions were vacant 
throughout the period during which Gile was 
requesting a transfer, but notes that Gile was 
entitled by seniority to an evening shift 
position if she had participated in United1 s 
November 1992 bidding process. United argues that 
Gile should have bid for a transfer in November, 
even though she was no longer working and was on 
indefinite medical leave, and she would have 
received the transfer that she requested. When 
Gile failed to bid for one of the vacant daytime 
positions, United claims that it could do nothing 
more for her. United 'protests that it would have 
constituted prohibited "affirmative action" for 
United to have reassigned Gile to a daytime shift 
outside the November bidding process, even for 
positions that remained open- after bidding 
closed. We disagree. 
Under the circumstances, the ADA required that 
United transfer Gile to a vacant daytime 
position. Although the ADA does not obligate 
employers to "bump" other employees or create new 
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p o s i t i o n s , s e c . 12111(9) of t h e ADA r e q u i r e s an 
employer t o r e a s s i g n a d i s a b l e d employee t o a 
v a c a n t p o s i t i o n f o r which t h e employee i s 
o t h e r w i s e q u a l i f i e d . See G i l e , 95 F .3d a t 499; 
H e n d r i c k s - R o b i n s o n , 154 F.3d a t 6 9 4 - 9 5 ; Dalton v . 
S u b a r u - I s u z u A u t o m o t i v e , I n c . , 141 F .3d 667, 678 
( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 9 8 ) ; DePaol i v . A b b o t t L a b o r a t o r i e s , 
140 F.3d 668, 675 (7 th C i r . 1998) . The employer 
i s o b l i g a t e d t o " i d e n t i f y t h e f u l l r ange of 
a l t e r n a t i v e p o s i t i o n s fo r which t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
s a t i s f i e s t h e e m p l o y e r 1 s l e g i t i m a t e , 
n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r e r e q u i s i t e s " and c o n s i d e r 
" t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e employee t o any of t h e s e o t h e r 
j o b s , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e t h a t would r e p r e s e n t a 
d e m o t i o n . " D a l t o n , 141 F.3d a t 6 7 8 . Un i t ed i s 
wrong t o s ay t h a t i t c o n s t i t u t e s " a f f i r m a t i v e 
a c t i o n " t o r e a s s i g n G i l e t o a v a c a n t p o s i t i o n f o r 
which she was e n t i t l e d by s e n i o r i t y and which 
would have accommodated h e r d i s a b i l i t y . I f Uni ted 
had r e a s s i g n e d G i l e a s she r e q u e s t e d , t h e only 
p r e f e r e n t i a l t r e a t m e n t of G i l e would have been 
t h a t , u n l i k e n o n d i s a b l e d employees who were no t 
on medica l l e a v e , s h e d i d no t have t o f u l f i l l t h e 
t e c h n i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t of c a s t i n g h e r November 
b i d . 
Al though t h e ADA does no t r e q u i r e t h e employer 
t o abandon i t s l e g i t i m a t e p o l i c i e s r e g a r d i n g j o b 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and e n t i t l e m e n t s t o company 
t r a n s f e r s , U n i t e d canno t s e r i o u s l y c l a i m t h a t t h e 
p r o c e d u r a l r e q u i r e m e n t of November b i d d i n g was 
t o o i m p o r t a n t f o r U n i t e d t o b y p a s s when daytime 
p o s i t i o n s r ema ined v a c a n t a f t e r t h e b i d d i n g 
p r o c e s s . In H e n d r i c k s - R o b i n s o n , t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s 
p o l i c y of p o s t i n g j o b openings and i n s i s t i n g t h a t 
d i s a b l e d employees i n d e p e n d e n t l y l e a r n of and 
a p p l y fo r new p o s i t i o n s was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o 
s a t i s f y t h e e m p l o y e r ' s du ty under t h e ADA t o 
i n v e s t i g a t e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t r a n s f e r r i n g 
d i s a b l e d e m p l o y e e s . H e n d r i c k s - R o b i n s o n , 154 F.3d 
a t 694. L i k e w i s e , U n i t e d f a i l e d i t s d u t y of 
r e a s o n a b l e accommodation because i t t o o k no 
a c t i o n o t h e r t h a n t o r e j e c t G i l e ' s r e q u e s t . By 
r e f u s i n g he r r e q u e s t and assuming no f u r t h e r d u t y 
t o accommodate b e c a u s e i t s s h i f t b i d d i n g p roces s 
was i n p l a c e , U n i t e d f a i l e d i t s ADA o b l i g a t i o n . 
B. J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n Under S u t t o n 
At t r i a l , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d the 
j u r y t h a t i t s h o u l d a s s e s s G i l e ' s d i s a b i l i t y 
w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o m i t i g a t i n g m e a s u r e s , namely t h e 
m e d i c a t i o n s t h a t G i l e took t o t r e a t h e r 
d e p r e s s i o n and a n x i e t y . A few months a f t e r the 
t r i a l ' s c l o s e , t h e Supreme Court d e c i d e d Sut ton 
v . U n i t e d A i r l i n e s , I n c . , 527 U . S . 4 7 1 , 119 S.Ct . 
2 1 3 9 , 2143 (1999) , and h e l d t h a t " t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of w h e t h e r an i n d i v i d u a l i s 
d i s a b l e d shou ld b e made w i th r e f e r e n c e t o 
http://c^selawJp.findlaw.c^ 12/23/2002 
measures that mitigate the individual's 
impairment." Gile admits that the jury 
instruction in this case was therefore improper 
under the Supreme CourtT s subsequent holding in 
Sutton, but explains that United could present 
scant evidence that this error prejudiced United. 
Indeed, to win a new trial based on an incorrect 
jury instruction, United must show both that (1) 
the instruction inadequately states Seventh 
Circuit law; and (2) the error likely confused or 
misled the jury causing prejudice to the 
appellant. See Doe v. Burnham, 6 F.3d 476, 479 
(7th Cir. 1993) . This is another onerous burden 
for United because, even if the jury instruction 
was patently incorrect, United still must 
establish that it was prejudiced by the improper 
instruction. See EEOC v. AIC Security 
Investigations, Ltd,, 55 F.3d 1276, 1283 (7th 
Cir. 1995) . United is correct that the jury 
instruction was improper under Sutton, but United 
is wrong to say that it made any difference here. 
United went so far to declare in its reply 
brief that evidence which Gile proffered to 
disprove prejudice is "irrelevant." It is both 
relevant and the reason that United loses this 
claim on appeal. United alleges only that Gile's 
condition improved under medication, and that the 
jury was not given the chance to conclude that 
Gile was not disabled when medicated. United does 
not demonstrate that substantial harm flowed from 
the improper jury instruction, and its 
speculation that the jury might have decided the 
case differently if given the proper instruction-
is insufficient to establish prejudice. In fact, 
we doubt that the improper jury instruction 
resulted in substantial harm because Gile 
suffered significant Impairment despite the 
medication. Gile began taking medication in 
September 1992, and nearly all the relevant 
events of the case occurred while Gile was taking 
regular medication but still suffering serious 
depression and anxiety. The jury instruction was 
harmless error. 
C. Punitive Damages 
%United moved at the end of trial for judgment 
as a matter of law on punitive damages, but the 
district court denied UnitedTs motion and the 
jury awarded $500,000 to Gile in punitive 
damages, later limited in accordance with 42 
U.S.C. ^^c. 1981a. United now appeals, arguing 
that the district court' s instruction on punitive 
damages violated the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 
U.S. 526, 119 S.Ct, 2118 (1999). We review de 
novo the district court' s denial of motion for 
judgment as a matter of law. See Tincher, 118 
fittp://caselawJpTHTdlaw.cG^ 12/23/2002 
F.3d at 1132. 
The district court may award punitive damages 
in connection with an ADA claim when the 
defendant engaged in a "discriminatory practice 
or discriminatory practices with malice or 
reckless indifference to the federally protected 
rights of an aggrieved individual." See 42 U.S.C. 
sec. 1981a(b)(1). In Kolstad, a discrimination 
case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. sees. 2000e to 2000e-17, the Supreme 
Court decided that establishing the requisite 
"malice or reckless indifference" depends not on 
the egregiousness of the employer's misconduct, 
but instead on the "employer's knowledge that it 
may be acting in violation of federal law.,f 
Kolstad,, 119 S.Ct. at 2124. Punitive damages are 
proper when the employer discriminates "in the 
face of a perceived risk that its actions will 
violate federal law." Id. at 2125. 
It is clear that McGuffin and Gile's floor 
supervisors knew of the ADA and United1 s 
reasonable accommodation policy, but United did 
not act with reckless dxsregard for Gile's ADA 
rights. Gile's supervisors deferred to McGuffin's 
evaluation, and McGuffxn believed that a shift 
transfer would not have accommodated Gile's 
disability. McGuffin in good faith disagreed with 
Orlandino that a shift transfer would enable Gile 
to work and believed that Gile's psychological 
condition was a nonoccupational, personal problem 
which did not trigger any obligation under the 
ADA on United's part. Punitive damages depend not 
on the egregiousness of the defendant's 
misconduct, or xts callousness in denying 
reasonable accommodation, but xnstead run from a 
culpable state of mxnd regarding whether that 
denial of accommodation violates federal law. See 
Kolstad, 119 S.Ct. at 2124; see also Deters v. 
Equifax Credxt Info. Servs., 202 F.3d 1262, 1269 
(10th Cir. 2000). Unxted's failure to accommodate 
Gile's disability amounted to negligence because 
it misunderstood Gile's difficulties, did not 
regard her condition a disability and neglected 
to pursue Gile in developing an alternative 
accommodation. Although United wrongly believed 
that Gile was not disabled under- the ADA and did 
not adequately address her accommodation request, 
United did not exhibit the requisite reckless 
state of mind regarding whether its treatment of 
Gile violated the ADA. The district court should 
have granted United's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law regarding punitive damages, and we 
will reverse the award of punitive damages, 
leaving Gile with a judgment for $200,000 in 
compensatory damages. 
http://ca$e!aw.Ip.findte^ 12/23/2002 
I I I . C o n c l u s i o n 
For t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , we AFFIRM t h e judgment 
f o r Cheryl G i l e of compensatory damages b u t REVERSE 
t h e award of p u n i t i v e damages. 
DIANE P. WOOD, C i r c u i t Judge , c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t 
and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t . I a g r e e w i t h t he 
c o n c l u s i o n of t h e m a j o r i t y i n P a r t s I I . A . and 
I I . B . of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t U n i t e d A i r l i n e s has 
shown no r e a s o n t o upse t t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t i n 
favor of C h e r y l G i l e on compensa to ry damages and 
t h a t t h e e r r o n e o u s i n s t r u c t i o n a b o u t m i t i g a t i n g 
measures was h a r m l e s s e r r o r . I would n o t , 
however, r e v e r s e t h e j u r y ' s award of p u n i t i v e 
damages, r e d u c e d as i t was r e q u i r e d t o be u n d e r 
42 U.S.C. sec. 1981a(b) (3) from $500,000 t o 
$100,000 (which kep t t h e t o t a l v e r d i c t w i t h i n t h e 
s t a t u t o r y $300 ,000 c a p ) . As t h e m a j o r i t y s t a t e s , 
under K o l s t a d v . American Den ta l A s s ' n , 527 U . S . 
526, 119 S . C t . 2118 (1999), t h e r e q u i s i t e m a l i c e 
o r r e c k l e s s i n d i f f e r e n c e r e q u i r e d f o r a p u n i t i v e 
damage award i s p r e s e n t when t h e employer 
d i s c r i m i n a t e s " m t h e face of a p e r c e i v e d r i s k 
t h a t i t s a c t i o n s w i l l v i o l a t e f e d e r a l l a w . n 527 
U .S . a t , 119 S .Ct . a t 2125. 
The j u r y was e n t i t l e d t o f i n d , as i t d id , t h a t 
t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what Uni ted d i d , through i t s 
a u t h o r i z e d d e c i s i o n m a k e r , R e g i o n a l Medical 
D i r e c t o r Dr . Robe r t McGuffin. McGuffin was 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r h a n d l i n g t h e accommodation 
p r o c e s s f o r U n i t e d employees whose medica l 
c o n d i t i o n c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e i r f i t n e s s t o 
work. He u n q u e s t i o n a b l y knew a b o u t Uni ted 1 s ADA 
p o l i c y , a s t h e m a j o r i t y a g r e e s . The j u r y d id n o t 
b e l i e v e t h a t McGuffin s e r i o u s l y t h o u g h t t h a t a 
s h i f t t r a n s f e r would no t have accommodated G i l e ' s 
d i s a b i l i t y , o r t h a t h i s view was formed i n good 
f a i t h . I n s t e a d , he behaved w i t h a s t o n i s h i n g 
c a l l o u s n e s s i n t h e face of G i l e ' s d i s a b i l i t y , 
t w i c e i n s e n s i t i v e l y t e l l i n g h e r s h e should j u s t 
q u i t or r e s i g n and d i s m i s s i n g h e r c o m p l a i n t s a s 
"mere" p e r s o n a l problems i n t h e f a c e of t he 
e x t e n s i v e m e d i c a l documenta t ion t o t h e c o n t r a r y 
from a p r o f e s s i o n a l Uni ted i t s e l f recommended. I 
do not d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y t h a t the r e c o r d 
d i d not compel a f i n d i n g of m a l i c e o r r e c k l e s s 
i n d i f f e r e n c e ; had G i l e f i l e d a p r o p e r p a r t i a l 
Rule 50 m o t i o n , she would no t h a v e been e n t i t l e d 
t o judgment as a m a t t e r of law on t h a t p o i n t . But 
on t h i s r e c o r d t h e j u r y was c e r t a i n l y e n t i t l e d t o 
f i n d t h a t U n i t e d had engaged i n r e c k l e s s 
b e h a v i o r . 
I t h e r e f o r e r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t from Pa r t I I . C . 
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Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210 
Re: Burgener v. Utah Labor Commission/Laboratory Corporation of America, 
No. 20020583 
Dear Ms. Stagg: 
Pursuant to our obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct, we are writing this 
letter to bring to your attention what we perceive to be the possible unauthorized practice of law 
that has occurred in this case. Upon our review of the record, we discovered that Ms. Kandi 
Steele has repeatedly filed material on behalf of and/or assisted Petitioner/Appellant Ms. 
Burgener in this matter. It is our understanding that Ms. Steele is not an attorney and her 
representation of Ms. Burgener may be deemed the unauthorized practice of law under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-9-101. If the Court determines that Ms. Steele has engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law, we request that this Court enter an order prohibiting her jfrom continuing to do so 
in this matter. 
We are serving all parties involved in this appeal with copies of this letter. If you have 
any questions, please call this office. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mark O. Morris 





LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 
cc: Anthony V. Alfano, Esq. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, a 
true and accurate copy of the foregoing, on the 25th day of August, 2003: 
Robin F. Burgener 
11302 Bell Ridge Drive 
Sandy, UT 840094 
Kandi Steel 
Paralegal Representative 
11302 Bell Ridge Drive 
Sandy, UT 84094 
Alan Hennebold 
Utah Labor Commission 
P.O. Box 146615, 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, 
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DR. DONNA MOXLEYJ^CASTLETON^ 
3468 BROCKBANieDMiVE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84124 -4759 
(801)278-9890 
Aug. 29, 1997 
Salt Lake County Youth Services Staff: 
Robin Burgener has been under my care for the treatment of depression and 
panic disorder. I am coordinating treatment with her family physician who is 
monitoring her medication. He recently increased Robin's anti-depressant 
medications in an attempt to stabilize her current condition. 
Given Robin's current psychiatric state, I am exploring more intensive treatment 
alternatives which may include day treatment and/or possibly an in-patient stay. 
I have many concerns about her mental health at this time to effectively cope 
with added stress and worry about Randy's safety. I request that you consider 
this in your treatment/discharge planning for Randy. I understand that Randy 
may enter Job Corps in 3 weeks time and is reluctant to remain at home during 
these weeks. I have never met Randy and certainly cannot make treatment 
recommendations however, I view Job Corps as the choice of last resort for a 
young women who has had no anti-social or management history in the past. 
I would like the Youth Services team to consider a 45 day 
residential/foster/group home placement to see if this family could work on their 
issues with the goal of the family reuniting and Randy returning to her home. I 
have discussed this with Robin and this is her desire as well. 
Please feel free to contact me at 278-9890. 
Thank you. 
onna Moxley Castleton, DSW, LCSW, BCD 
/\ Copy io/i s T*cvt ~-F^. -re £*£ Co^f_> . 
/ 
Representation Notice 
Robin F. Burgener 
11302 Bell Ridge Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
(801)571-3939 
May 28, 2002 
To whom it may Concern: 
As I was not satisfied with the representation of John alack Jr.at 
my last hearing, I no longer wish to have 
prior to my last hearing I have been very 
Kandi Steele, MSw, Paralegal. However I wis 
that I was required to be represented by in 
come to my attention that this was not thi 
Mr Black represent me. 
well represented by Ms. 
told by Judge Richard La jeunesse 
attorney, it has since 
case. 
Therefore I wish to again be represented tty Ms. Steele in all concerns 
of the matter of my Discrimination claim against Labcorp. 
Thank you 
<3 £ /? 
/ y 
' * * < - <• A 
pagf 1 
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* * • * * 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
• » * 
* » 
I hereby certify that I matted a true and Correct copy of the foregoajg ftfotion To 
Request Review, and Affidavit by placing the s*ne in the United States Mail in a 
postage prepaid sealed envelope, this 25* day dfMav. 2002 to Respondents Attorney, as 
follows: 
Mark Morris ESQ 
15 South Temple. Suite 500 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101 
ii Steele, Paralegal Representative 
/Ver? , 
"7PL,O fir * > / ' ':..-'
 a
-~'' 
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TE 
JBLEM/MEDS7LABS - - ^ > f t S FINDINGS PLANS 
P L A N : 
1 . She is to get additional BP checks for us as 
that was high today. 
Started on Prozac, EO mgs qd and we will see her 
back in one week. She agrees to call me if 
symptoms rfxk increasing 
t&sCttS^. DOUVILLE, M.D. 
D R D : s n b 
Di W 7 / 9 7 
Tt * / 8 / 7 7 
APR 1 4 199? 
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R O B Y N 
D O B = 
B U R G t Z N E R 
1 1 7 6 / 5 5 
: — ^ 4 4 
A - / l ^ / 9 7 
SUBJECTIVE: 
Robyn oresents for follow U D on depression. Please 
see orior notes. This was initially thought to be 
simple grief reaction, but symptoms oersist and were 
disabling. We have started her on Prozac, EO mgs qd. 
She had no prior history of significant deoression. 
She denies suicidal intent and feels that h&r 
deoression is lifting. She continues to use the 
Valium occasionally for anxiety. 
OBJECTIVE: 
GENERAL: Robyn seemed more relaxed, -hapoier and 
soontaneous today. 
ASSESSMENT: 
Deoression, slightly improved. 
PLAN: 
•t 
-L . We w i l l c o n t i n u e t h e P r o z a c . 
RTC i n r o u g h l y two w e e k s , or s o o n e r i f she h a s 
new or i n c r e a s i n g s y m p t o m s . 
We d i d c o i n s l e t e a d e t a i l e d form to day for her 
wo r k 
DOUGLAS R. D O U V I L L E , M . D . 















d o e s have some p r o b l e m s w i t h s l e e p , as w e l l . 
OBJECTIVE: . 
GENERAL: Robyn was s a d b u t c e r t a i n l y a p p r o p r i a t e 
and p l e a s a n t d u r i n g t h e v i s i t t o d a y . 
ASSESSMENT: 
G r i e f r e a c t i o n due t o d e a t h o f he r m o t h e r . 
PLAN: 
1 . She w i l l c o n t i n u e w i t h h e r c o u n s e l l i n g . 
e . We g a v e h e r a f ew R e s t o r i l t o u s e a t n i g h t f o r 
s l e e p , a n d a few V a l i u m t a b l e t s t o u s e when she 
i s v e r y a n x i o u s and d i s t r e s s e d . 
3 . We w i l l s e 4 p e r b a c k i n one week f o r f o l l o w u p . 
• M O N o a a n 
1 
AS R. D O U V I L L E , M . D . 
r. 3M;*ll 
R O B I N 
D O B = 
B U R G E N E R 






Robin presents for follow up on depression. Neither 
the Valium nor the Restoril we gave her seemed to 
help. The Restoril made her feel somewhat hung over. 
The depression persists and is very problematic as she 
cannot concentrate. She wishes to take an additional 
week off of work. She denies any suicidal intent or 
serious suicidal thoughts. 
OBJECTIVE: 
GENERAL: Robin was neat in her appearance. She 
was appropriate but somewhat flat in 
her affect and quiet. 
ASSESSMENT: 
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She is to get additional BP checks for us as 
that was high today. 
Started on Prozac, EO mgs qd and we will see her 
back in one week. She agrees to call 
symptoms *fi\ increasing. 
J ^ S H ? . DOUVILLE, M.D. 
me if 
DRD:snb 
Dt 4 / 7 / 9 7 
T i <»/8/?7 
APR 1 4 199? 
art ii 1EL ^ ^ 
3fe 7y~ -x* AMM $fi/p*li<. AjftJccUABv-
D O B s 
^v%lx^ 
B U R G E N E R 
1 1 7 6 / 5 5 4 / 1 4 / 9 7 
J5/4-
SUBJECTIVE: 
Robyn oresents "for follow uo on deoression. Please 
see orior notes. This was initially thought to be 
simple grief reaction, but symDtoms oersist and were 
disabling. We h^ve started h^r on Prozac, 20 mgs qd. 
She had no prior history of significant deoression. 
She denies suicidal intent and feels that h^r 
deoression is lifting. She continues to use the 
Valium occasionally for anxi&ty. 
OBJECTIVE: 
GENERAL: Robyn seemed more relaxed, hapoier and 
soontaneous today. 
ASSESSMENT: 




We will continue the Prozac. 
RTC in roughly two weeks, or sooner if she has 
new or increasing symptoms. 
We did ccynalete a detailed form to day for ^er 
wo r U. 1 \ 
DOUGLAS R. D O U V I L L E , M . D . 
D R D r s n b 
CLINICAL DATA 
rifA^qs.Ht-r,, l^ok?ro^ NAME fi vy : 5 y DOB 
ACCOUNT # 
DATE 
PROBLEM/MEDS/LABS FINDINGS PUNS 
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M*r R O B Y N D O B = 
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SUBJECTIVE: 
Robyn presents w i t h a 3-day history of exacerbation of 
her asthma. She stopped smoking some six months ago 
She has been on a steroid inhaler of some kind (she 
wasn't sure) , but also a Ventolin inhaler. She has 
had a cough for one week, but denies any chest pain or 
shortness of breath. No ear or sinus pain. 
OBJECTIVE: 









Regular use of her Ventolin inhaler.. 
Given a short course of Prednisone, 80 mgs 
tapering over seven days. 
If she is any worse in the next 24 hours, she 
must go to the ER. If she is not better by noon 
tomorrow^/srie is to call me back. 
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SUBJECTIVE: 
Robyn's mother died a 
she had been sick for 
somewhat unexpected, 
for a number of years. 
^mr 
week and a half ago. Although 
some time, tfc^ e death was 
Robyn had been caring for her 
Since her mother's death, she 
has had a very significant grief reaction with all of 
the classic signs of depression. Although she has had 
suicidal thoughts, she certainly has no suicidal 
intention. She has already started to work with a 
counsellor. She is mainly concerned because of her 
CLINICAL DATA 
WMtfM, Wlntu NAME 
DOB 
TESHsL ACCOUNT # 
DATE 
PROBLEM/MEDS/LABS 
APR. 2 ^ 1997 
FINDINGS PUNS \0 if J - BfMBi? £§5 
ONSET: ^ - ^ f ? 
_k 
1STTX: 
B U R G E I M E R 
1 1 / 6 / 5 5 





R O B I N 
D O B = 
SUBJECTIVE: 
Robin stoooed in today because' of her inability to 
return to work. She tried to return to work this 
morning and became deoressed and oamcky. Even with 
the Xanax, she was unable to focus on her job. She 
feels that her deoression is not much worse, but sti'l 
not uo for returning to work. She denies any suicidal 
ideation or-in-tent. She did not have systemic 
symotoms consistent with a D a m e attack. She fee's 
that she would like to wait one additional week before 
returning to work. 
OBJECTIVE: 
GENERAL: Robin was somewhat anxious, but 
aopropriate and oleasant during the 
visit today. 
ASSESSMENT: 
Deoression and anxiety, minimally lmoroved. 
PLAN: 
1 . We w i l l c o n t i n u e t h e P r o z a c , 2 0 mas a d . , but-
h a v e r e f e r r e d h e r t o p s y c h i a t r y . S h e i s a l r e a d y 
r e c e i v i n g s o m e c o u n s e l l i n g t h r o u a h h e r w o r k . 
2 . We w i l l s e e h e r b a c k i n o n e wee!.-,' o r s o o n e r i f 
s y m p t o m s a r e i n c r e a s i n g . 
I d i d w r i f i e X h e r an a d d i t i o n a l n o t e f o r w o r k . 







33LEM / MEDS / LABS 
R O B Y N B U R G E N E R 
D O B = 1 1 / 6 / 5 5 <^/«B*+/S>V 
SUBJECTIVE: 
Robyn presents for follow up on depression. Please 
see prior notes. She seems to be improving on the 
Prozac. Her primary problem is that she cannot return 
to work at night. She states that as long as she is 
not working at night, she does fairly well. She 
becomes panicky at the prospect or returning to work 
at night. 
OBJECTIVE: 
GENERAL: R o b y n , a s we have n o t e d b e f o r e , i s 
s l i g h t l y f l a t i n h e r a f f e c t w i t h p o o r 
eye c o n t a c t , b u t seems no w o r s e t h a n 
she h a s b e e n i n t h e p a s t . 
ASSESSMENT: 
M a j o r d e p r e s s i o n . I m p r o v i n g on P r o z a c . 
PLAN: 
1 . She s t i l l has no s u i c i d a l i n t e n t i o n . 
2 . I h a v e w r i t t e n a n o t e f o r w o r k r e q u e s t i n g 
d a y t i m e work f o r h e r . 
3 . We w i l l do referral f o r b o t h p s y c h i a t r y and 
c o u n s e l 1 i n g . 
**• We w i l l see h e r b a c k i n one w e e k . She i s 
s c h e d u l e d f o r a p h y s i c a l exam n e x t Monday and 
w i l l o b t a i n l a b s p r i o r t o t h a t . 
DOUGLAS R. DOUVILLE, M .D . 
DRD:snb 
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sl ightly. 8 eosinophils. Urine was 
abnormal with IE WBC's, but apparently 
contaminated. Lipids were well within 







Major depression. On discussion today, she 
feels like she is slowly getting better, but 
still states that emotionally, she absolutely 
cannot work nighttime shifts as this greatly 
exacerbates her depression. 
Normal exam except she has mild microcytic 
anemia. 
We will check guaiac cards for blood in the 
stool. 1 suspect this may be due to some heavy 
menstrual periods. We will also check a serum 
iron. Also, repeat her UA. 
She is to continue on Prozac, 20 mgs qd. 
She is still in the process of setting up an 
appointment with a psychiatrist and formal 
counselling. She states she will 
soon . 
We will e\her in follow up in 8 
I^^^Tr-DOUVILLE, M.D. 
have this done 
weeks. 
DRD:snb 
D« 4 / 2 9 / 9 7 
T i 4 / 3 0 / 9 7 
^ y / 3 \s'6>'?7^/^7iv&&?&?^ P'-t*fe>/,-»^ ^^~3/&^K 
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H7: &' Y /f 
R O B Y N B U R G E N E R 
D O B = 1 1 / 6 / 5 5 ^ f / 2 8 / 9 7 
SUBJECTIVE: 
Robyn presents for a complete physical examination. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: Recent onset of major 
deoression associated with her father's death. 
MEDICATIONS: She is currently on Valium, Prozac and 
also uses Ventolin and AeroBid (?) 
inhalers for asthma. She feels that 
her asthma is quiescent at this time. 
SURGERIES: She has had carpal tunnel surgery, right 
wr ist. -
FAMILY HISTORY: Father died from stomach cancer. 
Mother and aunt with breast cancer. She also has a 
sister with diabetes and another sister with HTN. 
SOCIAL HISTORY: She is a light smoker. She is 
divorced and works as a medical technician. 
REVIEW OF SYSTEMS: She has infrequent and not severe 
headaches. She has had nervousness and fatigue 
associated with this recent illness/dec ission. Her 
a'-il.Inn.i i'. i |u i t •• .i i M I L .i I. L h t * . L i m r . 
GYN REVIEW OF SYSTEMS: Unremarkable. She did h.ivi^  .1 











Normal SI and S2. t^o murmur or extra 
sound was heard. 
Soft and nontender without mass or 
organomegaly. 
Norma 1. 
E x t e r n a l g e n i t a l i a , v a g i n a and c e r v i x 
n o r m a l . U t e r u s , a d n e x a and o v a r i e s 
n o r m a l . 
Normal with guaiac negative stool. 
U—lo It t- LL - _ «J Nrff-M I 
CLINICAL DATA 
'MM.. NAME ULL 
DOB 
ACCOUNT # //-fly-5s: 
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)NC'I ^ £ / ^ 





R O B I N B E R G E N E R 
1 1 / < £ > / 5 5 3 / 1 3 / 9 7 
SUBJECTIVE: 
Robin presents for follow up on depression. Please 
see prior note. In addition, we recently did a 
physical exam in which mild microcytic anemia was 
noted. Robin apparently did not receive the guaiac 
cards as we indicated. She feels her depression is 
doing much better but that she continues to be unable 
to work nights and evenings. Apparently, her job is 
going to accommodate her on this request, but she 
requires a note that states that she is still unable 
to work nights. Robin states that she still cannot do 
th I s . 
OBJECTIVE: 
GENERAL: Robin was pleasant and appropriate 
during the visit today. 
ASSESSMENT: 
Depression improving. Still states she is unable to 
do sh I ft v4or k . 
PLAN: 
1 . Note wrItten . 
a. Continue Prozac, 20 mgs ad 
NOTE: Regarding her anemia, we gave her three guaiac 
cards and detailed instruction on how to use these. 
She will get an serum iron done at work and we will 
recheck her CBC in two months. She will call us back 
in two weeks to assess her progress. Her menstrual 
periods are very regular but somewhat heavy and this 
is the probable source of her anemia. Because she 
smokes, hormonal/manipulation might be slightly more 
hazardous. 
DRDrsnb 
D» 5 / 1 3 / 9 7 
Ti 3 / 1 3 / 9 7 
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DOB: 1 1 / 0 6 / 5 5 
S : Robin i=> a 4 1 - y e a r - o l d w h i t 
p a r a I a b o r t a 
•June J , 1 j :'7. 
06/11/97 
te xemale? gravida II 
st menstrual period was 
Robin was referred by Dr. 
I/cuville for consideration for a coltr^cory *n 
possible endometrial biopsy. A recent Pa^" a 
done in May showed benign cellular changes, 
was negative for neoplastic cells. There w a s " 
model are ii.fianrnarion and histiocytes were 
present. 
jxobm tells me triat about three or four years 
ago, she had a Pap smeai that was somewhat 
abnormal, but she does not really know the 
degree of the abnormality and no treatment was 
done. She lias had two previous pieanancies. 
One was a breach .delivery, .at 27 we^ks and then 
she also had a spontaneous abortion treated with 
a DccC- She does occasionally have some tulli»-c 
pelvic pain in the right and" the l^ft side "but 
really significant problems. She says that her 
periods are fairly regular, although"this last 
-period, was a little bit early. She does bleed 
fairly heavily the first couple of days. She is 
not using any contraception. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: Fairly unremarkable, 
although she is being treated with depression. 
She has problems with asthma as well/ 
PREVIOUS SURGERY; Include a breast biopsy with 
benign findings. Surgery for cartal tunnel a:.d 
a D&C-
ALLERGIES: NONE, 
C U R K E K T MEDICATIONS: Ventolin arid Azmaccrt 
inhalers . 
^ne is axso on r'rozac 20 mg a day-
After our discussion, Robin questioned whether 
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* * ^ 
R O B V r \ J B U R G E N E R 
SUBJECTIVE2 -
Robyn presents for follow up on left l e a a b 




The area of indu 
increase again. Packin 
ASSESSMENT: 
Unresolving abscess. 
ration and redness has started tc 
g was removed and renl aced . 
PLAN: 
1. Needs much wider I & D, 
orthopedic surgery. We will r^f^r tc 
NOTE: I did 
r e o a r r i i n n .
 g i V G R o b V n another note for work 
regarding her inability • "or\< 
anxiety and depression 
DC 
o w o r k a t n i g h t due t o 
LAS R. DOUVILLE, M.D. 
DRD:snb 
D
« 7 / 8 / ? 7 
Tt 7 / ? / ? 7 
CLINICAL DATA 
& NAME '/I o^5s DOB 
ACCOUNT# 
DATE 








There is some mild tenderness o\/Gr the 
frontal sinus areas bilaterally. The right 
TM is slightly bulging but otherwise normal 
in Appearance. Posterior pharynx is pink 
without lesions. 
Supple without adenopathy. 
Show expiratory wheezes throughout with fine 
crackles to the left base. Air movement 
does BppBar to be pretty good bilaterally. 
SI and S2. RRR. 
heart sounds-
noted . 
No murmurs, rub* or extra 
No pulse of paradoxus was 
ASSESSMENT: -
1. Clinical pneumonia with exacerbation of asthma, 






She is placed on Biaxin 500 mg bid for 14- days. 
Also, a prednisone taper of 60 mg for 2 days, ^0 
mg for 2 days, and 20 mg for 2 days. 
She is to resume her Azrnacort at 4- puffs bid 
when she hits 20 mg. 
I did let bier know that I felt like this should 
he her maintenance dose since she sounds like 
she has significant problems with her asthma. 
She is to also use her Ventolin inhaler 
regularly every 4- hours while she is having 
problems, and then prn after that. 
1 did let her know that she is to contact us 
ASAP if she has worsening symptoms, or return 
the clinic or call if there is no improvement 
2 to 3 days. 
Otherwise, follow up will be prn. 
to 
i n 
SUSAN SANDERSON, N.P, 
S S : c g 
Ol 7 / 1 6 / 9 7 
T i 7 / 1 8 / 9 7 
o\Wi VAlhA. \\mtiAtos'$ik\Ah![, *3 i ;XFF 
wti&Wh 1A 
ufrlr? gr|lltoL %A$hff; 'dDwoj <&w o 0PF- wbMW* ~^m 
MRN: 09994369 
Robin Burgener 
DOB: 11/06/1955 Age: 45 Sex: F 
have "severe menstrual bleeding". She believes her hemoglobin is 10-
11, and her hematocrit is about 30. She stopped smoking cigarettes 
six months ago after a 10~pack-year history. She has asthma 
controlled with Flovent with exacerbations treated with Albuterol, 
Vancenase for the nasal congestion, Prozac 30 mg per day is helpful 
for anxiety, depression, and mood swings. In the past, she tried 
Melatonin 6 mg, but this caused "weird dreams" and she stopped that 
medication. Her TSH and chemistry panels have all been normal. 
FAMILY HISTORY: Includes bouts of depression in her mother when the 
patient was young. Her mother is now deceased. Her father had 
crescendo snoring and breath holding at night, but there is no known 
family history of restless legs syndrome and no other history of 
daytime sleepiness or insomnia. 
SOCIAL HISTORY: Includes stress related to home, finances and 
"parenting". She states her work is okay. 
PHYSICAL EXAM: She is 65" tall, 203 pounds with a 36.5 cm neck 
circumference and blood pressures of 158/104 to 110, with a heart 
rate of 70. I checked the blood pressure three different times 
during the exam, including with a large cuff. The breath sounds are 
clear on inspiration and forced expiration. Heart sounds are regular. 
The nasal airways are widely patent, she can sniff in through 
either side. The oral pharynx is unremarkable. There is no 
enlargement of uvula, soft palate, 
Robin Burgener 
July 7, 1998 
Page 3 
tonsils, or tongue. There is no overbite. The chin is not recessed. 
The strength of facial, jaw, tongue, palate, and neck muscles is all 
good. The diaphragms move normally by abdominal palpation. There is 
no tibial edema, and arterial pulsations are easily felt over the 
feet. In the lower extremities, formal strength testing is quite 
good throughout . Rapid alternating movements of the feet and heel 
to shin maneuver were accurate. Plantar responses are downgoing. 
Vibration sensation at the ankles is good. Deep tendon reflexes are 
present at the knees and ankles. There is no clonus. The tandem gait 
was performed fairly easily and the Romberg was stable. 
SUMMARY: In summary, this 42 -year-old white female probably has a 
combination of three or four factors disrupting her sleep. First of 
all, she has a constitutional sleep phase delay tendency and is only 
getting about six hours of sleep per night. As a result of a late 
sleep onset time, this may not be adequate sleep time for her. 
Therefore, I discussed the use of early morning bright light, late 
evening dim light, how to keep sleep logs, and the possibility we 
would talk about low dose (0.5 mg) Melatonin for sleep. Secondly, 
she may have restless legs symptoms associated with iron deficiency 




DOB: 11/06/1955 Age: 45 Sex: F 
stilL take a nap the next day. In Dr. Schoenhal's office, her 
Epworth's sleepiness score was 19. She told me that she does not 
like to take naps, because she does not like how she feels when she 
wakes up from them. She keeps moving at work, but in the afternoons, 
especially, she could easily take a nap if she wanted to, She has 
not noticed herself fighting drowsiness while denied any close calls. 
In the evenings, the fatigue and sleepiness subsides somewhat. I 
could not elicit any convincing description of cataplexy or sleep 
onset dreams, but she does have sleep paralysis in the middle of the 
night. 
At about 3:00 a.m., when she is most relaxed and starting to get 
sleepy, she has a leg movement that is "hard to explain". She feels 
there is almost a "restlessness" in her legs as if she cannot get 
comfortable. Sometimes this makes her walk about the house for a few 
minutes, which is helpful in terms of relaxing her legs. It only 
happens when she is lying down relaxing at about 3:00 a.m. By 
Robin Burgener 
July 7, 1998 
Page 2 
9:00 a.m., it seems to be gone. It is a "involuntary movement". It 
is a brief twitch of short duration, but does bother the bed partner 
who has complained about these leg kicks and jerks. She is only 
aware of it herself about one night per week. 
In terms of the snoring that has been observed, it is loud, but her 
bed partner is deaf in one ear and sleeps on the good ear. The 
snoring is clearly variable from night to night, and there are some 
gasping awakenings that the patient is not aware of, but her bed 
partner thinks that she does partly wake up. Discontinuation of 
cigarettes six months ago has improved the snoring, but it is still 
present. A nasal airway dilator also helped somewhat but not 
completely. She has had dreams about breathing but mostly these 
relate to the episodes of sleep paralysis and her history of asthma. 
It is difficult to blame them on possible obstructive sleep apnea. 
She also does have morning headaches, but these last all day and 
occur about three times per week. She wakes up with a dry mouth and 
a cough and believes that she is mouth breathing. Her nasal airways 
are usually well treated during hay fever season with Vancenase 
topical nasal steroid. Sometimes, she will also use Benadryl to help 
keep her nose open. She starts out sleeping lateral but ends up 
sleeping supine, flat and level. She has never been on a dental 
device for mandibular advancement in sleep. She did have a 
polysomnography recently, no obstructive hypopneas, apneas or 
periodic leg movements were scored. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: Is notable for iron deficiency anemia as a 
child and also as an adult without any history of gastric bypass 




DOB: 11/06/1955 Age: 45 Sex: F 
2. Wrote her a script for the gloves she needs and wrote her 
a script for the Votec so she can get some retraining for 
supervisory position and hopefully that will allow her the 
time to be in gloves. 
3. Gave her a prescription for Elocon ointment. She can 
apply that once a day at night and she can wear socks or 
gloves wherever she has that. 
HQR Cynthia Flugrad, P.A.-C. 
09/01/1998 Jay Aldous Ancillary Daily - Other Ancillary 
07/23/1998 Christopher Jones Sleep Disorder Center - Other Ancillary 
07/06/1998 Christopher Jones Neurology - Clinic (Letter) 
CLINIC NOTE 
PATIENT: Robin Burgene r 
MRN: 999436-9 
DATE OF VISIT: July 6, 1998 
REFERRING PHYSICIAN: Joseph Schoehals, M.D. 
The patient is a 42 -year-old white female working as a laboratory 
technician. She complains of difficulty initiating sleep, snoring 
and gasping according to her bed partner, after she falls asleep, 
with fatigue and sleepiness the next day. 
She has always been a "night owl". She would never wake up feeling 
cheerful in the morning. She was able to stay up later than her 
parents when she was a child, and in her 20's was sleeping from 
midnight to 4:30 a.m. and feeling "okay" on that little amount of 
sleep. Then in her late 30's, she found she could sleep in from 9:00 
a,m. to noon. Now she is working from 2:00 p.m. to just after 
midnight. Bedtime is about 1:00 a.m., lights out is about 1:30 a.m., 
but she watches television until she falls asleep at 3:00 a.m. The 
television distracts her so she can "quite down my mind" from the 
worries and stress that she has. Once she is asleep, there is a 
frightening episode of "trying to wake up, but I can't move". 
Sometimes this is out of a dream. It occurs about 6:00 or 7:00 a.m., 
but only about twice per month, which is a decrease in frequency 
from before. Her final morning wake up time is 9:00 a.m. because of 
an alarm, otherwise she could easily sleep until noon without the 
alarm. 




DOB: 11/06/1955 Age: 45 Sex: F 
on iron tablets 300 mg b.i.d. with vitamin C to promote absorption. 
Thirdly, she has a possible obstructive sleep apnea, although her 
recent polysomnography was normal. Polysomnography can be quite 
variable from night to night, and the scoring of upper airway 
resistance syndrome can be very difficult. Therefore, one negative 
polysomnogram does not rule out clinically significant upper airway 
obstruction and sleep. Finally, she also has sleep paralysis. I do 
not know if this is familial or associated with her sleep schedule 
disorder and sleep fragmentation due to possible periodic leg 
movements as described by the bed partner and snoring arousals 
during sleep. Therefore, she agreed to check with the Dental Clinic 
about fitting of a dental device for mandibular advancement in sleep 
to see if we could treat the snoring, she agreed to this plan 
including a follow-up visit in three weeks to review her sleep logs. 
I encouraged her to get as much bright light in the morning and as 
much dim light in the evening as possible. 
Christopher R* Jones, M.D. 
CRJ:slmt/3/7798 (f7/9) 
cc: Joseph Schoenhals, M.D. 
250 East Broadway, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Darren Ott, M.D. 
Northeast Family Clinic 
70 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
07/06/1998 Christopher Jones Sleep Disorder Center - Other Ancillary 
04/28/1998 Pamela Faye Farrington Ancillary Daily - Other Ancillary 
04/08/1998 Pamela Faye Farrington General Gynecology Clinic (Office Visit Notes) 
ID: Ms. Burgener was referred by Dr. Terrence Loftus for 
evaluation of abnormal bleeding. 42-year-old white female, Gl 
P0101, LMP is uncertain as Ms. Burgener has had persistent bleeding 
off and on of varying volumes over the past year. Prior to that 
time she states that her menstrual periods were very regular and she 
had no significant gynecologic complaints in the past. She 
conceived her single pregnancy without difficulty. She was on birth 
control pills for approximately 3 1/2 years when in her 20fs. About 
two years ago she had a Pap smear which was mildly abnormal and a ^ 
repeat Pap smear was normal and had a normal Pap smear approximately 




DOB: 11/06/1955 Age: 45 Sex: F 
Patient Name : Robin Burgner 
MRN : 9994369 
Location : U0FU1 ARUP - EHP AR04 
S: Patient is a 44 year old who punctured herself, with a 
capillary tube that was full of blood, in her left thumb. She 
did have her gloves on. It bled pretty good. This was from 
a tiny infant newborn. As far as we know there are no 
problems with this child, though we will call the university 
and have them investigate that. We discussed blood born 
pathogen exposure with Robin at length and we are going to go 
ahead and do the test as per our protocol and she will follow 
up with us as per the protocol- She was counseled. We will 
follow up with her in a couple of days with the results on the 
initial draw, 
HQR: Roland Ruegner, P.A.-CD 
10/00 Reviewed by Dr. Miller. 
~«=~=«Revised: 24-Oct-2000 16:30==««==~ 
05/04/2000 Roland G Ruegner ARUP Clinic (Office Visit Note) 
Provider : RUEGNER, ROLAND G Provider ID : U1871 
Date of Enc. : 05/04/2000 
Type of Doc : OFV 
Patient Name : Robin Burgener 
MRN : 9994369 
Location : UOFU1 ARUP - EHP AR04 
S: This is a 44 year old female here following up on asthma 
exacerbation. She has finished the Prednisone and has 
continued to use her Flovent 3 puffs bid. She reports feeling 
much improved, she has not had to use any Albuterol for 3 days 
now. Previous to this exacerbation she would use Albuterol 
1-2 times per week, it became every few hours during the 
exacerbation. She is quite happy with the response in that 
way. On the other hand, she has been taking Claritin D for 
her allergies, states that this does not appear to be helping 
at all this year. She is suffering quite a bit from her SAR 
symptoms. The Claritin had worked well last year however. 
She has not tried any other prescription medications for 
allergies. She also takes Prozac, no other medications. 
O: 
General: Robin is her usual pleasant self and is in no distress. 
Lungs: Peak flows today are 500, 500, and 450. Lungs are 
bilaterally clear to auscultation and air exchange is 
good. 
A: 1. Asthma exacerbation resolved. 
2. SAR. 
P: She is to stay on 3 puffs bid for 2 weeks without using any 
Albuterol. At that point she can drop down to 2 puffs bid and 
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Fxhibit VII 
OEA# 
DOUGLAS R DOUVILLE M D 
FAMILY PRACTICE 
GRANGER MEDICAL CLINIC 
3280 WEST 3500 SOUTH 
WEST VALLEY UT 84119 
(801)965-3470 
NAME £w!Uv^ /KJUA^J LU4A-
ADDRESS D A T E , 
R 
4X&/V 
- ^ ^ l> IK f7-
D Label 
Refill times PRN NR 
IJU^A^^ MO U W M - ^ V * ^ M O 
Substitution Permitted Dispense as Written 
Exhibit IX 
DOUGLAS R. DOUVILLE, M D 
FAMILY PRACTICE 
GRANGER MEDICAL CLINIC 
3280 WEST 3500 SOUTH 
(801) 965 3470 WEST VALLEY UT 84119 
Name &Cdc*-~ Age 
Address 
BELOW MUST APPEAR GREEN Date 
£ OEA* I' 
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G Label 
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DOUGLAS R. DOUVILLE, M D 
FAMILY PRACTICE 
GRANGER MEDICAL CLINIC 
3280 WEST 3500 SOUTH 
(801)965 3470 WEST VALLEY, UT 84119 
Name ^ ^ U < ^ JOu^t^u^*^ Age 
Address 
BELOW MUST APPEAR GREEN Date ^l10/* ? 
R OEA # (j) 
• Label 
Refill times PRN NR f{ ^  
M P V V < U A ^ ^ M_D_ 
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DOUGLAS R. DOUVILLE, M.D. 
FAMILY PRACTICE 
GRANGER MEDICAL CLINIC 
3280 WEST 3500 SOUTH 
(801) 965-3470 WEST VALLEY, UT 84119 
Name. _ / . i , £ f * * ^ . . . . S ~ ^ « ^ ^ Age. 
Address 
BELOW MUST APPEAR GREEN Date.. 
R 0EA#> 
fciM**uj fa to*c<&^ 
n Label 




1378 Green St. 
Salt Lake City 
Dr. Donna Moxley Castleton 
3468 Brockbank Drive 







Previous Balance: $10,035.00 
Session Charges 
I Parte CHent fnsurencs Bitted Session Tim* (Hrs) Charge 
Date 
11/1/97 








Total Paysmnte : I $10,012.501 
C V t 
" 1 f t * > * z , 
' t-"rr ft. f ft J 
< * ' *-V / Sfew Balance: $22J0| 
^ ^ 7 //- &/ ^ ^ 
^lllfllfllff 
RX: 6 2 6 7 1 2 4 DATE: 0 5 / 2 0 / 1 9 9 9 
PATIENT: BURGENER, ROBIN 
DOCTOR: OTT, DARIN 
DRUG NAME: PROZAC 20MG CAP DIST 
SHOPKO PHARMACY # 2 0 8 3 
2 1 6 5 E. 9400 SOUTH 
SANDY CITY OT 
RPh-DAHL, KIM 
( 8 0 1 ) 9 4 2 - 8 5 5 5 
C o p y r i g h t 1999 F i r s t D a t a B a n k , I n c . A l l r i g h t s r e s e r v e d . D a t a b a s e 
E d i t i o n 9 9 . 2 I n f o r m a t i o n E x p i r e s J u l y 3 0 , 1999 
Attachm^^t D 
SALT LAKE CITY (ORG 42) RIF'S (7/1/97-9/30/97) 
NAME JOB TITLE HIRE DATE ANNUAL RATE 
Cozad, Reyman Thomas Technologist I 03/18/97 
Goodaman, Jayann___ Technician _ _ _ 04/02/96 
*Jf Norris, Chr'stineA " ~S^yjce Re .^_.."" pj^26/91 
"Toner, Timothy L '^ ' ' ^fechKologist 05/27/97 
Weber, Teresa Joy D/BaseTech 02/13/95 
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In-House Application 
Name , / —_—- Employee # Phone 
Present Job 
Job Title MLT— Region Shift /?,&//-
Location <£*/•/ h^e. Department cS-g r& /g^vs 
Current Supervisor &z~riA /P/> / « s 7 / 
Position Applying For 
Job Title /J^sr?^ /ir half Job Number
 ; i Shift Jj^ J^J 
4 
Job Title / /<sn« A A?*r # . Job Nu ber 
Supervisor\ Vvonn<? HPitrirks* ^Department H^^^UgyJ 
Location c5<a // /.al/ Region 3/ 
Qualifications yott possess for this job (experience, training, skills, education^ etc,) 
<2JK 7$t ./irat/ Qv* /''+'<? C* pC Set £ztz 7*Ae ^<?4 . -Z~~ tLt 
run ex//
 /r r ^ ^ ^ A ^AJ / &Lr4 n*$cfc* a ^ ^ 2&2 ^lk . 35? jC 
Q)<ffJ /<j a * /s /!£J? A CX ,5 L„r / / y Sresbr (7rt .&frt fsrattc.*^. 
Note Acceptance of this application is subject to a review of your minimum qualifications for the position applied 
as well as the existence of Disciplinary Actions which may currently be in effect. Please read qualification criteria 
below This application will be returned to you if you do not meet the minimum qualifications 
Applicant Signature ^ ^ T ^ / / / < c^O- Date 7g?/-?7 _ _ 
To be completed by Human Resources Department 
Notice of Disposition 
According to the Personnel Policy Manual, an employee must be in their current position for 12 months 
before requesting a transfer. With present Supervisor's approval you may request a transfer prior to 
12 months in your current position. Please obtain your supervisor's approval before submitting to your local 
Human Resources Department. 
Authorized approval to transfer* 
D You have a Counseling/Reprimand in your Personnel File You may not request a transfer for 12 months 
from the date of the Counseling/Reprimand Application will be returned if submitted 
£r Meets Minimum Qualifications. Application forward tn Hiring Supervisor on . ~7~3' "^7 
FACT FINDING CONFERENCE 
RECORD OF ATTENDANCE 
ROBIN F BURGENER LABCORP 
CHARGING PARTY RESPONDENT 
UALDNO. 97-0722 EEOCNO. 35C-97-0844 
DATE OF FACT FINDING CONFERENCE: TUESDAY, MAY 18,1999 
INVESTIGATOR: BFL.T RANDALL 











<*roi) 5?/~ SfS^/ 
/QA>Z?/ 7-£'£<i£ M<iO CSi<) 
lo/Ty^e^s 
RESPONDENT 
DAY PHONE NAMETPLEASE PRINT) TITLE 
2. VW f W u f c - f a c . / S 




NAME (PLEASE PRINT) 
1. 




-J^ y^-^ ^ v " ^^n - ^ ^ ^ 
^I5f ' ^ -
jjP^^JZ&Zj. ^ ^ ^ < ^ L _ ^ ^ f ^ ? 
^ ^ ^ _ ^ ^ i i _ _ _ 
/^L> 'ySteJ^ j&*~x~* *^~g~ Ct £ 
April 29, 1997 
Robin Burgener 
2744 S Centerbrook Dr 




Large Case Claims Team 
P.O. Box 419876 
Kansas City, MO 64141 
WATS (800) 909-8717 
Fax (816) 881-6060 
Re: LabCorp Managed Disability Program, Notice of Disability Benefits 
Dear Ms. Burgener: 
This letter is in reply to your request for disability benefits. We have provided the following 
information to your employer: 
Date we received request: April 4, 1997 
Your last day worked: March 21,1997 
Your first day of disability: March 24, 1997 
Return to work date: Undetermined 
We have approved your disability through 5/4/97 as long as you remain disabled from your job. If you 
are able to return to work before this date please contact your employer or our office to avoid any 
overpayment on your claim. Extension of your disability will be based on contact with your attending 
physician, review of medical records and/or other relevant information. 
LabCorp has asked us to inform you that this leave of absence will run concurrently with any leave to 
which you are entitled under the Family Medical Leave Act. Please contact your Human Resources 
Department for more specific information about your FMLA entitlement. 
If you have any questions, or if you feel you have additional information, please do not hesitate to contact 
us at the toll-free number listed below. 
Sincerely, 
i l «U. Ci 
Karen Kinnett 
Benefit Specialist - Large Case Team 
(800) 909-8717 Ext. 8924 
cc: Yvonne Hendrickson-Supervisor-FAX#801-269-8811 
Vicki Romero-Human Resources-FAX#801-269-8811 (Org. 42) 
FCPTIS DISPBILITY 
-•:816-88l-6C60 Apr 21 '97 11:33 P.C 
Exhibi t V 
April 18, 1997 
Robin Burgener 
2744 S Centexbrook Dr 




Large Case Claims Team 
P.O. dox 419876 
Kansas Oxy, MO 64141 
WATS (8DOJ 303-8717 
Fax (815) 381-6060 
Re: LabCorp Managed Disability Program, Notice of Disability Benefits 
Dear Ms. Burgener: 
This letter is in reply to your request for disability benefits. We have provided the following 
information to your employer: 
Date we received request: April 4> 1997 
Your last day worked: March 21,1997 
Your first day of disability: March 24, 1997 
Return to work date: April 16, 1997 
We have approved your disability through 4/15/97 as long as you remain disabled frora your job. If you 
are able to return to work before this date please contact your employer or our office to avoid any 
overpayment on your claim. Extension of your disability will be based on contact with your attending 
physician, review of medical records and/or other relevant information. 
LabCorp has asked us to inform you that this leave of absence will run concurrently with any leave to 
which you are entitled under the Family Medical Leave Act Please contact your Human Resources 
Department for more specific informaxion about your FMLA entitlement 
If you have any questions, or if you feel you have additional information, please do not hesiiate to contact 
us at the toll-free number listed below. 
Sincerely, 
Karen Kinnett 
Benefit Specialist - Large Case Team 
(800) 909-8717 Ext. 8924 
cc: Yvonne Hendrickson~Supervisor-FAXJ801-269-8811 
Vicki Romero-Human Resources-FAX#801-269-8811 (Org, 42) 
May 9,1997 ffortis 
Fortis Benefits 
Robin BUTgener Insurance Company 
27'44 S Centerbrook Dr PTB^WSJT Team 
West Valley City, UT 84119 Kansas City, MO 64141 
WATS (800) 909-8717 
Fax (816) 881-6060 
LabCorp Managed Disability Program, Notice of Disability Benefits 
Dear Ms. Burgener: 
This letter is in reply to your request for disability benefits. We have provided the following 
information to your employer: 
Date we received request: April 4, 1997 
Your last day worked: March 21,1997 
Your first day of disability: March 24, 1997 
Return to work date: Undetermined 
We have approved your disability through 5/18/97 as long as you remain disabled from your job. If you 
are able to return to work before this date please contact your employer or our office to avoid any 
overpayment on your claim. Extension of your disability will be based on contact with your attending 
physician, review of medical records and/or other relevant information. Medical records will be needed 
for any further certification of benefits. 
LabCorp has asked us to inform you that this leave of absence will run concurrently with any leave to 
which you are entitled under the Family Medical Leave Act. Please contact your Human Resources 
Department for more specific information about your FMLA entitlement. 
If you have any questions, or if you feel you have additional information, please do not hesitate to contact 
us at the toll-free number listed below. 
Sincerely, 
Karen Kannett J 
Benefit Specialist - Large Case Team 
(800) 909-8717 Ext. 8924 
cc: Vicki Romero-Human Resources-FAX#801 -269-8811 (ORG 42) 
Yvonne Hendrickson-Supervisor-FAX#801-269-8811 
FORTIS DISPBILITY Fax:816-881-6C60 Jun 9 '97 17:09 P.01 
June 6.1997 f/ortis 
Forth B&naffts 
Insurance Company 
Robin Burgener Lor?9 Case ctafms Team 
1-57Q r C + P'0' 80X 41B37* 
1J / 5 Lxreen a t Kansas C/ry, MO 64147 
Salt Lake Citv, NV 84105 WATS (soot 305-3777 
Fax (816) 881-6000 
Re: LabCorp Managed Disability Program, Notice of Disability Benefits 
Dear Ms. Burgener: 
This letter is in reply to your request for disability benefits. We have provided the following 
information to your employer: 
Date we received request: April 4,1997 
Your last day worked: March 21,1997 
Your first day of disability: March 24,1997 
Return to work date: Undetermined 
We have approved your disability through 7/13/97 as long as you remain disabled from your job. If you 
are able to return to work before this date please contact your employer or our office to avoid any 
overpayment on your claim. Extension of your disability will be based on contact with your attending 
physician, review of medical records and/or other relevant information. 
LabCorp has asked us to infonn you that this leave of absence will run concurrently with any leave to 
which you are entitled under the Family Medical Leave Act Please contact your Human Resources 
Department for more specific information about your FMLA entitlement 
If you have any questions, or if you feel you have additional information, please do not hesitate to contact 
us at the toll-free number listed below. 
Sincerelv, 
Karen Kinnett 
Benefit Specialist - Large Case Team 
(800) 909-8717 Ext 8924 
cc: Yvonne HendricIcson-Supervisor'FAX#801-269-8811 
Vicki Romero-Human Resources-FAX#801-269-8811 (Org. 42) 
FORTIS DISABILITY Fax:816-881-6060 Jul 21 '9? 14:14 P. 01 
July 18,1997 
Robin Burgener 
1378 Green St 




Large Case Claims Team 
P.O. Box 419744 
Kansas City, MO 64141 
WATS (800) 903-8717 
Fax (816) 881-6060 
Re: LabCorp Managed Disability Program, Notice of Disability Benefits 
Dear Ms. Burgener: 
This letter is in reply to your request for disability benefits. We have provided the following 
information to your employer: 
Date we received request: April 4,1997 
Your last day worked: March 21,1997 
Your first day of disability: March 24,1997 
Return to work date: Undetermined 
We have approved your disability through 8/17/97 as long as you remain disabled from your job. 
If you are able to return to work before this date please contact your employer or our office to 
avoid any overpayment on your claim. Extension of your disability will be based on contact with 
your attending physician, review of medical records and/or other relevant information. If a 
return to work date is listed above and you arc not able to return to work on that date, you 
will need to contact our office and your Human Resources within 3 consecutive working 
days of the return to work date to avoid possible termination. 
LabCorp has asked us to inform you that this leave of absence will run concurrently with any 
leave to which you are entitled under the Family Medical Leave Act Please contact your Human 
Resources Department for more specific information about your FMLA entitlement. 
If you have any questions, or if you feel you have additional information, please do not hesitate 
to contact us at the toll-free number listed below. 
merely, 
Karen Kinnett, Benefit Specialist - Large Case Team 
(800) 909-8717 Ext. 8924 
cc: Yvonne Hendrickson - Supervisor FAX# 801-269-8811 
Vicki Romero - Human Resources FAX# 801-269-8811 (Org. 42 ) 
FORTIS DISABILITY Fax:816-881-6060 Rug 21 *97 12:36 P.01 
August 21,1997 ffortis 
r> *• >^ Fortfs Benefits 
R o b i n BUTgener tnsur*nce Company 
1378 Green St **** Case °*,ms Te9m 
0 T P.O. Box 4 7$876 
Salt Lake City, UT Kansas CITY, MO S4UI 
WATS (800) 309-8717 
Fax (816) 881-6060 
Re: LabCorp Managed Disability Program, Notice of Disability Benefits 
Dear Ms. Burgenen 
This letter is in reply to your request for disability benefits. We have provided the following 
information to your employer: 
Date we received request; April 4,1997 
Your last day worked: March 21,1997 
Your first day of disability: March 24,1997 
Return to work date: Undetermined* 
We have approved your disability through 9/23/97 as long as you remain disabled from your job. If you 
are able to return to work before this date please contact your employer or our office to avoid any 
overpayment on your claim. Extension of your disability will be based on contact with your attending 
physician, review of medical records and/or other relevant information. 
*You will be receiving a Long Term Disability Claim Statement under separate cover from LapCorp in 
Burlington7 N. C You should complete the employee protion of the form and have your physician 
complete the Attending Physician portion. The entire form should then be sent to this office as soon as 
possible to avoid any delays in handling your Long Term Disability claim* If you do not receive this 
form, please contact Kim Beck in the Burlington office at IS00-222-7566 ext 4173. 
LabCorp has asked us to inform you that this leave of absence will run concurrently with any leave to 
which you are entitled under the Family Medical Leave Act. Please contact your Human Resources 
Department for more specific information about your FMLA entitlement. 
If you have any questions, or if you feel you have additional information, please do not hesitate to contact 
us at the toll-free number listed below. 
Sincerely, kmcereiy, / 
Karen Kinnett 
Benefit Specialist - Large Case Team, (800)909-8717 Ext 8924 
cc: Yvonne Hendrickson-Supervisor - FAX#801-269-8 811 
Vicki Romero -Human Resources - FAX2801 -269-8811 (Org. 42 ) 
(forth 
September 23, 1997 / j# v # ' B J 
„ . . „ Fortis Benefits 
Robin B u r g e n e r /nsi/rance Company 
1378 Green St Large Case Team 
Salt L a k e C i t y , U T 84105 PO BOX 419744 
Kansas City, MO 64141 6 744 
Fax (816) 474-2408 
RE: LabCorp Long Term Disability 
Gr#67599 
Dear Ms. Burgener: 
We have reviewed your claim for Long Term Disability benefits. 
Long Term Disability benefits provide coverage for loss of income under the following 
definition: 
During the first 24 months of a period of disability (including the qualifying period), an injury, or sickness 
or pregnancy requires that you be under the regular care and attendance of a doctor, and prevents you from 
performing at least one of the material duties of your regular occupation; 
Based on a review of the medical information received from Dr. Douville, we can find no 
evidence of limitation preventing you from going back to your occupation of a medical 
technician. According to Dr. Douville, you can preform the material duties of a medical 
technician in a day time position. Since you are able to perform the material duties of you 
regular occupation, no benefits would be available. 
Enclosed is Benefits Insurance Group Claim Denial Review Procedure. This represents your 
notification of denial as well as the applicable claim denial review procedure in the event you 




Large Case Team 
cc: Kim Beck, LabCorp 
Jane Wagoner-LabCorp 
Vicki Romero-LabCorp 
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